IDF’s Preemptive Strike (August 25) – A Demonstration of Force to Send a Message

By Yaakov Lappin and Tal Beeri

The IDF’s large-scale preemptive strike on Sunday, August 25, carried out shortly before 5:00 AM against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, took Hezbollah by surprise. In our assessment, besides its immediate goal of disrupting Hezbollah’s attack, the strike had another objective: a (limited) demonstration of the IDF’s capabilities to neutralize Hezbollah’s assets and deliver a clear message to Hezbollah: it is not advisable to engage in a full-scale war against Israel, neither now nor in the future.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amikam Norkin, former Air Force commander and currently a senior researcher at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), commenting on the attack, stated that the aircraft quickly targeted rocket launchers and storage facilities of Hezbollah’s UAV unit.

Norkin emphasized that since the time that Israel’s enemies chose rockets and missiles as their main means of attack, the IDF has developed methods to locate and strike rocket launchers as quickly as possible, though he noted that Israel cannot destroy “the last launcher.”

Most of Hezbollah’s attack, planned for that morning as retaliation for Fuad Shukr’s elimination, was thwarted, despite Hezbollah managing to launch over 200 rockets and about 20 UAVs into northern Israel. While the event, when viewed in isolation in terms of scale and the number of launches, was intensive, it does not represent an escalation compared to previous incidents in the ongoing months of conflict.

It seems that the IDF’s preemptive strike, which targeted broad areas in southern Lebanon (near 27 villages south and north of the Litani River), focused mainly on Hezbollah’s military zones, which are spread between the villages, in open areas, within valleys, under the natural camouflage of forests and dense vegetation. These areas contain launchers that are not usually manned and are likely operated remotely or by a small number of personnel on command. Such launchers are spread throughout southern Lebanon and are part of Hezbollah’s large rocket arsenal.

We believe that the nature of these targets explains the absence of Hezbollah casualties in the IDF’s preemptive strike (or, according to some reports, the very small number of casualties).

One notable example of such an area that was attacked is Wadi Zebkin:

According to Dr. Eyal Pinko, former head of the operational division in the Prime Minister’s Office and an expert in military strategy, there was no use of new capabilities in Israel’s preemptive strike at the intelligence or aerial level. He added that “it was just a matter of decision-making to execute such an attack.”

Another demonstration of force, which we believe was intended to send a message, was the publication of a video showing the refueling of an F-35 aircraft over Lebanese airspace. Tal Inbar, a senior researcher at the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, commented on the importance of the images released by the IDF spokesperson showing the F-35 stealth fighter being refueled over Lebanon. Inbar stated that “the F-35 is much more than an advanced fighter jet. It is equipped with the most sophisticated sensors that collect information about its operational environment—essentially, every F-35 is a top-tier intelligence-gathering platform. With communication between the aircraft and the Air Force control center, every ‘routine’ flight of this plane is, in fact, a high-value intelligence-gathering mission.”

Western sources estimated before the strike that for a preemptive action against Iran or Hezbollah to be feasible, real-time intelligence and identification of tangible threats would be necessary. In the case of Iran, however, a preemptive strike against identified real-time threats is significantly more challenging due to the flight time from Israel, estimated at about two and a half to three hours, as well as the required mission planning.

Israel’s intelligence coverage over Iran, a country 80 times larger than Israel, may be extensive but still might miss movements of targets such as mobile missile launchers. The vast size of Iran and its distance from Israel mean that even if a target is identified and about to be struck, it could continue moving, and Israeli fighter jets may have to seek updated target locations during the flight.

In conclusion, in Lebanon, Israel’s options for preemptive actions are much more accessible. The preemptive strike suggests that Israel has the capability to repeat the action in varying scales, depending on the operational and intelligence context, and the message to Hezbollah is clear. The demonstration of force was intended to assist in delivering the message to Hezbollah – DON’T.

In our estimation, Hezbollah was interested in initiating a full-scale war against Israel during 2023, but Hamas’s attack caused this plan to be put on hold (Hezbollah would not play ‘second fiddle’ to Hamas, and additionally, Hezbollah lost its operational surprise momentum). Hezbollah was forced to reconsider and, in our opinion, despite everything, will wait for a new opportunity to try and surprise Israel. In Hezbollah’s view, a full-scale war with Israel would ultimately serve its long-term goal of seizing control of Lebanon, even though it would be harmed in the short term.

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Alma Research

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