During the course of the Israel-Iran war known as “Rising Lion,” which took place from June 13 to June 24, 2025, Hezbollah chose not to engage militarily alongside Iran against Israel. This decision held even as Israel maintained its parallel offensive strategy of “mowing the lawn” — consistently targeting Hezbollah’s infrastructure and operatives within Lebanon.
Why did Hezbollah refrain from joining?
The prevalent (and popular) answer to this question is based on two claims:
The first claim is based on the internal Lebanese aspect – due to the pressure of the social, political, and economic climate within Lebanon, a climate in which Hezbollah is seemingly currently in a less comfortable and less enabling situation in Lebanon.
The second claim is based on the external aspect vis-à-vis Israel – “Hezbollah’s restraint” is attributed by some to a state of deterrence induced by the outcome of its conflict with Israel, which concluded in a ceasefire on November 27, 2024. This perceived deterrence is further reinforced by Israel’s ongoing and consistent offensive operations against the group.
Are these really the reasons for Hezbollah not joining Iran in the war?
The internal aspect indeed exists. However, in our understanding, the claim based on it gives it excessive weight in the context of Hezbollah’s status and decision-making. In our assessment, there is a large gap between the existing presentation of Hezbollah’s supposed weakness and the actual reality.
The civil growth engine of Hezbollah – the “Resistance Society,” Hezbollah’s Shi’ite base, which is a “captive audience” (religiously-ideologically, economically-dependent, and fear-based) continues to be maintained and supported by Hezbollah’s broad civilian infrastructure. This infrastructure is managed by the Executive Council and functions in parallel to the collapsing and non-functioning Lebanese state infrastructure. Admittedly, there are quite a few financial difficulties for the purpose of civilian reconstruction, difficulties that may intensify in light of the war’s outcomes with Iran, but it is still a functioning infrastructure. This is a very significant aspect of Hezbollah’s survivability.
In practice, Hezbollah, if and when, can be effectively influenced only by the climate pressure of the Shi’ite base. Is it currently a significant pressure? The answer is no – mainly due to the aforementioned “captive audience” principle. The general climate pressure in Lebanon (coming from other religions and sects in Lebanon) does not, in our understanding, effectively influence Hezbollah’s decisions, despite there being those who try to describe it as such.
The claim that Hezbollah is deterred creates a dangerous illusion and takes us back to the days before October 7, 2023.
On November 20, 2024, about a week before the ceasefire, Ibrahim Al-Amin – editor-in-chief of the Al-Akhbar newspaper, Hezbollah’s main mouthpiece – wrote that “the current confrontation (Hezbollah’s fighting against Israel that began on October 8, 2023) is just another round in the war against Israel which must be destroyed, and for this purpose, Hezbollah will act to restore its capabilities and re-empower itself…”
This sentence is, in fact, the essence of Hezbollah’s core ideology: there is no peace. There are no compromises. There is one ideology, and it is continuous armed resistance. Hezbollah’s core – armed resistance – is not a means, but an identity. Hezbollah is here to stay. Hezbollah’s ideological commitment to armed resistance and its objective of Israel’s destruction remains unchanged..
The rifle on Hezbollah’s flag – is not a decoration. It is a statement.
The concept of “deterrence” holds no real meaning within the worldview of an ideologically driven, religious extremist organization such as Hezbollah (and similarly, Hamas).
Hezbollah’s decisions regarding any military/terrorist activity and the initiation of war are made based on a religious directive. Any relevant interest (in our case, the interest of reconstruction) is a strengthening parameter for decision-making.
In our assessment, no religious directive was issued for Hezbollah to join the war on Iran’s side against Israel. Indeed, as reported, there were apparently Iranian pressures on Hezbollah to join – at the operational-military level – but the religious directive was slow to come. It did not come from the “Wilayat al-Faqih” (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), i.e., the Supreme Leader in Iran and the current leader of Hezbollah did not issue such a directive.
A strengthening interest for Hezbollah’s non-joining on Iran’s side is the reconstruction interest, mainly in its military aspect. Hezbollah needs time. Hezbollah needs “reconstruction quiet.” Therefore, its interest is not to cause significant escalation with Israel that would severely harm its reconstruction interest. In our assessment, in Hezbollah’s risk management, the current situation of Israeli “mowing the lawn” is a situation that can be tolerated and in which reasonable reconstruction can still be managed.
We do not know why the religious directive did not arrive and whether the possibility of issuing such a directive was considered. But had the religious directive come, Hezbollah would have joined the war on Iran’s side. In such a case, the popular claims about internal Lebanese pressure on Hezbollah and that “Hezbollah is deterred” would have collapsed.
Indeed, Israel damaged Hezbollah’s military capabilities very severely – but did not crush them.
As of this writing, it seems that despite the difficulties and challenges facing Hezbollah (which may even intensify following the war’s results with Iran), Hezbollah’s processes of reconstruction and military force build-up are in full swing. It may even be that the economic resources that still exist are primarily directed to this purpose – even at the expense of civilian reconstruction concerning the Shi’ite base, which is a “captive audience” in any case.
Hezbollah’s various units are actively reconstructing and modifying their operational plans, recalibrating their strategic approach, restoring military capabilities, and laying the groundwork for potential terrorist operations against Israel—both from within Lebanese territory and abroad. In our assessment, Hezbollah’s relevant units can currently, at any given moment, carry out activity against Israel.
Given the order (the religious directive), Hezbollah could, in our assessment, have joined the war on Iran’s side – both in terms of arsenal redundancy and in terms of operational-military capability.
