The developing debate in Lebanon surrounding direct negotiations with Israel is not merely a specific diplomatic issue. Rather, it is a clear expression of the deep struggle over the character of the Lebanese state, the distribution of power centers within it, and the central, and, unfortunately, as of the time of writing, rhetorical, question that has accompanied Lebanon for many years: is the Lebanese state the sole sovereign authority, or does Hezbollah continue to hold veto power over its foreign and security policy?
Although public criticism against Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into conflicts beyond the state’s control has become far more vocal and is intensifying among its opponents, we do not share (as of the time of writing this article) the assessments claiming an internal erosion of Hezbollah’s legitimacy. For Hezbollah, the legitimacy that truly matters in practice comes from its Shiite base. At this stage, we do not identify any significant shifts there.
Mapping the positions within the Lebanese political system reveals a clear fault line: on one side stands the Christian-Western camp, alongside parts of the Sunni and Druze camps, which view direct negotiations with Israel as a legitimate tool for restoring sovereignty to the state. On the other side stands the Shiite axis led by Hezbollah, which seeks to preserve the equation of “resistance” and the organization’s strategic independence vis-à-vis state institutions.
The debate over the very existence of direct negotiations with Israel has, in effect, become a debate over Lebanon’s future identity.
Hezbollah as a “Veto Player”
The political reality in Lebanon demonstrates that no significant political initiative can advance without Hezbollah’s consent, or at least without its refraining from using political and practical force to obstruct it. The organization’s influence is not limited to the security arena; it also penetrates state decision-making mechanisms, down to the level of the composition of negotiating delegations and the nature of contacts with international actors.
In practice, Hezbollah has succeeded in shaping a political equation whereby the state is permitted to conduct diplomacy (indirectly only), as long as it does not undermine the strategic interests of the “resistance.” In doing so, the organization has transformed itself from a military-political actor into a structural veto player within the Lebanese system.
This equation was reflected, among other things, in the recent statement (May 12) by Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem. While he noted that responsibility for managing the negotiations, in order to achieve Lebanon’s sovereign objectives, would remain with the Lebanese government, he reiterated Hezbollah’s position that Lebanon should conduct only indirect negotiations with Israel, where Lebanon holds the bargaining cards, and withdraw from direct negotiations, which he described as a net gain for Israel and concessions without compensation.
Qassem, of course, did not neglect to reiterate Hezbollah’s conditions, which naturally align with the organization’s strategic military, economic, and social interests: safeguarding Lebanon’s sovereignty through an end to Israeli aggression at sea, on land, and in the air; the liberation of Lebanese territory through Israel’s withdrawal from it; the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River; the release of Lebanese prisoners; the return of Lebanese residents to all of their villages in southern Lebanon; and the reconstruction of Lebanon.
The Camp in Favor of Negotiations: Direct Negotiations as a Means of Restoring Sovereignty
The Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party currently lead the clearest line in support of direct negotiations with Israel. For them, the very shift toward direct dialogue is no longer an ideological taboo, but rather part of a broader struggle to restore decision-making authority to the Lebanese state.
Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces party (Christians), defined the negotiations as a “necessity,” arguing that the reality that has emerged along the border requires moving toward a direct and permanent arrangement, rather than temporary ceasefire agreements. These statements reflect a profound shift in Christian-Lebanese discourse: Israel is perceived as an influential actor in the internal struggle over the future of the state.
Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji (Lebanese Forces) perhaps articulated the state-oriented camp’s perspective most clearly: in his view, direct negotiations with Israel are not a form of “surrender,” but rather a tool for achieving three objectives; consolidating the ceasefire, securing an Israeli withdrawal, and restoring full sovereignty to the state. In doing so, he effectively presents an alternative to Hezbollah’s concept of “resistance”: no longer security based on extra-state military power, but rather on the institutions of the state itself.
A similar position is evident within the Kataeb Party. Sami Gemayel expressed “full support” for direct negotiations between the State of Lebanon and Israel, as part of the need to restore decision-making authority to the state. Amin Gemayel expanded on this, linking an arrangement with Israel to broader regional stability.
The Free Patriotic Movement presents a more complex and cautious position. On the one hand, its senior figures emphasize that if direct negotiations lead to an Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of Lebanon’s rights, they should be supported. On the other hand, Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, seeks to avoid appearing as though he is abandoning the alliance with Hezbollah, and therefore stresses that direct negotiations cannot take place under military pressure. This position reflects the movement’s attempt to preserve room for maneuver between the sovereigntist camp and the Shiite axis.
A shift is also becoming apparent within the Sunni arena. Prominent members of parliament, including Fouad Makhzoumi, have expressed support for direct negotiations within a constitutional and state framework, while emphasizing the need to strengthen state institutions and the army.
Walid Jumblatt (Leader of Lebanon’s main Druze party — the Progressive Socialist Party) also defended the president and the government against criticism from Hezbollah and its supporters, stating that “(direct) negotiations are a legitimate means of defending Lebanon,” and that there is no place for “accusations of treason” against the Lebanese leadership. At the same time, reports indicated that Jumblatt and Nabih Berri (Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement) are coordinated around support for “security negotiations only,” rather than a full political track with Israel.
Saad Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon and leader of the Sunni “Future Movement,” has thus far not issued a clear public statement regarding the possibility of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. However, in recent months Hariri has repeatedly voiced sharp criticism of Iran and its influence in Lebanon, arguing that Tehran uses Hezbollah to drag the country into confrontations and wars that do not serve Lebanese interests.
We assess that, with a high degree of probability, Hariri supports direct negotiations with Israel behind the scenes (at this stage).
The Camp Opposing Negotiations: Preserving the Equation of “Resistance”
In contrast, Hezbollah and Amal present a consistent position rejecting direct negotiations with Israel, especially under fire. From their perspective, the very existence of direct negotiations could be interpreted as recognition of Israel’s legitimacy and as undermining the identity of the “resistance.”
The list of demands and conditions outlined by Naim Qassem in his statements is not merely a technical set of requirements. Rather, it reflects an attempt to reshape the rules of the game so that any political process would take place only after the Lebanese government acknowledges Hezbollah’s status as a decisive actor in Lebanon.
In any case, negotiations would take place exclusively through indirect channels and not for the purpose of a peace agreement or anything similar.
Hezbollah continues to make clear that it will not accept any arrangement reached without its involvement, and that “the decision will be made on the ground.” In doing so, the organization seeks to preserve the deterrence equation (internally) that it has built over the years: the weapons of the “resistance” are not subject to negotiation and are not subordinate to state decisions.
According to reports in the Arab media, since the renewal of the latest war and against the backdrop of the direct negotiation processes with Israel, relations between Hezbollah and President Joseph Aoun have been in a state of rupture.
Nabih Berri also sharpened this position when he argued that direct negotiations make no sense as long as Israel continues its military activity in Lebanon. Berri has even reduced his activity and dialogue with the president amid disagreements over direct negotiations. In practice, Berri plays a dual role: on the one hand, he is perceived as a pragmatic intermediary vis-à-vis the international system; on the other hand, he serves as a political brake against any attempt to bypass the Shiite axis in Lebanon.
Between Statehood and Limited Sovereignty
The Lebanese state leadership — the president and the government — is attempting to maneuver between the camps. On the one hand, there is growing recognition that there is no military solution to the conflict and that a political track is required. On the other hand, the Lebanese state’s room for maneuver remains extremely limited as long as Hezbollah maintains an independent military force and the ability to impose a political veto.
Here lies the central contradiction of the Lebanese system: the state is expected to conduct foreign and security policy, yet it does not hold a monopoly over the use of force. As long as this reality persists, any political initiative will remain limited, partial, and dependent on internal balances of power.
Not Only a Debate About Israel — But About Lebanon’s Future
The debate surrounding direct negotiations with Israel is not merely a discussion about foreign relations. It reflects a deeper struggle over the question of who determines Lebanon’s strategic policy: the institutions of the state, or the “Axis of Resistance” — namely, Hezbollah.
For the first time in years, it is possible to identify in Lebanon a growing number of public voices that view direct negotiations as a Lebanese interest rather than merely an international imposition. At this stage, however, the shift is taking place primarily at the level of public and political discourse, not in the actual balance of power.
As long as Hezbollah preserves its military strength, political standing, and ability to dictate red lines, the prospects for direct and full negotiations with Israel that would produce effective results on the ground will remain limited, if they exist at all. In this sense, the discussion in the context of Israel is in fact a discussion about whether Lebanon is capable of becoming, once again, a fully sovereign state in the fullest sense of the term.
