One of the most significant developments following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria was the withdrawal of Russian forces from their various bases across the country, with their presence being largely consolidated at the Khmeimim base near Latakia and the Tartus base in western Syria. Upon coming to power, the new regime in Syria took a hardline stance toward Russia, raising doubts about the future of the Russian presence in the country.
As part of these developments, Russia significantly scaled back its military presence in Syria, relocating troops and transferring weapons systems, naval vessels, aircraft, and substantial equipment to other bases across the region. It also expanded and reinforced its military installations in Libya, possibly as a contingency plan in case it withdrew entirely from Syria. However, by early 2025, there were signs of a shift in this trend. Multiple reports indicated that Russia and Syria had entered negotiations regarding maintaining a Russian military presence in the country. Yet, as of June 2025, no breakthrough had been achieved, and officially, Russian forces remain concentrated in the two bases previously mentioned.
It is important to remember that the Russian military presence in Syria, which lasted for decades and was mostly stable, is very important for Moscow, as it constitutes a central strategic anchor for it in the Middle East, serving military, political, economic, and religious interests and enabling regional influence.
However, various reports in Syria in recent months point to the possibility that Russia is trying to find another solution for its continued presence in Syria, one that is not currently dependent on the new regime. According to these reports, supported by additional indications, it seems that Russia is trying to establish another foothold at the Qamishli airport in northern Syria. This assumption is further strengthened in the context of the visit of the Turkish foreign minister to Russia about three weeks ago, during which, according to various assessments, the parties also discussed this issue. At this stage, it is not clear whether the intention is to replace the Khmeimim base or to operate the Qamishli base in parallel.
The Qamishli airport, situated near the Turkish border in a region controlled by Kurdish forces (SDF), is a familiar location for the Russians. Since 2016, Russian forces have maintained a presence there, establishing a base that over the years hosted Mi-8 and Mi-35 attack helicopters used to safeguard joint patrols with Turkey. The airbase also housed cargo aircraft, armored personnel carriers, tanks, surveillance systems, and even a field hospital. Russian military police forces (which are effectively infantry forces) were responsible for protecting the base.
Russia appears to be reestablishing its presence in Qamishli. Beginning in March 2025, it started relocating troops, equipment, and various systems to the base via cargo flights from Khmeimim. These transfers intensified between April and June 2025, during which the base underwent infrastructure upgrades and a significant enhancement of its security and defense capabilities. Currently, the base primarily hosts combat helicopters (reports specifically mention Ka-52 helicopters), while cargo aircraft do not remain stationed there on a permanent basis.
It can be assumed that these moves were carried out in coordination with at least part of the SDF forces, relying on the fact that there are quite a few elements among the Kurds who are not satisfied with the agreement signed with the regime, which at this stage is not fully implemented. It should be noted that even after the signing between the parties, there are still clashes, and even battles, between regime forces and SDF fighters.
It should also be noted that the renewed Russian entrenchment in Qamishli is taking place simultaneously with the evacuation of American bases in Syria.
The departure of American forces, which operated mostly in the Kurdish area, places the Kurds in a difficult situation in the face of threats from Turkey on one hand and the need to reach understandings with the al-Shara regime on the other. That is, for the Kurds this may be an attempt to find a new support in the face of the threats facing them, while for Russia this is an additional leverage to improve its position vis-a-vis the new regime in Syria. It also should be noted that Russia has been accused more than once of supporting remnants of the Assad regime and the Shiite axis in Syria, while providing them shelter in its bases and supplying weapons and intelligence for attacks against the regime in the Syrian coastal area.
On the other hand, the US and the West are making efforts to reduce Russian influence in Syria and to distance the new regime from it. This issue was also raised in the past as one of the factors that will affect Syria’s future regarding the lifting of sanctions, the transfer of economic aid, and the continued rehabilitation of the country.
In addition to Russia, the Kurds, and the West, Turkey plays a crucial role in these developments. With significant influence in Syria and well-defined interests, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue, Turkey also serves as a mediator and host for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. We can therefore assume that Russia is coordinating with Turkey as well, though the specifics of this coordination and the mutual objectives of both sides remain unclear at this point.
