By: Dr. Yossi Mansharof.
While the IDF renews the war in Gaza, it is worth examining how Hezbollah will behave in such a scenario. Hezbollah in the Nasrallah era is fundamentally different from Hezbollah after the elimination of Nasrallah and the organization’s top command and control echelon. One can observe that that Hezbollah, under the alternative leadership headed by Naim Qassem, is still navigating towards the reorganization of the organization, lacking experience, lacking confidence, and rebuilding personal relationships with Iran. Until now, these relations were managed by senior Hezbollah officials, primarily Nasrallah, Ibrahim Aqil, and Ali Karkhi. Now, the new leadership of Hezbollah and Iran (with an emphasis on the Quds Force) must advance the relationship to allow for advanced cooperation between the parties.
The first strategic decision that Hezbollah’s leadership will now have to make is whether to join the war in Gaza. In fact, in recent weeks, public expressions of the dispute between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah regarding the issue of Hezbollah’s participation in the war have already surfaced. In his meeting on February 23 with the senior Iranian delegation on the sidelines of Nasrallah’s funeral, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun declared that “Lebanon is tired of the wars of others on its soil.” In an interview on March 2 with the Saudi pan-Arab newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, he declared his aspiration to ensure that only the Lebanese government is authorized to decide on the country’s entry into war or peace, thus implicitly opposing Hezbollah’s adventurous policy that drags Lebanon into wars against Israel and holds the Lebanese people hostage to its policies. Aoun’s condemnation, just hours after the firing of five rockets from Lebanon into Israel on March 22, claiming that these were “attempts to drag Lebanon back into a cycle of violence,” also reflects the president’s position.
Join the Gaza War or Settle for Observer Status?
Pressure from the Lebanese state against Hezbollah, urging it not to draw Lebanon into another war with Israel, is already evident. In fact, it seems that Naim Qassem would prefer to focus now on urgent tasks that lie before him: rebuilding Hezbollah’s force, reorganizing the organization in the aftermath of the blow it suffered from Israel, and rehabilitating the war damage suffered by the Shiite community, the social base upon which Hezbollah relies. Therefore, it is possible to assume that Qassem himself will not rush to engage Hezbollah in the war in Gaza. In his speech at Nasrallah’s funeral, Qassem alluded to this, stating, “We will adhere to the resistance, and we will advance patience or action as we see fit.” Also, the restraint and containment that Hezbollah has adopted so far in the face of the serial attacks against it by Israel since the ceasefire, which include Hezbollah fatalities, hint at the course of action that Qassem prefers. Conversely, at Nasrallah’s funeral, he also hinted, albeit vaguely and noncommittally, that he could order Hezbollah to join the war in Gaza, stating, “We are committed to our oath and will continue his path, even if we are all killed.” Furthermore, Hezbollah may also be burdened by the crisis that recently broke out with the new Syria under Julani, which included significant exchanges of fire and is presently contained, although the implications are still unclear.
As for Iran, it can be assessed that it will leave the decision-making to Hezbollah’s leadership, understanding the organization’s distress in light of its political weakness in the new political order in Lebanon after Nasrallah. Alongside this, against the background of an ongoing internal review conducted by Hezbollah to identify the failures in the war and punish those responsible, as reported in the Lebanese media, and as Naim Qassem himself admitted in an interview with Al-Manar channel on March 9, it seems that Tehran will likely understand and accept a decision by Hezbollah to remain uninvolved in the fighting until it has addressed the security and intelligence failures that enabled Israel’s severe strikes against it. Tehran will also recognize the assessment that Hezbollah itself will make, whether its social base can withstand the damage involved in additional months of fighting against Israel. During and after the war, Hezbollah carried out an extensive propaganda effort in its various media channels to glorify the status of those killed in the war, both within its ranks and among its supporters, who were killed in the Israeli attacks against Hezbollah targets. Despite this, it seems that in light of the severe damage caused to its infrastructure, Hezbollah’s social base is not ready for a renewed entry into the war. The financial difficulties Hezbollah is experiencing also weigh on the organization’s motivation to re-enter the fighting. Alongside this, Hezbollah’s weak response on March 18 to the renewal of Israeli attacks in Gaza, which lacked any threat, confirms the assessment that Hezbollah would prefer to stay out of the fighting.
Alongside these considerations, which dictate Hezbollah’s avoidance of entering the war, Israel must consider additional motivations that may push the organization’s leadership to make a different decision. Hezbollah’s leadership is expected to feel pressure from three factors that will urge it to exhaust Israel’s power and assist Hamas: First, in light of the expected joining of the Houthis and the Shiite militias in Iraq to the war, the organization’s leadership may fear for Hezbollah’s status as the leading organization in the axis of resistance. This status is important for Hezbollah to justify the extensive financial aid it currently needs from Iran for its rehabilitation. Secondly, the leadership may feel that it cannot disappoint its Iranian patron, who expects it to exert maximum efforts to assist Hamas, in accordance with its status as the “jewel in the crown” in the Iranian proxy system.
Finally, it can be cautiously assessed that Hezbollah is in a deep shock following the elimination of Nasrallah and the senior command echelon of the organization, and therefore the current leadership’s decisions do not receive wall-to-wall agreement as they did in the days of Nasrallah and his veteran and experienced members of the Jihad Council (Hezbollah’s General Staff). The shock Hezbollah is experiencing was well reflected in the case of Nawaf al-Moussawi, who is responsible for resources and borders in the organization. In an interview with Al-Mayadeen channel, identified with Hezbollah, on March 3, he harshly criticized the security officials in the organization for their inaction, which was reflected in the pager and communications devices attack. In response to his remarks, it was reported that the organization’s leadership is considering taking “severe disciplinary measures” against him, which may include freezing his membership, revoking his powers, and even his final expulsion from the organization. In light of the combination of these pressures, it is therefore possible that the organization’s leadership, especially Qassem, whose skills fall significantly short of Nasrallah’s, will decide to join the fighting after all.
Is Hezbollah Behind the Rocket Launchings into Israel on March 22?
Following the firing of five rockets towards Israel on Saturday, March 22, Hezbollah denied involvement in the incident. Moreover, as reported in the Lebanese media, Hezbollah even informed President Aoun that it was not behind the launchings. If Hezbollah did carry out the launchings, it will not be able to use this method again. However, as a Lebanese security source assessed, Palestinian parties may be behind the launchings. This reinforces the possibility that Hamas or the Palestinian organization, Al-Jama’a Al-Palestiniyya, carried out the launchings in order to drag Hezbollah into opening a front against Israel in order to assist Hamas’ war effort.
Policy Recommendations for Israel: How to Reduce the Risk of Another Front Opening by Hezbollah
Given the developing situation, it seems that the scales are tipping more towards Hezbollah preferring to adopt the status of an observer vis-à-vis the renewal of the war in Gaza, but the possibility of the organization’s leadership ultimately deciding to join the fighting still exists. Therefore, it is better for Israel to take the following actions:
First, to convey a sharp threat to the Lebanese state that Israel will not tolerate Hezbollah’s joining the war and therefore it will have to notify the residents of southern Lebanon, up to the Litani area, to evacuate in order not to endanger their lives. This will burden the Lebanese government, which will have to deal with the suffering of this population, even though it is mostly Shiite. In addition, as Israel aims to concentrate its efforts on the war in Gaza, it must make it clear to the Lebanese government that it will be unable to avoid damaging Lebanese infrastructure to impede Hezbollah’s military actions. This includes Israel threatening to attack bridges and main roads, as well as the electricity infrastructure in Lebanon.
Secondly, Israel must threaten Hezbollah in advance that if it joins, all of its remaining command echelon will be destroyed, along with massive attacks on the rest of its assets and infrastructure. The IDF has demonstrated its intelligence capabilities and extensive target bank, enabling Israel to carry out this threat if war resumes in Lebanon.
Third, Israel must use the Trump administration as an effective lever of pressure against Hezbollah and Lebanon. Both in terms of equipping itself with weapons that will enable the IDF to conduct massive fighting on both fronts, and in the form of exerting pressure on the Lebanese government. Given the Trump administration’s $95 million aid package to the Lebanese army, the United States possesses a substantial point of leverage, which it could use by threatening to halt that aid if Hezbollah participates in the war.
In light of the lessons learned from the October 7th failures, the IDF will need to improve its intelligence alertness concerning Hezbollah to thwart missile attacks or other attacks from the group and maintain a sufficient force deployment on the northern border to prevent a Hezbollah invasion plan.
The author is a researcher of Iran, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy.
This article was previously published in Walla.
