The current ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is not perceived by Hezbollah as a binding arrangement or as a basis for security stability, but rather as a temporary, fragile, and even illegitimate reality. Contrary to past patterns, in which Hezbollah sought over time to establish a “deterrence equation” of attack–response between the sides, the organization’s current conduct indicates a substantial conceptual shift.
From Hezbollah’s perspective, the very presence of the IDF in Lebanese territory constitutes sufficient grounds for continued attacks, regardless of the ceasefire conditions. In doing so, the organization effectively rejects any distinction between a “permitted” Israeli action and a violation and adopting an approach of responding to any IDF activity. This is also reflected in its claims of responsibility for its attacks.
Moreover, from Hezbollah’s perspective, the very formation of the current arrangement through negotiations between the State of Lebanon and Israel constitutes a fundamental problem. The organization does not recognize the legitimacy of any arrangement resulting from direct or indirect contact between Beirut and Jerusalem, and views this as a deviation from the core principles of the “resistance.” Accordingly, it presents the ceasefire not as a comprehensive Lebanese agreement, but as a political move imposed on Lebanon that does not bind Hezbollah. This perception allows Hezbollah to justify the continuation of its military activity, while undermining the legitimacy of the arrangement and of the Lebanese actors participating in it.
So far (as of April 27, 9:30), Hezbollah has carried out 31 attacks, of which 7 were directed toward Israeli territory and the rest against IDF forces operating in Lebanon:
18 attacks using UAVs and explosive drones, of which 5 incidents involved UAVs that penetrated Israeli territory.
5 attacks using indirect fire, of which 3 attacks were directed at communities in Israeli territory.
3 incidents in which Hezbollah carried out anti-aircraft fire at IDF UAVs in Lebanese territory, with one documented case in which it succeeded in downing a Hermes 450 UAV.
2 anti-tank missile attacks against IDF forces operating in Lebanon.
1 attack using an explosive device against IDF forces operating in Lebanon.
(Note – two additional attacks where the weapon used is unknown).
This is while the IDF is operating in accordance with the ceasefire conditions and continues continuously to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure along the Yellow Line and to prevent violations by the organization.
This approach is also clearly reflected in public statements by the organization’s leadership.
Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s leader, said in his speech today, April 27, that “the direct negotiations and their outcomes are as if they do not exist for us, and do not concern us at all. We will continue our defensive resistance for Lebanon and its people; we will not return to what was before March 2. We will respond to the Israeli attack and stand against it. No matter how much the enemy threatens, we will not retreat, we will not surrender, and we will not be defeated.”
The head of the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc, Mohammad Raad, defines any ceasefire that allows Israel freedom of action within Lebanon as a “cunning deception” and as a cover for continued “Israeli aggressiveness.” His remarks reflect a fundamental rejection of the very possibility of maintaining a ceasefire that does not include a complete halt to Israeli military activity, alongside a call for the Lebanese government to withdraw from negotiations with Israel.
Similar messages emerge from statements by Member of Parliament Ali Fayyad, who emphasizes that the ceasefire is “meaningless” in light of continued Israeli attacks, and that any attack—regardless of its nature—grants Hezbollah the right to respond. In practice, even Israeli actions that comply with the ceasefire conditions are not perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the organization. Fayyad adds that any arrangement that does not lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory is illegitimate, thereby setting a threshold condition that is inconsistent with existing arrangements.
These statements are not merely rhetorical; however, they reflect a broader strategic conception. Hezbollah seeks to reshape the rules of the game so that it is no longer constrained in its response to IDF activity in Lebanon. This is in contrast to its conduct during the previous ceasefire period (November 2024–March 2026), when it consciously chose to absorb IDF strikes as part of a strategy to rebuild its military capabilities. Now, it appears that the organization has changed its approach and adopted a firmer line.
This also differs from the patterns of operation that characterized the period between October 8, 2023, and the end of Operation “Northern Arrows” on November 27, 2024. During that period, Hezbollah operated through a concept of the “support front for Gaza,” and established a relatively clear operational equation: attacks against military targets in Israel as part of the effort to support the fighting in Gaza, alongside attacks against civilian targets—but, according to its claims, only in response to Israeli strikes on “civilian” targets in Lebanon. That is, even through a prolonged confrontation, the organization maintained a logic of mutual equation and response conditions.
In this context, the internal dimension of Hezbollah’s conduct must also be understood. After more than a year of IDF strikes without response, during which the organization avoided escalation and absorbed damage to infrastructure and manpower, the need to restore its image vis-à-vis its Shiite support base has intensified. The renewal of attacks and the hardening of its stance regarding the ceasefire allow it to present itself as one that does not abandon the principles of the “resistance” and continues to act against Israel.
At the same time, Hezbollah is working to undermine the legitimacy of any political process between Israel and Lebanon. In an official statement published on April 26, the organization emphasized that its actions are a “legitimate response to the ongoing violations” by Israel, which, according to it, amount to hundreds of cases since the beginning of the truce. In this statement, the organization repeats a familiar pattern: accusing Israel of violating agreements, denying the legitimacy of American mediation, and sharply criticizing the Lebanese government, which is perceived as weak and as failing to defend the country’s sovereignty.
Hezbollah is also active in the Lebanese domestic arena in an attempt to block political progress. Through this effort, the organization is conducting a critical and even threatening campaign against the country’s leadership, headed by President Joseph Aoun. Statements by senior officials reflect an escalation in tone. For example, on April 27, senior Hezbollah figure Nawaf al-Moussawi compared Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat—a comparison that carries an implicit threat regarding his fate…
Statements of this kind are not exceptional only in their rhetoric but also indicate a growing willingness of Hezbollah to exert direct and even threatening political pressure on the Lebanese establishment, in order to prevent any move perceived as rapprochement toward an arrangement with Israel. In doing so, the organization reinforces its overall line: denying the legitimacy of political arrangements, alongside an attempt to shape Lebanon’s internal political arena in accordance with its interests.
In conclusion, Hezbollah’s current strategy is based on three central axes: a principled rejection of the ceasefire in its current format; an attempt to change the pre-campaign status quo, in which it refrained from responding to IDF actions against it; and an aspiration to undermine the political process between Israel and Lebanon. All of this occurs alongside an effort to restore deterrence and the organization’s internal image after a prolonged period of erosion.
These trends indicate that the current ceasefire is inherently unstable, and that from Hezbollah’s perspective it is, at most, a tactical pause—not a binding arrangement.
