After the war, the Iranians made a strategic decision to continue supporting Hezbollah and to invest renewed resources in its strengthening and reconstruction efforts. Iranian “advisors” from the Revolutionary Guards arrived in Lebanon and are currently working closely with Hezbollah operatives as part of the organization’s renewed force buildup. Mainly in military aspects, but also in civilian aspects.
The Iranians and Hezbollah face many challenges and Difficulties in the process of the force buildup and reconstruction. One of the main challenges is the collapse of the Iranian corridor that passed through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. This was essentially an Iranian strategic infrastructure whose purpose was to establish the Shiite axis in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in military, economic, social, religious, and ideological terms. This infrastructure was cut off and collapsed after the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024.
In order to continue supporting Hezbollah, with an emphasis on financial and military support, the Iranians had to recalculate their route (literally and figuratively). In cooperation with Hezbollah, they evidently began devising alternative routes for a new corridor to facilitate the transfer of money and weapons. Some of the routes have already been used in the past, and the Iranians have prior knowledge and experience. This is in addition to the extensive knowledge and experience gained from operating the original Iranian corridor, spanning over 1800 kilometers, through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. It can be assessed that several options are currently available to the Iranians:
The Maritime Route (Direct and/or Combined):
The Direct Maritime Route. The direct maritime route departs from Iran, passes through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, enters the Mediterranean Sea, and from there directly to Lebanon.
The Combined Maritime Route (Maritime – Land – Maritime). The combined maritime route includes a maritime route from Iran to Sudan. From Sudan, overland (Libya/Egypt) to the Mediterranean coast. From the Mediterranean coast (Libya/Egypt), the route continues through the Mediterranean Sea to Lebanon.
Iran is taking advantage of the chaos in Sudan to increase its involvement and influence in the country. In our assessment, the Iranian interest in Sudan has intensified in light of the blockage of the land/air/sea corridor through Syria and the severe strategic damage to Iranian activity and influence in Syria as a result.
It appears that Iran is interested in reviving the Sudanese option as a potential alternative corridor, this time to Lebanon, similar to its past use (peak activity about 15 years ago) of the geographical area of Sudan as a significant area for smuggling weapons to the Gaza Strip. To this end, after passing through Sudan, Iran can use two geographical areas of two countries: with high probability – Libya, and with lower probability – Egypt.
The main smuggling route for transferring weapons to the Gaza Strip in the past was from Iran, through Sudan, from there to Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, and from there through the Egyptian Rafah (Philadelphi Corridor) to the Gaza Strip (Gaza Rafah), both through tunnels and through the land crossings. In this way, the Iranians smuggled hundreds of rockets, hundreds of mortar shells, dozens of anti-tank missiles, and tons of explosives into the Gaza Strip.
We do not know today if the “Egyptian option” overland towards the Mediterranean Sea and from there by ship to Lebanon is possible and relevant. However, it should be remembered that the length of the border between Egypt and Sudan is over 1200 kilometers, most of which is not monitored. In addition, most of the Egyptian territory is a barren desert that can be traversed with the help of local criminal smuggling infrastructures towards the Mediterranean coast loading weapons onto a ship.
(Note – In this context, it cannot be ruled out that history will repeat itself, i.e., a future Iranian attempt to renew weapons smuggling to Hamas or other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, provided that there is no absolute Israeli control in the above and underground course of the Philadelphi Corridor).
The Libyan geographical space may be a more convenient space for the Iranian smuggling corridor activity, and it is possible that the Iranians will mark it as a preferred option over the “Egyptian option.” The common border between Sudan and Libya, Which is about 450 kilometers long, is also mostly unmonitored. Similar to Egypt, most of the traffic area in Libya, from the border with Sudan towards the Mediterranean Sea, is a barren and unmonitored area.
General Khalifa Haftar controls eastern and central Libya, a potential area for the Iranian smuggling route. If and when the Iranians implement smuggling routes through Libya, in light of the map of control over the country’s territory, they will likely be in an area controlled by the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, who also control part of the border area with Sudan.
For example, the Iranians can travel from the Sudan-Libya border to the Al Jawf – Al Kufrah area in southeastern Libya. From there, travel directly towards the Ajdabiya area, near the Libyan coast, southwest of Benghazi.
Haftar is also supported by the Russians (who are supported by Iran with Iranian weapons in the war against Ukraine). It is difficult not to notice a possible combination of interests…
Currently, Libya today is a divided country, exhibits considerably less stability than Egypt in numerous areas: political, security, economic, and social. Instability is an ideal situation for the Iranians to establish a foothold. It will be more convenient for the Iranians to operate on Libyan soil than on Egyptian soil. This convenience is particularly relevant in a situation if their activity is exposed. In risk management, it is preferable for the Iranians to be exposed in Libya than in Egypt. Evidently, their damage from exposure will be greater from the Egyptians than from the Libyans.
In addition, there is another Iranian interest. A foothold in the region controlled by Khalifa Haftar serves as a counterweight to two countries that Iran does not like to say the least. The first is the United Arab Emirates, which also supports Haftar. There is historical hostility between it and Iran. The second country is Turkey, which supports Haftar’s opponents. Because of Turkey, Iran has lost its strategic hold on Syria, and here you have an Iranian closure… And this is before we even mention the US, which also has interests and apparently ties to Haftar (who is also an American citizen…).
The maritime smuggling route can end in two ways. The first, a direct end at one of the seaports of Lebanon, with an emphasis on the main port in Beirut (regarding Hezbollah’s foothold and influence in the ports, see below). The second, the smuggling vessel will not arrive directly in Lebanon but will stop at an agreed point in the economic or territorial waters of Lebanon. A Hezbollah vessel, departing from Lebanon, will join it in the open sea for the transfer of the smuggled contents in a “back-to-back” method. Alternatively, there is a possibility that the smuggled contents will be lowered into the sea using buoys, the vessel that transported it will leave, and then the Hezbollah vessel will arrive and collect the contents.
Regarding this, see our article from November 2024 on the arrest (on October 31, 2024) of Hezbollah operative Imad Amhaz and the connection to Hezbollah’s maritime infrastructure operating under civilian cover.
In our article on Amhaz, we assessed with high probability that Hezbollah (with an emphasis on Unit 4400 – the unit responsible for transporting and smuggling money and weapons into Lebanon – in cooperation with the Naval Unit and the relevant Revolutionary Guards units – see details below) has operated in recent years to form a maritime infrastructure whose purpose is to operate a ship or ships under civilian cover, inter alia, for the purpose of carrying out smuggling operations. It is possible that Amhaz was supposed to be a key figure in this infrastructure, among other things, in operating such a ship for Hezbollah or as an official on a civilian ship that would serve as a proxy for Hezbollah to carry out smuggling.
The Air Route:
The air route is currently used mainly for smuggling cash intended for Hezbollah. As of this writing, there are no direct commercial flights between Iran and Lebanon, and the smuggling is carried out on two main commercial connecting routes: The first route is from Iran to Iraq and from Iraq to Lebanon. The second route is from Iran to Turkey and from Turkey to Lebanon.
The smuggling is carried out by passengers, equipped by the Quds Force with suitcases of money, appearing like any passenger’s regular luggage on a commercial flight.
The Maritime and Air Entry Points to Lebanon:
Lebanon has seven main civilian seaports (and in addition, a number of small marinas) and one main international civilian airport. The Port of Beirut is the largest seaport in Lebanon, and in addition, there are ports (from north to south) in the city of Tripoli, Jounieh, Sidon, Aadloun, Tyre, and Naqoura. The main airport is the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut.
For many years, Hezbollah has been developing and cultivating its control and influence over what transpires in the land, air, and sea border crossings in Lebanon, with an emphasis on the seaport in Beirut and the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut. To this end, Hezbollah maintains closed complexes for its activities within the Port of Beirut and within the airport (see, for example, “Hangar 12” in the seaport of Beirut before the explosion in August 2020, or buildings and hangars rented for Hezbollah within the airport). Of course, entry to these complexes is prohibited, except for the relevant Hezbollah operatives.
Moreover, with high probability, Hezbollah employs collaborators from among the professional civilian staff in these ports and, in addition, employs collaborators within the two main state organizations that are responsible for the proper functioning of the ports and their supervision: the General Directorate of General Security (GSGD) and the Customs Authority.
The relevant Hezbollah units, such as the Security Unit and Unit 4400, each operate their collaborators separately in these places.
The responsibility for coordination and liaison with senior officials in the formal security and supervisory bodies of the Lebanese state, including the General Security Organization and the Customs Authority, lies with Hezbollah’s Coordination and Liaison Unit, headed by Wafiq Safa, whose status has greatly strengthened as a result of the leadership vacuum created in Hezbollah after the war.
The General Security Organization, which is in effect the dominant non-military security organization in Lebanon, has only recently (March 13, 2025) appointed a new director, Hassan Shqeir, who is a Shiite identified with the Shiite Amal movement, an ally of Hezbollah. In an article we published in March 2025 about the appointments in the Lebanese security organizations, we asked two central questions:
What will be the extent of cooperation between the Shiite duo: Hassan Shqeir and Wafiq Safa? And how will Shqeir’s appointment affect Hezbollah’s freedom of action and movement in the ports of Lebanon, considering the General Security Organization’s responsibility for airport and seaport security?
In his position, Wafiq Safa is in contact with the Director of Customs of the seaport in Beirut, Mahmoud Massoud (a Sunni Muslim). Massoud has been accused over the years, several times, of corruption and managing smuggling networks in the port and was even arrested for investigation in August 2020 as a result. Currently, Massoud still serves in his position.
Wafiq Safa is also in contact with the Director of Customs of the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut, Samer Ibrahim Dia (a Shiite Muslim). Dia has been accused several times of heading a network that operates in favor of Hezbollah and allows Hezbollah deep control of the airport assisting in the transfer of cargo for the organization without legal supervision.
It should be noted that only recently (March 13, 2025) a new CEO was appointed to Rafic Hariri Airport. His name is Amin Jaber – a Shiite Muslim. Apparently, he is also on good terms with Wafiq Safa.
According to a report in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper from April 4, the Lebanese authorities revoked the security clearances of more than 30 employees at Rafic Hariri Airport. According to the report, these employees were Hezbollah collaborators within the airport who worked in the loading and unloading of aircraft cargo, inspecting luggage, and in the lost and found department. We do not know at this stage how to verify this report. If this report is accurate, then perhaps this is the beginning of a positive trend, although Hezbollah will always be able to recruit new collaborators in the right places.
The Syrian (Land) Route:
As of this writing, it appears that in light of the fall of the Assad regime, most of the routes of the original Iranian corridor through Syria have been blocked. However, while the air and sea routes have been completely blocked, it appears that some of the land routes of the original corridor, mainly in the area adjacent to the Lebanon-Syria border (in Lebanon – the Bekaa area, northeastern Lebanon, in Syria – west and southwest of the city of Homs), are not blocked and smuggling activity (and not only weapons) continues.
Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 continues its attempts to transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon. These are weapons that Hezbollah acquires through local Syrian procurement collaborators, from the arsenal of weapons remaining from the former Syrian army. Apparently, this also includes weapons that were transferred to Syria before the fall of the Assad regime and were intended for Hezbollah but have not yet been transferred to Lebanon and are in effect “stuck” on Syrian soil in storage sites in the Homs area.
The Iranians and Hezbollah have not abandoned their intentions to try to re-establish a foothold on Syrian soil. The motivation for this exists. In our assessment, this could be expressed in the near future, inter alia, by creating new collaborations with local forces, based on various interests and money, to reactivate the land routes of the original corridor, which crossed Syria from east – the Iraqi border, to west – the Lebanese border (see the dashed routes in the attached map of the original land corridor).
The Iranian Units Involved in the Smuggling Operation:
Unit 190. The unit within the Quds Force tasked with worldwide weapons and personnel smuggling operations. The unit’s personnel apparently also operate within Iran’s oil smuggling network. The weapons transferred by the unit include a wide range, from light weapons, machine guns, and explosives to UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air defense systems.
By virtue of its role, the unit works closely with Brigade 8000 in the Quds Force and with Unit 4400 in Hezbollah. The information currently available indicates that its commander is Behnam Shahriari, also known as Hamid Reza and Seyed Ali Akbar. Shahriari is subject to Western sanctions.
In recent years, the unit has worked to transfer weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, terrorist organizations in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, the Polisario organization in the Western Sahara, organizations and militias in Sudan and the Horn of Africa, various forces in Asia, and more.
The unit operates with various means designed to conceal the smuggled weapons as well as the association to Iran. These include, among others, the use of shell companies, civilian infrastructures and companies, the use of a third party, false registrations, and more. The smuggling routes are diverse and take place by air, sea, and land.
Past publications indicate that the unit makes frequent use of civilian merchant ships and commercial flights of Iranian companies. In some cases, weapons are smuggled inside shipments of innocent goods and products or those classified as medical equipment or humanitarian aid. Another course of action taken by the unit’s personnel is the use of a third country to obscure the connection to Iran.
Over the years, Israel has thwarted a number of Iranian smuggling attempts by ships and exposed them to the media. Among other things, the capture of the ships, Francop in 2009, Victoria in 2011, and Klos-C in 2014.
In addition to transferring weapons, the unit also operates to transfer combatants between the various arenas of conflict. In this context, there are known reports from the past that individuals from various militias are transferred to Syria under the guise of Shiite pilgrims visiting various sites in Syria. Similarly, militia personnel are transferred between countries under the guise of students.
Unit 700. Similar to Unit 190, Unit 700 is also involved in the transfer of weapons and logistical equipment for the Quds Force and the organizations operating with Iranian support. The unit works in cooperation with Unit 190 of the Quds Force and with Unit 4400 of Hezbollah and is considered to have connections with senior government officials in Iraq and Lebanon, and more. Various publications indicate that its commander is Gha’al Parseh.
In the past, several sources claimed that the unit took advantage of the earthquake that struck northern Syria in 2023 to smuggle weapons, equipment, and personnel into Syria and Lebanon under the guise of humanitarian aid.
