In recent years, there has been an increasing trend involving the infiltration and the creation of terrorist infrastructures in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) by Iran, along with its allies, Hamas, and the Palestinian Jihad Organization (PIJ), and additional organizations.
On February 20, a major attempted attack that involved 4 explosives planted in 4 buses in the cities of Bat Yam and Holon failed, after 3 explosives detonated in empty buses in parking lots, and another device was discovered before detonating. According to several reports, there is suspicion that the devices came from the Samaria area.
The phenomenon of increased terrorism in Samaria, fueled by Iranian support, continued with even greater intensity since the Iron Swords War that broke out on October 7, 2023. On a regular basis, reports and testimonies accumulate indicating deliberate attempts to ‘ignite the area’ in Judea and Samaria, with an emphasis on Samaria, to incite the local Palestinian population—with a focus on ‘refugee camps’ – and to mobilize it for a violent campaign, using the smuggling of money and weapons.
There is a continuous flow of information and warnings regarding intentions to carry out attacks and to build terrorist infrastructures in Samaria. Security organizations are implementing a new policy of prolonged stays within the camps, while targeting weapons transfers from Jordan, conducting ongoing raids on terrorist strongholds, and also targeting attempts to create local weapons caches. Significant legal enforcement against smuggling cells is also underway.
Defense Minister Israel Katz declared on February 23 that “we are at war with Islamic terrorism in Judea and Samaria,” and announced the expansion of the operation designed to prevent terrorist elements led by Iran and Hamas from creating an expanded battlefront in Judea and Samaria (the operation is called ‘Iron Wall’).
According to Katz, the IDF is preparing for a prolonged stay of about one year in the camps in Judea and Samaria that have been identified as centers of terrorist activity – in Jenin, in Tul Karem, and others. The purpose of the stay is to prevent terrorism from “regrowing.” In the process, approximately 40,000 Palestinians evacuated these camps.
According to the defense minister, the Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria and areas of Israel within the Green Line constitute strategic targets in the eyes of Hamas and Iran, and even before the events of October 7, 2023, intelligence materials were found indicating plans for attacks against Israeli settlements in Samaria. Recently, the cabinet ordered a change in policy: The army will not enter the camps solely for a short operation, but will remain there.
The defense minister stated that this is a stay of at least one year and added, noting: “The central infrastructure of terrorism in Judea and Samaria is the refugee camps. For more than two years, Iran has been transferring weapons, funding, and direction into the camps in order to build terrorist units, which will serve as a force and an eastern front against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria and against the settlements of the Green Line.”
This is a dramatic paradigm shift – in the past, Israel used to engage in temporary operations, clear out targets, and withdraw within hours or a few days, or at most a few weeks. Now, the directive is to remain in the camps, to prevent the rehabilitation of terrorist infrastructures and to block the transfer of weapons and terrorist operatives. From a military perspective, this requires large numbers of personnel and continuous supplies.
The camps, as bases for terrorism, pose a direct threat to the Israeli home front, and therefore have been identified by Iran as an attractive target for investment in order to activate Hamas cells, Islamic Jihad, and terrorists operating independently.
How Iran nurtures the front in Judea and Samaria
Security officials point to an extensive smuggling network that transfers weapons to Judea and Samaria from Jordan. For example, on February 23 a statement was published exposing a network of arms smugglers brining weapons from the Jordan border, in which 34 pistols and 4 long-barrel rifles were seized. Theses smuggling operations are partly intended for criminal organizations, but on a regular basis, some of the weapons (pistols, rifles, and explosives) find their way to the camps in Judea and Samaria, and eventually to terrorist organizations.
According to a joint statement from the Shin Bet, the police, and the State Prosecution on February 23, which announced the arrest of a network of arms smugglers from the Negev, the phenomenon of “flooding the market” with cheap weapons is seen as enabling terrorist cells to arm themselves without needing significant funding.
In recent months, there has been a noticeable increase in smuggling from the Jordan border. The Shin Bet emphasized that this is a “direct supply chain to terrorist organizations.”
The investigation revealed that members of the smuggling infrastructure were involved in two significant arms smuggling operations across the Jordan border in the second half of 2024, using vehicles that crossed from Jordan into Israel and carrying a variety of weapons.
A senior IDF officer stated that “over the past two years, we have been observing Iranian and Hamas entrenchment trying to influence the Judea and Samaria arena, while they try to bring in arms and money to terrorist organizations in areas that we usually also deal with. We see this even today in the refugee camps in Jenin and in Tul Karem, where we are also acting to foil those directing the terrorism.”
“We are looking at the entire supply chain of weaponry that comes from the eastern arena and enters illegally into the territories of Judea and Samaria, as well as the repair and manufacturing of weapons [workshops in Judea and Samaria for the production of local weapons such as the Carlo rifle].” Additionally, there has been a recent increase in the use of non-standard explosives, and northern Samaria constitutes a focal point for hostile activity.
The senior official also highlighted the incitement strategy that Hamas cells are leading in Judea and Samaria. He spoke of teachers in schools, doctors, and family members of militants – all of whom disseminated violent messages calling for attacks on IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians. According to the official, “in the past year, we have arrested more than 200 individuals wanted in the field of incitement.”
Currency exchange stores in Judea and Samaria, involved with terrorist funds, have also experienced raids by Israeli security forces. Money changers under surveillance, identified as transferring funds, are targeted by security raids and Israeli security forces freeze their assets.
IDF spokesperson for international media, Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, stated that Iran’s intentions are well known, and for years Iran has been striving to smuggle arms to Judea and Samaria, and even to terrorist cells within the Green Line, such as the attempted explosive attack that was foiled against former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon in Yarkon Park in Tel Aviv. On September 18, 2024, it was reported that 8 Arab – Israeli suspects planned to murder Ya’alon by placing an explosive device of the Claymore anti-personnel type – of Iranian manufacture – in 2023 in Yarkon Park in Tel Aviv.
Regarding Syria, in light of the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Iran is considering a new course and is examining the continuation of its activities in this arena. It appears that it will try to renew operations and will not easily give up on this arena.
Hamas, with Iranian support, remains active in Lebanon as well. Until the outbreak of the Iron Swords War, Hamas was engaged in building local power in Lebanon, while also operating a headquarters in Beirut, headed by Salah al-Aarouri, formerly the deputy head of the Political Bureau who was eliminated in Beirut on January 2, 2024. The central mission of this headquarters was to direct attacks in Judea and Samaria.
On February 17, 2025, Muhammad Shaheen, head of Hamas’ operations in Lebanon, was eliminated by the Israeli Air Force in Sidon. Shaheen was suspected of promoting “various terrorist plots,” including rocket fire from Lebanon. We assess that he was also involved in orchestrating terrorism in Judea and Samaria.
Will the Israeli policy succeed in neutralizing Iran in Judea and Samaria?
To what extent will the policy guiding Operation Iron Wall succeed in foiling the smuggling, the operations, and the financing channels of Iran’s involvement in Judea and Samaria, and the organized incitement activities?
On the one hand, the IDF and Shin Bet are taking actions not seen in a long time: prolonged stays in the camps, the deployment of armor, intensified seizures of weapons and money, targeted eliminations of Hamas operatives in Judea and Samaria and in Lebanon, and more. On the other hand, Iran and Hamas have previously shown resilience and the ability to recover. In previous major operations against terrorism in the camps in Judea and Samaria – most notably Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, which began after about two years of large-scale suicide bombing waves in Israeli cities – a certain calm was achieved, but terrorism eventually returned.
Iran, Hamas, and PIJ’s efforts to incite in Judea and Samaria are directly running into Israel’s efforts to prevent them from achieving their goals. In 2024, for example, the Shin Bet foiled 1,040 attacks, most of them in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem, of which 689 were shooting attacks, 326 were explosive attacks, and 2 were suicide attacks.
Israel is combining precise intelligence and preventive activity in the camps along with an aggressive thwarting of arms smuggling.
It can be assumed that the Iranians will continue to search for weak points; Israel will continue in 2025 to prevent the long-term establishment of armed groups in Judea and Samaria with Iranian support in the form of funding, arms, incitement, and orchestration, while also continuing to try to use Jordan, and likely later also Syria, as smuggling routes into Judea and Samaria.
It should be remembered that the area of Iraq, in any case, constitutes an intermediate zone both towards Jordan and towards Syria, and that the Shia militias in Iraq provide an additional assistance platform to the Iranian effort in this context. Syria also constitutes an intermediate zone for smuggling from Lebanon.
