By Zoe Levornik.
Israel’s policy in Syria has drawn criticism from within Syria and internationally. However, this policy aims to strengthen Israel’s security and protect Israel’s border communities in an environment of uncertainty and instability. When necessary, it also seeks to defend minority populations in Syria, such as the Druze, who share mutual interests with Israel and are threatened by the new regime.
As part of the criticisms against Israel’s policy, some have claimed it exploits the Druze community for Israel’s own interests. Recent articles in The Wall Street Journal and Deutsche Welle argued that Israel’s intervention on behalf of the Druze is a pretext for maintaining a presence on Syrian territory and undermines efforts by the new regime to unite factions and establish a strong, unified Syrian government. The articles also quoted experts who suggested that Israel’s policy stems from a historic perception of existential threat as a nation surrounded by enemies. According to them, this policy harms Israel’s security, and they advocate for Israel to withdraw from Syria and engage in dialogue with the new Syrian regime.
Given the nature of the new regime in Syria and the numerous challenges it faces, we estimate that it will not prioritize, to say the least, negotiations or dialogue with Israel regarding normalization of relations. Until such an option becomes viable, Israel must continue its current policy of maintaining border security, thwarting threats, and protecting populations with whom it has common interests beyond the border as well.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of the new regime in Syria, Israel is grappling with a new reality along its border with Syria, which includes threats and challenges to its security. The stance of the new regime towards Israel and whether it will act to prevent hostile groups in southern Syria from operating against Israel remains unclear.
The violent events of recent weeks against the Alawites in northwestern Syria, along with the clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border involving Hezbollah operatives, highlight the challenges faced by the new regime in Syria in establishing its rule, as well as the potential threats to Israel and to minority groups within Syria or those opposing the regime. Consequently, Israel adopted a policy of detecting and countering threats on the one hand and protecting groups with shared interests and strengthening ties with them on the other.
Immediately following the rise of the new regime in Syria led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa, Israel began operations along the Syrian border to identify and destroy weapons and military equipment from the previous regime to prevent them from falling into the hands of the new regime or other groups in Syria that might use them against Israel. Concurrently, Israel worked to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria and set up nine outposts in this area. This allows Israel to monitor all activities along the border area that pose threats to its security and to continue identifying and destroying weapons and military equipment.
In his speech on February 23, 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel intends to remain in the buffer zone indefinitely and demanded the complete demilitarization of southern Syria. Since then, Israel has been conducting frequent strikes on military targets that pose a potential threat to its security, particularly in southern Syria and, when necessary, throughout Syria. The current situation in Syria does not allow Israel to withdraw from southern Syria without jeopardizing its security, as there is currently no responsible Syrian entity working to maintain security in the border area with Israel.
Syrian President Al-Sharaa is attempting to bring various factions under his control, either through agreements (the Kurds) or violent suppression (the Alawites). However, in southern Syria, the new regime appears to have not yet established its authority, leading to instability, especially with the Druze in Al-Suwayda and the Daraa region.
A recent example of this instability is the shooting incident on March 25, targeting IDF forces in the tri-border area with Jordan near the village of Koayiah.
Al-Sharaa is also working intensively to gain international support, primarily to lift sanctions on Syria and receive essential economic assistance for rebuilding the country. On this front, it appears that he has succeeded in convincing Western countries to support Syria, as the West desires a more stable Syria and aims to minimize external interference and influence from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Russia in Syria’s internal affairs, which could harm Western interests in the region.
It seems that especially the European Union countries have quickly “forgotten” the violent suppression of the Alawites. For instance, on March 20, the German Foreign Minister once again visited Damascus to reopen Germany’s embassy in Syria…
In recent weeks, Israel has intensified its attacks in Syria. This escalation coincides with signs of uncertainty and instability within the new regime, including its increasing violence against opponents and Alawite civilians, as well as clashes between the new regime’s forces and Hezbollah operatives along the Lebanese border.
Israel is aware that the international hourglass is already running. The deeper and more extensive Western involvement in Syria becomes, the more restricted Israel’s freedom of action will be. Therefore, there is currently a window of opportunity that must be utilized to address the threats Israel identifies in Syria.
In parallel with its operational activities in Syria, Israel is working to protect groups in Syria with shared interests that are at potential risk under the new regime, such as the Druze population in Syria.
On February 23, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared in his speech that Israel would protect Druze civilians in Syria from any threat. Defense Minister Israel Katz also reiterated the commitment to the Druze population in several public statements.
This policy is supported not only by declarations but also by actions. Israel facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Druze population (March 13) and allowed, for the first time in decades, a visit of approximately 100 Druze religious leaders from Syria to Israel (March 14).
Israel’s policy toward the Druze in Syria has elicited mixed reactions both in Syria and internationally. Among the Druze population, there were expressions of support and gratitude toward Israel (including the raising of the Israeli flag), alongside condemnations and clarifications that the Druze do not want or need Israel’s help and remain loyal to Syria (the flag raised was burned shortly thereafter). (See the full article).
Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been engaged in a war across seven fronts and arenas (“Unity of the Fronts”), which demonstrates the complete opposite of the claims presented in the aforementioned articles. Israel has learned from the attack on October 7 and does not intend to allow its enemies’ potential capabilities to develop into concrete threats near its borders again.
Israel’s presence in southern Syria is aimed at thwarting and preventing threats to its security and to the residents of the north. Israel’s commitment to the Druze community in Syria stems from the danger posed to this group by the new regime, a significant portion (and not just a minor one) of which supports Israel.
The violent attacks that occurred at the beginning of March against the Alawite community revealed the methods employed by the new regime’s forces against opponents and minorities, exposing the potential danger to various minority groups in Syria.
Israel views protecting populations with shared interests as part of its own security interests.
The new regime in Syria is currently attempting to reach agreements with the Druze population, but as of now, the sides have yet to reach an understanding, and there are voices both in favor and against within the Druze community. If an agreement is not achieved, we may once again witness violent clashes between regime forces and members of the Druze community, as occurred in Jaramana (See the full article).
Israel is not acting to undermine or weaken the new regime in Syria but is closely monitoring developments and is prepared to act if they pose a threat to Israel or to populations it has an interest in protecting. Israel has an interest in ensuring that neighboring regimes are stable, capable of enforcing law and order within their countries, and maintaining control over their borders. Israel is also working toward normalizing relations with countries interested in cooperating with it and recognizing its right to exist.
https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-israel-doing-in-syria-and-why/a-71824463
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-syria-turkey-islamist-government-leaders-d5c118d8
