On October 21, 2024, the Israeli Air Force conducted targeted strikes against dozens of branches of the Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank, aiming to disrupting Hezbollah’s financial network. These strikes were part of a broader effort to weaken Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its hold over the Lebanese population.
Despite the above air strike campaign, the centrality of the bank within Hezbollah’s operations today is clear: the bank is an enabler of Hezbollah’s renewed rehabilitation and re-empowerment after the war.
The Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank is the financial backbone for funding Hezbollah’s activity and serves as a critical financial conduit for maintaining the “Hezbollah state,” which is funded by Iran, undermining Lebanon’s official institutions, and deepens the country’s economic crisis.
The Lebanese government has yet to act on dismantling the bank nearly seven months after the strikes on Al-Qard al-Hassan branches, despite the support of the United States for such an action.
In practice, the reality is the opposite: Hezbollah has acted to physically rehabilitate the branches that were attacked and is in the process of reopening them.
A prominent example is the central branch in the Zqaq al-Blat neighborhood of Beirut – an area of symbolic and public importance, especially among the Shiite community in the city.
After months of intensive rehabilitation work, videos were circulated documenting the renovation of the entire building by Hezbollah. The branch was reopened on May 19, 2025.
In the picture: a Hezbollah supporter displays stages of the renovation of the attacked branch with the caption, “This institution will not collapse, do whatever you want.” See also the video of the branch renovation and the announcement of its reopening date.
Beyond the operational need, the rehabilitation of Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank branches and their reopening by Hezbollah are being used as a significant cognitive tool towards the Shiite base: illustrating resilience, determination, and the ability to recover quickly despite the damage inflicted by the Israeli attacks. A symbol of the return to normalcy, economic independence, and a sense of functional security – messages aimed directly at the base (see appendix for examples of Hezbollah’s campaign on social media in this context).
The reopening of the central branch in Zqaq al-Blat was strategically timed to support Hezbollah’s political campaign during the municipal elections. Hezbollah viewed these elections as a significant political power test to maintain its strength.
The Lebanese government must not be allowed to grant refuge to Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank or similar institutions under the claim that they serve civilian needs. It appears that, as of this writing, the State of Lebanon cannot (and perhaps also does not want to) deal with this issue.
Only recently it was published that, due to heavy American pressure, the State of Lebanon (cautiously, it must be said) conveyed messages to Hezbollah regarding the consideration of closing Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank. However, Hezbollah’s response and warning that such an action could lead to an “explosion” clarified to the Lebanese government, at this stage, the limits of its ability and willingness…
There must be no tolerance for the activity of Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank. Its complete dismantling requires sustained pressure. As it currently stands, the heavy American pressure on the Lebanese government is not enough.
There must be sustained pressure added from Israel, which should be demonstrated in repeated and varied strikes on the bank’s branches as part of the effort to prevent Hezbollah’s rehabilitation, similar to the repeated strikes carried out against operatives, sites, and activities related to Hezbollah’s military rehabilitation.
Hezbollah is determined to rehabilitate and re-empower itself both civilly and militarily. It has Iranian backing for this. Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank is a central enabling anchor in this rehabilitation.
A focused and ongoing Israeli military campaign against the bank’s branches could prompt Lebanon to act, encouraging them to shut down Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank and similar entities.
Appendix – The Social Media Campaign
As part of Hezbollah’s campaign to maintain internal support in general and to amplify the reopening of Al-Qard al-Hassan Bank branches in particular, emotional and populist messages were posted on social media glorifying Hezbollah’s contribution – economically, medically, and security-wise – while comparing it to the “failing” Lebanese entities.
Below are examples of prominent posts that gained wide exposure on social media:
“On the day the economic situation weighed on us — the doors of Al-Sajjad (Hezbollah’s retail chain) opened for us.
On the day the pharmacies closed their doors — Al-Murtada’s pharmacies opened for us.
On the day the banks stole our money — Al-Qard al-Hassan opened for us.
On the day danger threatened us — he gave his blood and soul to protect us.
And then someone came, shamelessly and with no loyalty, and says: ‘What did they give us, why should I give them my vote?!”
“I deposited gold in Al-Qard al-Hassan and took a loan, a year and a half passed without paying a single installment — they didn’t call me, and I didn’t hear a word from them… This doesn’t sit well with the ungrateful — they want the thieving banks, the ones that robbed the people and their money.” #The_Stupid_Nation
“Whoever loves Lebanon and its industries, here is a gold ounce of Sayyid Hassan, available at Al-Qard al-Hassan branches.”
