In September 2024, two suicide UAVs (OWUAV- One Way Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) were intercepted in northern Israel in two separate incidents. The remnants of the UAVs, found in open areas near residential areas, allow for a close examination of some of their components.
The first UAV (see Appendix A) that was intercepted is likely from the Shahed family. This type of UAV, as well as several other findings (detailed below), indicate that it was probably launched by the Iranian supported Shiite militias in Iraq.
The second UAV (see Appendix B) is probably a Sayyad 107 (or similar type) launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon.
Key Points:
A. The two UAVs reviewed in this document are different from each other and exhibit different capabilities and characteristics. These include, among other things, size, range, type and weight of warhead, engine type, etc. However, they share several similarities and common characteristics.
B. The characteristics of the UAVs, and their connection to Iran, raise two reasonable possibilities regarding their production and supply. The first is that these UAVs are transferred from Iran in parts and assembled by the end-user in a simple and fast manner. Another possibility is that Iran transferred the knowledge and infrastructure needed to produce and assemble the UAVs in the various target countries.
C. Most of the systems and components in the two UAVs are not improvised. Some of them were probably produced as part of an organized and documented production line, while other key parts are available for purchase on the civilian market at a relatively low cost (made in China, Japan, etc.). These include engines, flight computers, servo mechanisms (electric motors), etc. The use of civilian components for military systems is well known and documented in a wide range of cases, both in Israel and in Ukraine, Yemen, and other arenas where there is Iranian involvement.
D. For obvious reasons, it was not possible to measure the various UAV parts, and therefore this issue is not addressed in this document.
Appendix A – A Shahed family UAV
This UAV was intercepted over an agricultural area in northern Israel in late September 2025. Several details indicate that it was probably launched by Shiite militias in Iraq. This conclusion is based on the type of UAV, the location and direction of the interception, technical findings, and the claim of responsibility by the aforementioned militias, which is consistent with this case.
An examination of the UAV reveals several interesting findings.
First, its external shape is very similar to that of the Shahed 101, but its dimensions are larger. There is a possibility that it is a UAV from the same family, perhaps an intermediate model between the 101 and the Meraj 532.
Similar to other UAVs, this UAV is also launched from a rail using a rocket booster, which detaches after launch. In addition, the flight path and impact point are entered via a computer before launch.
Engine
The engine installed in this UAV is a DLE-111 two-stroke gasoline engine manufactured by Mile HaoXiang Technology Co. Ltd of China under the DLE brand. It is a two-cylinder engine with a displacement of 111 cc, producing 11.2 horsepower and weighing 2.86 kg. In this case, as in other cases, the engine was equipped with a wooden propeller.
No serial numbers were found on the engine itself, but the carburetor, model MP22A1, had the serial number 221226.
As can be seen in the pictures, the engine used is brand new, and some of the factory markings are still visible on it (for example, the paint on the screws).
It is known that this type of engine, as well as other engine modles from the same company, are used in a wide variety of other UAVs launched by terrorist organizations supported by Iran. Among other things, engines of this type were found on Qasef-1 and Samad family UAVs used the Houthis in Yemen, as well as on Ababil T UAVs operated by Hezbollah (the Ababil and the Qasef are probably variants of the same UAV family).
In addition, identical debris and engines of the same type were found at several other sites in northern Israel where UAVs launched from Iraq crashed during the “Iron Swords” war.
Mile HaoXiang Technology Co. Ltd is a well-known civilian company that manufactures a variety of products mainly used for remote-controlled model aircrafts. These engines, which cost several hundred dollars, are even sold in Israel. Due to the use of these engines by terrorist organizations, the CAR research institute tried to examine their supply chain, including by contacting the company directly, but these efforts yielded no clear findings.
Fuselage
The UAV fuselage is composed of carbon fiber parts and consists of several sections connected by metallic rings and bolts. In addition, it can be noted that the rings contain pre-made notches and holes that contain the wiring and pipes of the various systems. The various systems (servo mechanisms, fuel system, warhead, etc.) were connected to the fuselage using rivets, and the engine was connected to the main fuselage with another metallic ring.
The UAV wings are thin, lightweight, hollow, and also made of carbon fiber. They are long in relation to the fuselage and reinforced with several rods. Similar to the main fuselage, the wings also contain ducts, notches, and dedicated spaces for wiring and servo mechanisms. In addition, the wings also have production numbers, serial numbers, physical descriptions, etc.
The UAV will usually be transported with the wings detached from the fuselage, to be assembled before launch.
The numbers documented on the upper part of the rear wing of this UAV – GA2085 – are very similar to other serial numbers documented in videos published by the Iraqi militias themselves, as well as to numbers found on UAV parts that struck northern Israel in several incidents. For example, at another site in northern Israel where a UAV launched from Iraq exploded, a wing with the number GA2125 was found, videos published by the militias show UAVs with the numbers GA2096 and GA2162. It can be assessed that the consistency and similarity of these numbers indicate that these are parts manufactured as part of an organized production line.
Another interesting point is the fact that the serial numbers on the wings begin with the marking ‘S/N’. This marking, which has also been found in weapon systems used by Russia in the war in Ukraine, has previously been identified as being associated with Iranian production.
Warhead
The shape of the warhead of the intercepted UAV is very similar to those of other warheads found in Iranian UAVs in various arenas in the Middle East, Ukraine, etc. They contain an explosive charge and have a domed liner (Explosively Formed Penetrator) installed at the front for penetrating hard targets. The type and weight of the explosive material are unknown, as is the triggering mechanism. While the warhead of the Shahed 101 weighs 8 kg, the size and weight of the warhead in the intercepted UAV appears to be larger.
In addition, UAVs found in other arenas show a mechanism at the rear of the warhead that looks like a detonator, or another system related to the activation of the warhead. In these UAVs, it appears that there is a wax-like material (red color) around the perimeter of the mechanism, which is probably used for sealing and securing. Such a warhead (including the use of a wax-like material) was found in Ukraine at the crash site of a Shahed 131 UAV launched by Russia. According to most estimates, this UAV was manufactured in Iran.
Electrical Harnesses and Other Systems
Electrical harnesses and connectors – all the electrical and electronic systems in this UAV are not improvised. The wiring harnesses, the form of cabling, the connectors, etc., appear standard and indicate a serial production source. In addition, there is labeling on many cables that includes the name of the system to which it connects
Servo Motors – The electric motors (servo motors) found on the UAV, whose function is to drive the various parts (throttle, rudders, etc.), did not bear markings that allowed for their definite identification. However, they are very similar to servo motors manufactured by HITEC found in UAVs launched by the Houthis. These motors are available for purchase on the open market and cost several tens of dollars.
Navigation System – The available images do not show the navigation systems of the intercepted UAV, but an examination of images and videos of UAVs filmed by the militias in Iraq suggests that this UAV was also equipped with CRPA antennas for GNSS[1] systems. These antennas, which rely on satellite positioning systems, are capable of differentiating between various signals based on direction, intensity, and other characteristic while mitigating the effects of jamming and spoofing signals. This technology enables UAV navigation systems to operate effectively in environments affected by GNSS interference or spoofing attacks. These UAVs were equipped with an array of four antennas, enabling them to cope with multiple sources of jamming. However, it is unclear which satellite positioning system was used exactly (GPS, Galileo, BeiDou, GLONASS).
Pressure Gauge – One of the interesting parts found at the UAV crash site is a pressure gauge model G-4455 (serial number S.N.3259) manufactured by an American company called Rogers Kratos. This company manufactures equipment for the aviation industry, and many of its products require export approval. At this stage, it is unclear how it reached Iran or the Shiite militias in Iraq and in which system it was used in the UAV.
Appendix B – Sayyad 107 UAV
The debris of this UAV, which was probably launched by Hezbollah, were found in northern Israel in early September 2024 after it was intercepted.
UAVs of this type struck the dining hall at the Golani Brigade base on October 13, 2024, and the Prime Minister’s residence in Caesarea 6 days later (October 19). Apparently, Hezbollah made extensive use of UAVs of this type in numerous attacks it carried out during 2024, especially in northern Israel, but there is no official confirmation of this.
Currently, few high-resolution images of the Sayyad 107 are available, with the IDF Spokesperson’s official releases relying on illustrations. However, available videos and images indicate that the Sayyad 107 features a relatively simple design, characterized by a cylindrical fuselage, long wings in proportion to its fuselage, and a V-shaped tail. Similar to other UAVs, the Sayyad 107 is launched from a rail using a rocket booster and, according to the IDF Spokesperson, has a range of approximately 100 km and a 5 kg warhead.
Despite the fact that it is reasonable to assume that the origin of the UAV is Iran, it is highly possible that its assembly, and perhaps even its production, takes place in Lebanon and other countries in the region.
Fuselage
The UAV fuselage is made of a material that looks like carbon fiber and is divided into two main sections – the main fuselage and the tail section, which contains the tail wings and the engine. It appears that both the tail wings and the engine are installed during the connection of the tail section to the main fuselage.
The parts that connect to the fuselage are assembled with nuts and bolts, without the use of rivets. In other words, it is likely that the UAV is transferred from Iran (or from the country of manufacture) in parts and assembled by the end-user in a simple and fast manner. The UAV wings connect to the upper part of the fuselage in dedicated notches with 4 bolts.
Engine
The engine installed in the UAV is an OMA 5025-375 electric motor manufactured by a Japanese company called O.S. MOTORS. The engine, which weighs 405 grams, is equipped with a plastic propeller and is powered by a battery pack and costs $100-200 (for comparison, the DLE-111 piston engines that Hezbollah used extensively weigh 2.86 kg and use a wooden propeller). Similar engines were also found on a UAV intercepted near Kibbutz Kabri in early July 2024, as well as on UAVs that struck residential buildings in Nahariya in early September 2024.
The use of an electric motor increases the difficulty of detecting and intercepting the UAV because it reduces its acoustic and thermal signature (along with the use of carbon-like material).
Warhead
The UAV’s warhead is installed inside a cylinder at the front of the UAV. In addition, it is possible that a small domed liner (Explosively Formed Penetrator) was installed at the front of the warhead. The type and weight of the explosive material are unknown, as is the initiation mechanism.
Flight Computer
Various UAVs found in Ukraine and other arenas associated with Iran and Russia carried V5+ flight and navigation computers from a Chinese company called CUAV.
This computer is responsible for controlling the UAV’s flight according to a predefined route and managing all onboard systems.
It incorporates, among other components, accelerometers, a gyroscope, an altimeter, and additional avionics elements. Additionally, the computer supports radio communication; However, based on available imagery, it appears that this feature was not utilized in this case, and the waypoints and flight path were preprogrammed into the UAV’s computer.
Flight computers from the same company were also found in Russian UAVs that crashed in Ukraine. Similar to the engine, this component is also available on the open market for a few hundred dollars, and among other places, it can also be purchased in Iran itself.
Electrical Harnesses, Batteries, and Wiring
As mentioned, this UAV was equipped with an electric motor. The attached images show that the energy source for operating the motor, and the various systems is a battery pack (wrapped in blue nylon) installed inside the fuselage. In addition, it appears that there are additional systems and circuits that receive power from separate batteries. The electrical harnesses and wiring appear relatively standard and not improvised, and the use of heat-shrink tubing (the material that bundles the wiring), standard connectors, serial numbers, etc., can be noted. All of these probably indicate serial assembly and production, likely as part of an organized and documented production line.
[1] Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna Global Navigation Satellite System
