The Southern Operations Room (SOR) is a coalition of several organizations originating in southern Syria (Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra). The main forces operating within this framework are Druze organizations from the Suwayda province and Sunni organizations from the Daraa area. In addition, there are several local groups operating in the Quneitra and the southern Golan Heights area, but there is no information available regarding them.
This coalition, which was officially announced on December 6, 2024, operated in coordination with the rebel forces that led to the overthrow of the Assad regime (the Fatah al-Mubin operations room). Despite the cooperation with the attack led by Ahmed al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), there were quite a few voices among the leaders of SOR who claimed that he was not the right person to lead Syria.
During the civil war, some of the organizations operating within SOR fought against the Assad regime, ISIS, Hezbollah, and Iranian militias, as well as against organizations currently affiliated with HTS and Ahmed al-Shara. Some of these organizations operated independently, while others were part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
After the regime took control of southern Syria in 2018, many of the rebels chose to move to the Idlib area as part of the “reconciliation agreements,” while others chose to remain in the south of the country and be subject to the supervision of Russia and the Syrian regime. Following the rebel offensive in December 2024, many of these organizations and activists reneged on their agreements with the regime and joined the fight against it.
At the time of the announcement of the establishment of SOR, its leaders claimed they would work to ensure stability and security in southern Syria and that their main goal was to take over Damascus and overthrow the Assad regime. SOR commanders stated that they coordinate their actions with those of the Fatah al-Mubin operations room and other rebel factions in the country.
The most prominent leaders of this coalition are Ahmed al-Awda and Nassim Abu Ara.
Al-Awda, 44, from Bosra al-Sham (Daraa Governorate), holds a degree in English literature and previously served in Assad’s army. Following the outbreak of the civil war, he joined the rebels in his region and commanded the “Youth of Sunnah” (Shabab al-Sunnah) organization, that operated as part of the Free Syrian Army. In this capacity, he collaborated with various rebel factions in the south of the country, including Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist organizations. After the regime took control of southern Syria in 2018, he became the commander of “8th Brigade” (see below), which operated under Russian auspice and was considered close to Russian forces in the country.
Abu Ara, who serves as the spokesman for SOR and one of its prominent commanders, was formerly an officer in Assad’s army. Similar to Al-Awda, Abu Ara also joined the rebels during the civil war and was one of the leaders of the “Youth of Sunnah” and later one of the commanders of the 8th Brigade. Abu Ara is also perceived by many as someone who cooperated with Assad and Russia
The following is a breakdown of the main organizations:
Harakat Rijal Al-Karama (Men of Dignity Movement)
A Druze rebel organization operating in the Suwayda area. Sheikh Wahid al-Balous founded the organization in 2014 to protect Druze communities in the Suwayda region. It has since grown to become one of the most prominent and central rebel organizations in southern Syria, as well as the largest Druze organization. Sheikh Yahya Al-Hajjar currently leads the organization after Balous’s assassination in 2015.
Over the years, the leaders of the organization have maintained neutrality, not officially joining the FSA (Free Syrian Army) or other organizations, and have, for the most part, maintained normal relations with the Syrian army. However, in the past two years, the organization has intensified its activity against the regime, and its members joined SOR after the rebel offensive in northern Syria began.
Kawat Shiekh al-Karama (Sheikh of Dignity Forces)
A Druze rebel organization operating in the Suwayda district. The organization’s leaders are Laith and Fahd Balous (sons of Sheikh Wahid Balous), who split from the Rijal al-Karama Movement after the murder of their father in 2015. During the offensive that led to the overthrow of the Assad regime, the organization helped take over the Suwayda area and attacked Damascus from the south.
Liwa al-Jabal (Mountain Brigade)
A Druze rebel organization based in Suwayda Province. The organization was founded in 2014 and has become one of the most prominent in the region, focusing on protecting Druze. Throughout the war, the organization operated against the Assad regime, Iranian militias, Hezbollah, and ISIS, but also against other rebel organizations and, in some cases, even collaborated with the regime. The organization’s founder, Murhij Hussein al-Jarmani, was assassinated in Suwayda in July 2024.
8th Brigade–
The organization has been functioning in the Daraa and Busra al-Sham region since 2018. This organization evolved from the “Youth of Sunna Forces” rebel organization. This organization which operated as part of the Free Syrian Army until 2018 and was one of the largest organizations in the Daraa area. After the Assad regime took control of southern Syria in 2018, many of the organization’s operatives chose to participate in the “reconciliation agreements,” in which they began operating as part of the Syrian army’s 5th Division and under Russian auspices (until 2022). These agreements also included a name change for the organization.
After the beginning of the rebel offensive, the organization’s operatives joined the southern operations room and helped take over southern Syria. The organization’s commander is Ahmed Al-Awda, who is considered by many in southern Syria to have collaborated with the Assad regime.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Following the “reconciliation agreements” imposed by the Assad regime on the rebels in 2018, most of the organization’s operatives moved to the Idlib region in northern Syria. Several hundred operatives, who were no longer openly active within the organization, remained in the south of the country, maintained contacts with it, and even recruited new operatives. In the months preceding the rebel offensive, these factions increased their activity against the regime and were part of the forces that helped take over southern Syria.
The Central Committee
A civilian framework that began operating in the Daraa region after the Assad regime took control of southern Syria in 2018. This framework is headed by prominent local leaders, tribal sheikhs, former rebel organization leaders, and representatives from the Quneitra region. Its main purpose is to represent the residents of Daraa and its environs vis-à-vis the regime, as well as to supervise the implementation of the “reconciliation agreements” by the regime and rebel organizations (for example, the release of prisoners, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, etc.). The 8th Brigade is one of the factors that helped implement the agreement vis-à-vis the opposition organizations.
Alongside these organizations, there are many unaffiliated groups, and with no clear organizational framework operating in southern Syria and Quneitra. Many of those operating in these groups – both Sunnis and Druze – previously operated as part of the Free Syrian Army or within organizations that were disbanded in 2018. Additionally, these groups’ operations would not have been possible without the support of the tribal leaders, sheikhs, and tribal and municipal councils in the Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra areas.
To conclude, the vast majority of rebel forces that have taken over southern Syria are Druze and Sunnis who previously fought against the Assad regime and the Shiite axis. Most of them do not hold extreme Islamist views, and their main activities focused on ensuring the safety of communities and civilians in the areas under their control.
However, it is important to note that in recent days, the rebels have begun appointing new provincial governors. Two notable appointments in this context, for the governors of Latakia and Damascus provinces, were filled by senior members of the Ahrar al-Sham organization. This organization was founded at the beginning of the civil war and currently constitutes a coalition of organizations with a Salafi-Jihadist ideology. The relations between Ahrar al-Sham and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (led by Julani) have experienced ups and downs over the years, during which conflicts occurred between the organizations and their leaders. Nevertheless, it appears that the organizations have managed to cooperate recently for the purpose of overthrowing Assad.
The appointment of a new governor for the Quneitra and Daraa provinces (and to some extent Suwayda as well) may hint at the direction the new government in Syria is choosing to take, and perhaps allows for an assessment of the risk that will be reflected to Israel, especially along the border in the Golan Heights.
