General:
On the morning of March 28th, the day the Shiite axis commemorates “International Jerusalem Day” (the Iranian one), rockets were launched towards Israel. This is the second time this type of incident has occurred since the ceasefire with Lebanon commenced on November 27, 2024. Two rockets were launched towards the city of Kiryat Shmona. One of the rockets was intercepted and the other fell in Lebanese territory. The launch was carried out from the Qaaqaait al-Jisr area, north of the Litani River (an area not included in Resolution 1701), approximately 17 kilometers away, in a direct line, from Kiryat Shmona.
This is the fourth rocket launching incident into Israeli territory in total since the ceasefire came into effect. Once again, the Lebanese army did not identify the preparations of the rocket launch and failed to prevent the launch, similar to the six-rocket launch incident on Metula on March 22nd (See detailed analysis article). After many hours, the Lebanese army managed to locate the launch site in the Qaaqaait al-Jisr area. The two rockets launched, according to Lebanese military officials’ assessments, are identical in type to the rockets launched on March 22nd.
Hezbollah denied any involvement in the shooting, and as of this writing, it is unknown who actually carried out the rocket launch.
In the 36 hours before the rocket launch (March 26-27), Israel attacked and killed six Hezbollah operatives. Three of them were transferring weapons in the Yohmhur a-Shaqif area. Three others belonged to the Radwan Unit and were involved in planning terrorist activity against Israel. The senior among them was Ahmad Adnan Bajjiga (also known as Kamil Shaghra – Abu Hassan), a Radwan Unit commander equivalent in rank to a battalion commander. He was originally from the town of Machghara in the Beqaa Valley. He was killed at the entrance to the town of Maaroub (northeast of Tyre) while traveling in his vehicle. The other two Radwan Unit operatives were killed while traveling in their vehicle in the village of Baraachit.
It is unclear if there is a connection between the killing of the six operatives in three separate incidents (March 26-27) and the launch of the two rockets at Kiryat Shmona (March 28). An analysis of the various potential perpetrators of the launch will follow
Israel’s Response (Extensive Attack in Southern Lebanon and Targeted Attack in Beirut):
In response to the rocket launches toward Kiryat Shmona, Israel began extensive artillery fire towards areas in the eastern and central sectors of southern Lebanon.
The second stage of the Israeli response included airstrikes in ten different areas in southern Lebanon.
Unlike the March 22nd rocket launch incident, this time Israel escalated its response and carried out a targeted attack in Beirut as well: a building in the Al-Hadath neighborhood, in the Dahieh area of Beirut. The targeted building was used by Hezbollah’s aerial unit (Unit 127) to store UAVs. Following an evacuation warning, the building was attacked and subsequently collapsed.
Hezbollah is to be held responsible under all circumstance:
As we already noted after the March 22nd rocket launch, Hezbollah is still the dominant force in southern Lebanon. The launch area is, once again, under the geographical responsibility of the Badr Unit. In any case, Hezbollah should be held responsible, even if it did not actually “pull the trigger” and even if it was unaware of the intention to carry out the rocket launch. In the event of terrorist activity against Israeli territory, regardless of who is behind it, Israel’s response should in any case be directed at Hezbollah.
Who Carried Out the March 28th Rocket Launch – Analysis of Possibilities:
On March 29th, the Lebanese army commander announced that several suspects who may be connected to the rocket launch had been apprehended and arrested. According to our assessment, three main possibilities exist for who conducted the launch and who is responsible:
Palestinians Independently
It is possible that the launch was carried out independently and on the initiative of Palestinians belonging to Hamas Lebanon or operating under it (Jamaa al-Islamiyah, for example) or any other Palestinian faction (PIJ, etc.) that operates in cooperation with Hamas-Lebanon. If the rocket launch was indeed carried out by Palestinians, it is possible that they came from one of the three refugee camps located in the Tyre area (Burj al-Shemali, Rashidieh, Al-Bass), or from one of the two refugee camps in the Sidon area (Ein al-Hilweh, Mieh Mieh). There’s a possibility that these launches are tied to the renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip.
Hezbollah in a Double Game (Directly or Through a Proxy)
The probability that Hezbollah carried out the launch directly by its operatives exists, but in our assessment, Hezbollah is not interested in directly associating itself with an incident of this kind (see below). It is more probable that Hezbollah operated through a proxy.
In the case of an operation through a proxy, Hezbollah knew about the launch in advance and approved it while “turning a blind eye” and managing risks, and perhaps even provided logistical assistance in some way. In this case, we believe that the launch was carried out by Palestinians (see details above) or by one of the other terrorist organizations that cooperated with Hezbollah during the last war and served as a kind of proxy for it, such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon. It is also possible that the launch was carried out by Syrian refugees trained by Hezbollah to launch rockets.
Hezbollah understands very well that responsibility for any direct terrorist activity against Israel from Lebanese territory will be placed on it in any case, which will lead to an Israeli military response that will harm its interest and desire for “rehabilitation quiet.” On the other hand, Hezbollah knows that Israel will attack its operatives and sites anyway and will not give it “rehabilitation quiet” (we see this every day). Therefore, it is possible that it decided that if it is attacked every day anyway, then in response it will adopt a policy of attrition against Israel and carry out sporadic shooting through a proxy. On the one hand, it benefits from attrition against Israel, on the other hand, it keeps itself “clean” domestically, towards the Lebanese state, and will not be considered “dragging [Lebanon] into another war.”
In fact, Hezbollah is playing a double game – it publicly disclaims responsibility and is willing to apparently give up the narrative of resistance publicly. But it benefits from attrition against Israel and perhaps also estimates that in any case the Shiite base will credit the shooting to it…
Palestinians Under Iranian Direction (Bypassing Hezbollah and Without Its Knowledge)
It is possible that this is an activity under Iranian direction (against the backdrop of the Iranian Jerusalem Day?), while compartmentalizing Hezbollah.
The Palestinian branch operating within the Quds Force is responsible for maintaining continuous contact between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the terrorist organizations in Lebanon and is responsible for supporting them financially and professionally (knowledge and means). The Palestinian branch is in close contact with the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, with an emphasis on Hamas and PIJ, and operates with them in parallel to its activity with Hezbollah.
What Can Be Done If Another Attack Is Carried Out Against Israel from Lebanese Territory?
In the event of another attack against Israel from southern Lebanon, Israel should consider carrying out two main actions, which are a clear escalation, and can also be carried out simultaneously:
The first action is a broad attack on Hezbollah targets in Beirut, similar to the attacks that occurred in the Dahieh area during November 2024.
The second action is the renewal of the effort to eliminate senior figures in the Hezbollah leadership (the political and military leadership). Currently, the senior leaders who are in the top leadership and known to us are:
Political Leadership – Naim Qassem (leader of the organization), Ali Damoush (head of the Executive Council), Mohammad Raad (chairman of the Resistance faction in parliament and possibly appointed deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah), Ibrahim Amin al-Sayed (head of the Political-Political Council), Mohammad Yazbek (head of the Judicial Council) and Wafiq Safa (head of the Coordination and Liaison Unit).
Military Leadership – Mohammad Haidar (Hezbollah Chief of Staff), Haitham Ali Tabatabai (commander of the Southern Front), Talal Hamia (head of Unit 910).
In addition to the military leaders, the commander of the Radwan Unit and the commanders of the Southern Front’s geographical units should also be included. Except for the commander of the Badr Unit (who was not killed during the war and from whose unit’s area the rockets were launched), the commander of Radwan, the commander of Nasr and the commander of Aziz are new to their positions. The identities of all these are unknown to us.
