Shortly after its establishment in 1979, the Iranian regime set for itself the goal of exporting the Islamic revolution, taking over the Middle East, and destroying the State of Israel for reasons that stem from religious Shi’ite – jihadist – ideology.
Iran’s patterns of action have always preferred to strive to realize these goals through building proxies, which were equipped with high quality capabilities produced by Iranian weapons industries, enjoyed massive Iranian budgets, and received training and battle doctrines.
For decades, Iran built and nurtured terrorist armies around Israel, with an emphasis on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, tried to replicate the achievement in Syria, and grew similar models in Iraq and Yemen, with local adaptations.
The idea was to build a multi-front capability to flood Israel’s skies with aerial threats and the ability to conquer Israeli territory by proxy forces under Iranian orchestration for the purpose of mass murder and kidnappings, thereby leading, through a series of powerful attacks, to the collapse of the State of Israel.
Meanwhile, Iran established more components in its offensive strategy: an advanced missile and UAV program, and a nuclear program. These were intended to deploy a protective umbrella over its proxies and over Iran itself, and to establish deterrence against Israel, the U.S., and rival Sunni Arab states – with emphasis on Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
According to its plan, Iran could continue to conduct its attacks without being directly exposed to Israeli fire, thereby enjoying a sphere of immunity. The U.S. and Sunni Arab states opposing Iran’s radical vision were also a ‘target audience’ for Iranian deterrence over the years.
Iran’s plans have been severely disrupted from its perspective in recent months. Iran finds itself repeatedly clashing directly militarily with Israel, in complete contradiction to the foundations of its strategy, while fundamental components of its long-term strategy have been dramatically weakened.
One can mark the exchanges of blows over a geographical range of between 1,600 to 2,000 kilometers between Iran and Israel since April 2024 as the beginning of the first direct war between Israel and Iran, even if this war is characterized by brief bursts of fighting so far (but which will be crucial for the continuation of the campaign).
These exchanges of blows mark a new stage in Israel’s campaign to defend itself against Iran’s plan to harm Israel, with Israeli strikes in Iran on April 19 (according to foreign reports) and even more so on October 26 demonstrating the technological and intelligence capabilities of the Israeli Air Force and the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate against the Iranian threat – capabilities that have been activated in a direct and unprecedented manner.
The Israeli strikes in Iran (October 26) demonstrated the Israeli Air Force’s ability to operate in distant enemy territory and hit critical targets. The operation included the use of advanced fighter jets and refueling aircraft, which flew about 1,600 kilometers from Israeli territory to hit targets in Iran. The strikes proved Israel’s ability to achieve near-total air superiority in Iranian skies.
The strikes were characterized by restraint in target selection, focusing on military installations and missile production plants, and did not hit nuclear facilities or oil installations. This, according to reports, resulted from American pressures to avoid direct escalation with Iran, especially ahead of the elections in the United States.
The direct conflict between Israel and Iran placed Israel in a unique position in the regional struggle, as Israel demonstrates its military capabilities against Iran in the eyes of the entire Middle East, which is divided between the Iranian axis and the opposing Sunni-Arab bloc.
While most Iranian strikes were intercepted by air defense systems, almost all the munitions that Israel fired at targets in Iran accurately hit their targets.
The recent Israeli strikes may be preparation for a broader operation in the future, to hit more sensitive or strategic installations in Iran, especially in light of Iran’s recent threats to respond and attack Israel for a third time.
Two Out of the Three main Components in Iran’s Strategy Were Hit
Seen from a broader view, and if we analyze the situation according to events, two out of the three main components of Iran’s strategy against Israel – the proxy program and the missile program – have suffered severe blows, while the third remains intact for now.
The proxy forces and the ring of fire that Iran built around Israel suffered a series of blows that took Hamas off the board as a significant regional player and significantly weakened Hezbollah’s fire and ground invasion capabilities, although Hezbollah retained the ability to conduct a low-intensity war of attrition, far below the original Iranian vision.
This means that Iran currently lacks the ability to activate its proxies to rain massive fire on Israeli cities or invade its territory; it cannot threaten such steps to deter Israel (as it did in the past), and it is forced to break its own strategic principles by confronting Israel directly alone.
The recent strikes succeeded in significantly weakening Iran’s air defense systems (the destruction of Iran’s strategic long-range air defense systems, which also included Russian-made S-300 batteries) and Iran’s missile capabilities (hitting critical components for ballistic missile production so that Iran effectively lost its ability to produce new missiles in the foreseeable future).
According to Dr. Eyal Pinko, a former intelligence officer and naval officer from the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, who participated in a webinar organized by the Jerusalem Press Club on October 27, Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s air defense systems and missile solid fuel factories mark a very significant strategic achievement. According to reports, the strike destroyed four Russian-made S-300 systems, a significant strategic achievement that allows the Israeli Air Force to carry out repeated strikes if needed. Russia will not rush to supply more such systems to Iran while it is still at the height of its war against Ukraine, Pinko assessed.
Iran also has the ability to produce a local version of the S-300 system, called Bavar 373, but in light of the ineffectiveness of both systems against Israeli Air Force aircraft, Iran’s motivation to equip itself with these systems again will likely be replaced by a hurried attempt to develop new air defense capabilities.
The Israeli strikes hit several critical targets, including, according to several reports, installations in Parchin and Khojir, where, according to reports, missile engine and solid fuel production plants were destroyed. According to various reports, these plants have a decisive impact on Iran’s ballistic missile industry, with the assessment being that it will take Iran about a year or more to restore the capabilities that were damaged.
According to another report, a site related to oil storage was also hit in the strike, which seems like a heavy hint of things to come.
If indeed the ability to produce and fuel missiles was severely damaged, this means that Iran is ‘stuck’ for now with its existing missile arsenal, and its defense industry will not be able to quickly replenish stocks (not to mention exporting them to its Russian ally).
Pinko estimated, citing assessments by Western research centers, that Iran had nearly 1,000 missiles before it began directly attacking Israel and that so far it has fired about 400 missiles at Israel.
In addition, damage to Iran’s air defense systems leaves Iranian airspace almost completely exposed to further strikes, and Iran is forced to contend with an inability to defend its skies, until and if China and Iran reach an agreement regarding re-supplying its air defense capabilities, according to Pinko.
Moreover, Pinko argued, Iran’s attempt to maintain old air defense systems like the American ‘Hawk’ system also ended in failure, and the loss of the S-300 systems leaves Tehran, the capital – an area that was a focus of dense air defense – completely exposed.
While the recent Israeli strikes focused on damaging the missile program and air defense systems, Iran’s nuclear program remained outside the targets of the strike and remained intact and advancing.
It appears that diplomatic considerations by the Israeli cabinet, and mainly the desire to avoid a crisis with the U.S., which explicitly fears being dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran during the election period, shaped the dimensions of the Israeli strike.
The Nuclear Program—The Component Not Yet Hit
Nevertheless, the nuclear threat continues to disturb Israel, with assessments, according to public information, indicating that Iran may be about two to three weeks away from enriching uranium to a military level of 90% in quantities required to build three atomic bombs.
According to Sima Shine, head of the Iran and the Shiite Axis research program at the Institute for National Security Studies and former Deputy Director General at the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, Iran is between 6 to 18 months away from building a warhead or first atomic bomb. What stands between Tehran and nuclear capability at this stage is a directive from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian Supreme National Security Council under his leadership.
Iran has intentions to break out to nuclear weapons in an unknown time frame, and it is getting closer to this capability consistently and systematically, without any significant response from the international community and the U.S. Already now, Iran is considered a nuclear threshold state, a status it hoped would grant it immunity through deterrence, but this hope was dashed by the Israeli strike on October 26.
At the same time, the ties between Iran and the global powers Russia and China constitute a significant part of Israel’s strategic challenge. Russia, which owes a great debt to Iran in exchange for a large supply of firepower against Ukraine and the construction of a UAV and missile production plant on Russian soil, may help Iran advance its nuclear program through knowledge and technology sharing. The ballistic and cruise missiles that Iran has already developed can serve as platforms for launching nuclear warheads.
Over the years, Iran has succeeded in establishing strategic partnerships with Russia, which used Iran as a source for supplying firepower like UAVs and missiles for its operations in Ukraine, and with China, which continued to provide Iran with economic backing through extensive oil purchases and diplomatic backing in the UN Security Council (along with Russia). The three countries cooperate to undermine the U.S.-led world order and create a multipolar global system that would allow them to operate more freely in the international arena. A prominent expression of this cooperation is circumventing sanctions of any member in this triangular club with the help of the other members.
On October 27, in a webinar organized by JINSA, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former Israeli National Security Advisor, emphasized that “Iran stands alone in direct confrontation with Israel. Everything they planned to happen did not happen; everything they did not want to happen is happening.”
Therefore, he added, Iran is at a critical stage where it will have to decide on a new strategy in light of the problems the regime faces.
The damage that Iran caused in the two waves of attacks against Israel, in April and October, is minimal, according to Amidror, and the Iranians understood that Israeli air defense systems stand against Iranian missiles.
In contrast, Israel proved that it can accurately hit any target it chooses in Iran, and there is nothing the Iranian regime can do to stop it.
Now, the Iranian regime will have to decide how to proceed after exposing the regime’s inability to defend itself, Amidror argued.
If Iran launches a third direct attack against Israel, Israel will have the required legitimacy to strike critical energy facilities vital to Iran’s economy, at a time when the Iranian economy is already facing severe challenges. Iran may forgo responding to the Israeli attack and recognize the new regional balance of power.
Former Air Force Commander, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amikam Norkin, said in the same webinar that the capabilities Israel demonstrated on October 26 were built over the past 15 years. The same Air Force that operates against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, against the Iranian-Hezbollah axis in Syria, and against the Houthis in Yemen, also operated against Iran.
Currently, he added, after the destruction of the S-300 air defense batteries, Iran no longer has a strategic self-defense capability, after the advanced Russian system did not stand up against the Israeli capability.
Norkin emphasized that the Air Force operated in more than three different areas in Iran, not just in western Iran in the area closest to Israel, which contributed to Israel’s power projection.
Iran’s ability to produce ballistic missiles was significantly damaged, according to Norkin. Additional targets that were hit in the strike included, according to reports, the Parchin site. Nowadays, the site is associated with experiments in rocket engines and mixing solid fuel, according to several reports.
Striking the site, along with other buildings related to the rocket production and solid fuel program in Khojir, significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities in this area. These facilities constitute part of Iran’s strategic ability to produce and maintain a ballistic missile arsenal with a range of about 1,700 km and above, allowing Iran to maintain a continuous threat range against Israel and its allies.
Beyond damaging missile capabilities, the strike on October 26 places Israel in an active position against Iran. It clarifies that any direct attack by Iran will be met with a comprehensive response action. Denying Iran the sanctuary it built over decades constitutes a significant blow to Tehran. Iran is now forced to reconsider its deployment and understand that its key installations are vulnerable, which will require it to invest many resources in defense and rehabilitation.
According to Norkin, the message from Israel to Iran is that it is not worthwhile to push Israel to the next stage. Israel, for its part, is not interested in entering a “tennis match” with Iran, i.e., exchanges of blows, he said. Avoiding this situation will allow Israel to continue to prioritize the war effort against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Norkin’s view.
The choice of aerial routes for the Israeli strike in Iran embodies hints regarding the new strategic situation created in the region, according to Norkin. In light of requests from Sunni Arab states for Israel not to fly through their airspace on the way to Iran, to avoid Iranian missiles and ‘punishment’ from Tehran, according to Norkin, the Air Force apparently chose to fly through enemy states and without being able to be detected by radars.
The choice of routes required “opening paths” for the planes, referring to strikes on radar stations in Syria and Iraq, to allow the continuation of the strike to progress without threats along the way.
According to Major General (res.) Yaakov Ayish, former Israeli military attaché to the U.S. and Canada, the Israeli strike is more than a response to the previous Iranian missile attack.
The goals behind the Israeli move included: restoring Israeli deterrence against Iran, exposing Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s economy to future Israeli attacks, and exposing Iran’s weakness, thereby further cracking the Iranian ring of fire around Israel, along with the enormous damage caused to Hamas and Hezbollah.
All these have deeply undermined Iran’s status as the main instigator of terrorism in the Middle East, said Ayish.
One cannot ignore the American pressure exerted on Israel, said Ayish, along with the assistance that came in the form of the arrival of THAAD systems to Israel to support its air defense capabilities.
Summary and Outlook for the Future
Looking ahead, a central question arising from the attack is whether Israel will accept the equation calling for it to accumulate “legitimacy” before further strikes in Iran. That is, will Israel wait for another trigger to strike Iran’s nuclear program and thereby accept the status quo of Iran as a nuclear threshold state today?
In such a situation, only a move towards nuclear breakout by Tehran or another missile attack on Israel could serve as a basis for another Israeli strike.
However, it can be argued that the advanced state of Iran’s nuclear program today already constitutes a basis in itself for another strike, this time perhaps on major nuclear sites, a strike that significantly relies on the previous destruction of Iran’s air capabilities in the October 26 strike.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinted that the nuclear program would be a target in any further war event with Iran when he stated on October 28: “I have not given up on the nuclear program; it is at the top of our priorities. We continue to act to remove the Iranian threat. Israel is perceived today as the powerful country in the region. These are fateful days of historical turning point.”
Significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program, even if it leads to further missile fire from Iran, would constitute a critical complementary move to damaging two other components in Iran’s strategy to destroy Israel – the proxies and the missile program.
It can also be speculated that, similar to the unprecedented strikes on Hezbollah by the Israeli Air Force in September, Iran’s firing capability will be greatly shaped by the extent of damage to other capabilities of Iran.
In any case, the sense of Israeli abilities and confidence by Israeli decision is significantly rising, after the cumulative damage to two out of the three components of the Iranian effort to lead to the collapse of the State of Israel. These may be fateful days characterized by a turning of the tide to Iran’s detriment.
However, the Iranians are known for their strategic patience and ability to learn lessons and improve, and one should not assume that the blows Iran has suffered are decisive.
Without an Israeli commitment to continue preventing Iran’s proxies from building their strength on Israel’s borders, to prevent Iran from renewing its missile production, and to prevent it from advancing towards nuclear breakout, Tehran could, step by step, recover from the blows it has suffered and rebuild its strategy.
In light of this, it is critical that Israel keeps its ‘finger on the trigger’ and that it knows how to preserve and even deepen its historic achievements against the Iranian axis, while increasing its value in the eyes of the Sunni-Arab bloc, as it continues to establish its status as a regional power capable of dealing with Iran and its various arms that have been carefully built over decades.
One Response
Interesting summary. It’s clear that destroying Iran’s incipient nuclear weapons capability is a strategic sine qua non, and should be prosecuted as quickly as possible.
Rather than focus all efforts on defeating the various Iranian proxies, Israel should consider eliminating Iran’s ability to foster these proxies. Israel and the US should focus on reducing to zero the Iranian funds and weapons support of the proxies. These proxies don’t exist in a vacuum; if their power falters, forces surrounding them may sense opportunity. It’s unlikely that the countries hosting these proxies desire their presence. These countries may rise against the Iranian proxies if victory appears possible. If the Iranian regime is removed, at the worst it may be necessary to wipe up these proxies; likley, though, without Iranian dollars and support, they will dry up of themselves.
Israel should target Khamenei and his mullahs, as well as the revolutionary guard. Successful economic sanctions will likely decay the IRG significantly; they likely muster to the dollar. Killing Khamenei will be a propaganda victory; killing his henchmen will substantially erode the fundamentalist grip on Iran. It seems likely that the people of Iran will rise against the repressive regime. What emerges though is not readily foreseen.