For several years, Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal, former commander of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies and now a senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, has been proposing a unique idea regarding Israel’s need to invest in automatic return fire systems on its borders with enemies and during maneuvers in enemy territory. According to Ortal, such systems may also be capable of detecting and intercepting threats already launched in the early stages – while still in enemy territory.
This proposal, if adopted along with the offensive approach Ortal advocates, based on the continuous prevention of enemy force buildup through ongoing raids in enemy territory, could significantly improve Israel’s capabilities against threats such as anti-tank missiles from Lebanon and Gaza. However, this would require the Ministry of Defense and the defense establishment to work with defense companies to develop a fundamentally different response from previous approaches.
In the South, Ortal suggests that Israel establish an advanced detection and attack system on the Gaza border. This system would automatically detect the source of anti-tank missile threats and automatically return fire to the launch point within seconds.
Such a capability would pose an unbearable risk to enemy anti-tank missile squads and serve as a significant deterrent to their activities. The system would be more effective than a buffer zone (designed to protect the holding area – i.e., Israel’s territory) in dealing with such a threat, as even basic anti-tank missiles with a range of five kilometers can threaten Israeli communities in the south from deep within the Gaza Strip. This approach appears to be highly relevant to the Lebanon border as well.
Hezbollah anti-tank missile squads, as well as surface-to-air missile squads and mortar operators, are required, according to Ortal, to stay in the firing position for many tens of seconds, and sometimes for lengthy minutes – making them vulnerable to rapid and automatic return fire capabilities after the enemy firing locations are detected. In Gaza, after the intense fighting stage, the mortar threat has returned to be dominant against IDF soldiers stationed in the strip, some in positions that have become fixed.
It is likely that this approach is equally relevant to the northern border challenges regarding Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah is equipped with a large number of anti-tank missiles. A notable example includes the Iranian Almas missile, based on Rafael’s Spike missile, with a range of possibly up to 16 kilometers in its latest versions (Almas 3 / 4).
Moreover, in many cases, the system could intercept threats already launched. The war in the north demonstrates how complex it is to detect and intercept very advanced drones and anti-tank missiles (like the Almas) after they have already crossed into Israeli territory. Identifying them in enemy territory, under conditions dictated by the terrain in southern Lebanon, should be simpler, and therefore the chances of intercepting them are higher.
Ortal calls for a sustainable strategy based on competitive thinking, rather than merely relying on reactive measures. This approach includes creating systems that not only deal with immediate threats but also enable Israel to continue its ongoing military effort over time.
A major strategic mistake has been Israel’s tendency to allow terrorist organizations in Lebanon and Gaza to accumulate large arsenals of ballistic weapons, anti-tank missiles, and UAVs. This accumulation created a cycle in which Israeli decision-makers avoided action for fear of paralyzing the Israeli home front – i.e., it was Israel that was deterred, not the terrorist armies growing on its border.
To break this cycle, Ortal suggests integrating advanced fire systems that detect and attack anti-tank missile squads and rocket launch points immediately after their launch into the continuous offensive operations in Gaza, which will follow the high intensity phase of the war.
Even in the current situation of medium-intensity conflict in the North, this approach could improve the IDF’s ability to better secure the residents of the Galilee and the Golan Heights.
In 2021, Ortal proposed a similar approach to rocket threats, in the form of fast Israeli network-based missiles during IDF maneuvers in enemy territory. This includes integrating operational data networks, distributed sensors, and fast missiles guided by the sensors for quick attacks on enemy attack positions. The missiles can be positioned close to IDF forces maneuvering in enemy territory, placing them close to their target and providing the ability to hit the target within seconds.
This approach offers several advantages: accuracy, resilience to interference – the missiles themselves are guided to the target by external sensors that acquire the target and are not dependent on data transfer between different systems or on GPS, and great speed. This solution does not require sophisticated systems, and the missile itself does not need its own homing system, making the solution particularly cheap and accessible.
Such an approach could also be applicable before a ground maneuver in the North, when deployed along the border with Lebanon. Such a fire capability in Israel’s possession could significantly challenge the enemy’s ability to carry out repeated attacks without risk. It also does not rely on advanced intelligence capabilities to locate and track enemy operatives and transfer the target information to the Air Force to complete the shooter-to-sensor cycle.
The automatic return fire system could disrupt and interfere with enemy operations, force adversaries to reconsider their approach, and reduce the overall threat to Israel’s border areas, in the South and North.
Currently, the dominant thinking in the Israeli defense establishment regarding the post-war reality in Gaza emphasizes the establishment of a buffer zone featuring multiple obstacles, to protect Israel’s territory and make it difficult and delay various types of attacks on border communities and bases.
In Gaza, Ortal estimates that over time it will be more difficult to enforce a ‘buffer zone’. Terrorists will test Israel’s responses by approaching the border, and sometimes these attempts will include civilians or a guise of civilian activity. Therefore, the main strategic goal should be to prevent the re-establishment of a terrorist army and, at the same time, the ability to respond immediately to any attack. On the northern border, there is no need to wait for the next war in order to develop and install a system of the type that Ortal describes.
In a 2018 analysis of the tunnel threat, Ortal emphasized that historically, traditional defensive solutions have not stood the test of time and have not withstood the ongoing effort of terrorist organizations and armies to challenge them. According to Ortal, each of the previous obstacles was advanced for its time, but in the end did not prevent infiltrations and attacks. Similarly, today in Gaza, they do not provide a solution to anti-tank missile threats that can be launched by terrorists deep in the strip, beyond the buffer zone. Unlike ballistic rocket threats, the Iron Dome does not have the ability to intercept anti-tank missile fire that moves horizontally toward a target. Therefore, Ortal argues that the focus should not be on physical obstacles but on a more active defensive approach whose important component should be the ability to respond immediately and effectively to enemy fire. In a broader view, a continuous, sustainable, and focused offensive effort will be required to prevent the establishment of terrorist armies in the first place in the case of Gaza (and possibly later in southern Lebanon, in a phase that will come after a war with Hezbollah). Here too, the ability of the kind of systems that Ortal described to reduce fire on Israel’s home front should enable a less restrained Israeli policy towards the enemies across the border.
