By: Boaz Shapira.
In recent weeks, there has been a significant increase in the number of Houthi attacks against Israel using ballistic missiles and UAVs. December 2024 was the month with the highest number of attacks since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war.
The rise in Houthi attacks is particularly notable given the weakening of other Shiite Axis organizations, as a result of Israel’s actions against them and the collapse of the Assad regime. The capabilities of Hamas, PIJ, and Hezbollah to attack Israel have significantly decreased due to the war with Israel, and to this we can add the cessation of attacks by Shiite militias in Iraq against Israel since the end of November 2024.
Iranian support of the Houthis began in the early 1990s and expanded over the years. During the civil war in Yemen, Iranian support increased further and was one of the factors that enabled the Houthis to take control of large parts of the north of the country in 2014, including the capital Sanaa. From 2014 onwards, Iran increased its efforts in Yemen even more and assisted the Houthis in the war against Saudi Arabia, in conflicts against other forces in the country, and in the context of the conflict with Israel.
The Iranian support covers a wide range of areas, including the supply of weapons, military training, economic support, establishment of production and weapon assembly infrastructure, and even direct assistance in military operations. In addition, Iran provides the Houthis with political, religious, and ideological support.
The Iranian assistance is intended to shape the Houthis similar to the Hezbollah model, but on a larger scale. However, it appears that the Houthis’ pace of development is much faster than that of Hezbollah, as reflected in their advanced weapon operation capabilities and extensive combat experience, which they have accumulated in a relatively short time. Additionally, the Houthis control a much larger area than Hezbollah, their location at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is of strategic importance, and Yemen also has natural resources, such as oil, which do not exist in Lebanon. All these embody great potential for Iran regarding the future strengthening of the Houthis.
As part of its support efforts, Iran smuggles enormous quantities of weapons into Houthi-controlled territories. These weapons include light arms, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and the like, but also anti-tank missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, UAVs, explosive boats, air defense systems, and more. In addition, the IRGC are smuggling money into Yemen and has also operated an extensive counterfeiting network there, distributing counterfeit money in Yemen, estimated at millions of dollars.
The majority of Iran’s smuggling efforts are carried out via maritime routes, using civilian ships and boats, as well as through aerial routes, utilizing cargo and passenger flights. Over the past decade, Western forces have thwarted many smuggling attempts by sea. In most cases, these were shipments of disassembled weapons, and some contained advanced weapons such as anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and more. Additionally, there is a limited use of a land route, where after crossing the Arabian Gulf, shipments are transferred to Houthi territories through Oman and eastern Yemen.
The Iranian unit in charge of carrying out these smuggling activities is Quds force’s unit 190.
This unit is responsible for smuggling weapons to organizations and forces operating with Iranian support around the world. Its activity in the past decade within the framework of the Iranian corridor to Syria and Lebanon is well known, as is its cooperation with Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 (see below). Unit 190 operates through various means designed to disguise the smuggled weapons as well as their connection to Iran. These include, among other things, the use of shell companies and civilian infrastructure and companies, the use of third parties, false registrations, and more.
In addition to transferring weapons, the unit is also responsible for transferring personnel between different arenas. In this context, reports indicate that members of different militias, including Houthis, have been transferred to Syria under the guise of Shiite pilgrims, while in other cases they were using the cover of being students. The unit also operates within Iran’s oil smuggling network, designed to circumvent the sanctions imposed on it.
From the information currently available, it appears that the current commander of Unit 190 is Behnam Shahriari, also known as Hamid Reza and Seyed Ali Akbar Mir Vakili. Shahriari is subject to Western sanctions.
As part of its role, the unit collaborates with other units in the Quds Force such as Unit 340 and Division 8000.
Unit 340 specializes in research and development of weapons as well as in training and instruction of operatives of Iranian-supported organizations. Other areas under its responsibility are providing technical assistance, developing production capabilities, and transferring technological knowledge to these organizations in order to upgrade their capabilities and make them independent.
The commander of Unit 340 is Hamid Fazeli, also known as Mohsen Kafi. Most of the unit’s personnel are officers trained in engineering, mechanics, chemistry, etc.
Division 8000, under the command of Hassan Habibi, is responsible for weapons production as well as training and integration of weapon systems among Iranian organizations and militias. The division oversees specialized units focusing on specific areas of expertise such as UAVs, missiles and rockets, air defense, and more.
The training and instruction provided by Iran to the Houthis are mostly done in Yemeni, but also in other countries. As part of this, Houthi fighters were sent for professional training in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq (some lasting several months). One example, of which we wrote about, is a special training program for Houthi fighters conducted at the IRGC Naval Academy in northern Iran. This training, headed by Unit 8030 of Division 8000 in the Quds Force, lasts several months and covers content related to the operation of naval weapon systems as well as naval warfare capabilities. Another example, published in the Lebanese press, is the training of Houthi fighters by Hezbollah in training camps in the Beqaa area.
In addition to military training, Houthi students are sent for academic studies at universities in Iran and other countries. The studies focus on fields such as physics, engineering, chemistry, and the like, in order to create knowledge centers that can develop, produce, and maintain weapons independently, exactly as was done with Hezbollah.
Alongside weapons smuggling and military training, Quds Force operatives maintain a permanent presence in Yemen. They assist the Houthis in training operatives and establishing infrastructure for the production and assembly of weapons, with the goal of fostering Houthi independence and reducing their reliance on Tehran. These efforts have resulted in several missile production and assembly sites spread across the Sanaa and Saada areas.
Another aspect of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement is the presence of a Quds Force representative and a Hezbollah representative in the Houthis’ Jihad Council. These representatives are defined as “Jihad Assistant” and “Deputy Jihad Assistant”. This is similar to the presence of the Quds Force commander’s representative (usually the commander of the Syria-Lebanon Corps) in Hezbollah’s Jihad Council meetings. The Quds Force and Hezbollah representatives serve as key military advisors to the Houthis and as coordination officers responsible for weapons supply, coordination of professional training, and so on. There is no available information regarding the identity of these advisors, except that the Hezbollah representative is known by the name “Abu-Zeinab”.
Reports in recent years also indicate that Quds Force personnel are actively participating in the Houthis’ military operations. This activity includes coordinating attacks and transferring intelligence, operating various systems and means (for example, coastal radars for detecting targets in the Red Sea) and even active participation in combat on the battlefield and in attacks against Israel and coalition forces.
Quds Force personnel in Yemen operate as part of the 6000 branch, responsible for activities in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula area. The highest-ranking commander of this corps is Abdul Reza Shahlai, also known as Hajj Yusef and Yusuf Abu al-Karkh. Shahlai was reportedly born in 1957 in the city of Kermanshah, joined the IRGC in 1980, and took part in the Iran-Iraq war. Over the years, he has operated in several arenas, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. As part of his activities, he coordinated the transfer of weapons and personnel between different arenas, oversaw the training of operatives, and planned terrorist operations against Western and Arab elements. Among other things, he is accused of orchestrating a series of attacks against American forces in Iraq and of planning the failed assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the United States in 2011. In addition, Shahlai heads a wide financial network supporting Iranian activities in Yemen and other arenas.
Shahlai has been subject to U.S. sanctions since 2008 and a $15 million reward has been placed on his head. In 2020, the U.S. attempted to assassinate him in Sanaa, on the same day Qasem Soleimani was eliminated, but he survived. It appears that he has been operating from Yemen since 2014 and in the past even served as the Quds Force representative on the Houthis’ Jihad Council.
Various sources have referred to Shahlai as a very senior and a key figure in the Quds Force, and as one of Qasem Soleimani’s close associates. It seems that his importance and status rose after Soleimani’s assassination due to his operational capabilities and numerous connections. Some reports even referred to Shahlai as one of the deputies of the Quds Force commander, but there is no official confirmation of this. In November 2024, several reports claimed that Shahlai was smuggled out of Yemen through the port of Hudaydah using Russian ships, but this matter is also unconfirmed.
Another key figure who operated on behalf of Iran in Yemen and was exposed is Hassan Irlu.
Available information suggests that Irlu has been operating in the Arabian Gulf area on behalf of the Quds Force since 2012. Prior to this, he operated in Lebanon and Syria, developed strong ties with Hezbollah’s leadership, and played a central role in sending forces to assist the Assad regime following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. In 2020, he was appointed as Iran’s ambassador to Yemen, but apparently continued to function simultaneously as a senior Quds Force official in the country (there are conflicting reports whether he was the Quds Force commander in the country or acted as Shahlai’s deputy). Various reports that appeared in mid-2021 indicated a possible rift between Irlu and the Houthi leadership and that the latter asked Tehran to replace him.
In late 2021, Irlu was flown to Iran on a medical evacuation flight and passed away shortly thereafter. Iranian authorities officially stated that his death was the result of complications from COVID-19, but Arab reports claimed that he was injured in a Saudi attack (his daughter also implied this in social media posts shortly after his death). In early 2021, Shahlai replaced Irlu, but without an official diplomatic status.
It should be noted that while the Quds Force is primarily responsible for the Iranian operations in Yemen, Iran has consistently relied on Hezbollah personnel over the years. Hezbollah operatives were sent to Yemen and worked alongside Quds Force personnel in all the previously mentioned areas. Over the past decade, reports have emerged indicating that cooperation between the Houthis and Hezbollah began as early as 2005 and has developed mainly after 2011. This cooperation included the operation of training camps by Hezbollah in Yemen, mutual delegation visits, and even Hezbollah personnel fighting alongside the Houthis against Saudi Arabia.
The Hezbollah unit currently responsible for activities in the Yemen arena is Unit 3800. The unit, established in 2003, is responsible for training, advising, and supporting Iran-backed proxy forces. Initially, its operatives were deployed to train Shia militias in Iraq, and its activities later expanded to Yemen. The unit also facilitated the transfer of funds and weapons to Iraq and other conflict zones.
In 2012, Hajj Khalil Yusuf Harb (also known as Abu Mustafa and Sayed Ahmad) was appointed commander of the unit, and he established and deepened the connection between Hezbollah and the Houthis. Harb is considered one of the senior and most experienced commanders in Hezbollah and previously commanded Unit 1800 (Lebanon-Palestine operations). It appears that he completed his role in Unit 3800 around 2020-2021 and returned to command Unit 133 (the unit that replaced Unit 1800). Today, after the severe blow to Hezbollah’s senior military officials, Hajj Khalil Harb is considered one of the most senior and experienced figures remaining.
Other prominent Hezbollah seniors who previously operated within Unit 3800 are Ali Musa Daqduq (Abu Hussein Sajid) and Haytham Ali Tabatabai. Daqduq operated for several years in Iraq (and was even arrested by the U.S.) and then commanded the “Golan file” in southern Syria on behalf of Hezbollah. On November 10, 2024, reports indicated that a building in the Sayyidah Zaynab neighborhood in Damascus was attacked, and various sources claimed that it was an assassination attempt in Daqduq. Tabatabai previously served in several positions in the Radwan Unit and after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria he was sent to assist the Assad regime. Available information indicates that around 2015 he was deployed to support the Houthis in Yemen, where he operated for several years. Upon returning to Lebanon, he was appointed a senior position in the Radwan Unit
In our assessment, there is a high probability that following the elimination of Hezbollah’s high command, Tabatabai currently holds one of the organization’s senior positions. Western sanctions have been imposed on Tabatabai and the U.S. has placed a $5 million reward on his head.
In addition to assistance in weapons supply and training, several reports have been published in recent years about Hezbollah personnel who were arrested in Yemen and even killed during battles. For example, in 2014, Yemeni media reported that several Hezbollah operatives from Unit 3800 were arrested in Yemen, alongside members of the IRGC. Additionally, in 2018 Saudi Arabia claimed that its forces killed eight Hezbollah personnel in the Saada area, and in 2021 a senior operative named Akram al-Sayed was killed in Yemen, apparently while training Houthi field commanders.
Moreover, throughout the Iron Swords war, pictures of Hezbollah operatives killed during the war were published, indicating that they were previously sent to Yemen and served alongside the Houthis. All these reports support claims that Hezbollah and IRGC personnel are actively participating in combat alongside the Houthis, over a long period and in several arenas. An interesting additional detail that emerged from these reports is that in many cases Hezbollah and IRGC personnel are buried in Yemen itself, and not transferred to Iran or Lebanon. It is possible that this is part of Iran and Hezbollah’s effort to maintain the secrecy of their activities on Yemeni soil.
Despite all of the above, and despite the common perception of them as an Iranian proxy, it should be noted that the relationship between Iran and the Houthis’ presents slightly different relations than what is commonly thought. Although the Houthis and Iran share religious belief, ideology, and many goals and interests, and cooperation between the parties is very deep, the Houthis are not completely subordinate to Iran and leave themselves a large degree of freedom for independent decisions. Over the years, this independence has been expressed in actions and statements that did not always align with the Iranian interest. Additionally, Houthi leaders do not hide their aspiration to establish a religious theocracy, led by a religious scholar, who serves as the absolute and supreme authority in all matters. This aspiration, which effectively creates a competing religious and political authority to the Ayatollah in Iran, contradicts the Iranian view that the supreme religious leader of Iran should be the sole leader of the Muslim world.
