Starting this morning (January 26, 2025), the Shia base began trying to return to several villages and areas in South Lebanon. Here are Alma’s insights so far:
- Hezbollah is pushing and encouraging the Shia base to return. This is not a spontaneous event but an organized one: there were advance notices, setting times for gatherings, meeting points, etc. Hezbollah may even pay ad hoc fees to some participants.
- We estimate that Hezbollah operatives are physically present in the field.
- As of now, the Lebanese army has not been able to fulfill its mission of preventing these events and the arrival of the base (in some cases, it seems they cannot or do not want to do so).
- Hezbollah is interested in friction and creating incidents where Lebanese civilians are harmed (there have been reports of injuries and even deaths in some places). This is classic fuel for its message: “Lebanese citizens want to return to their land and they need protection…” From Hezbollah’s perspective, this strengthens the justification for why they need to be there because the Lebanese army cannot protect “the citizens” alone… The equation of “the people – army – resistance” (a central narrative in Hezbollah’s messaging) is more relevant than ever.
- Additionally, images from these events with the Shia base waving Hezbollah flags and Nasrallah’s pictures serve as a platform to reinforce “the victory image” that Hezbollah wants to present to its internal audience in Lebanon.
- The events are a potential platform for terrorist attacks against IDF forces (planned or opportunistic).