In recent days, an agreement was signed between the new regime in Syria and the Kurdish forces (SDF), intended to integrate them within the state and its mechanisms.
In addition, in the last 24 hours, reports have emerged that the regime is conducting advanced negotiations on a similar agreement with the Druze leadership.
These agreements are part of al-Sharaa’s effort to unite Syria under a central government, and the attempt to advance the country’s rehabilitation processes.
The agreement between the new regime and the Kurdish forces was signed in Damascus on March 10th between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abadi, the commander of the SDF. Various reports indicate that the agreement was achieved through American mediation and pressure. It is unclear whether this pressure is related to Trump’s declaration regarding his plan to withdraw American forces from Syria and hints about the possibility of a broad American diplomatic move in the Middle East.
The agreement emphasizes that the Kurds are part of the Syrian people and country, regulating their integration within it.
Among other things, it was agreed that the Kurdish civil institutions will be integrated into those of the new regime and that the SDF forces will be integrated into the new army and security organizations. It was also agreed on Kurdish representation in the political system and state institutions and on the return of refugees to the areas from which they were displaced under the protection of the regime.
In addition, it was noted that control of the border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields will be subject to government control, but the SDF spokesman clarified that at this stage there will be no change regarding control of the energy infrastructure and that the regime forces will deploy only on the borders with Iraq and Turkey.
The clauses of the agreement are to be implemented within one year from the date of signing.
As mentioned, alongside the signing of the agreement with the Kurds, numerous reports in the last 24 hours claimed that al-Sharaa is conducting advanced negotiations towards an agreement with the Druze as well, but at this stage there is no official information on the matter. Reports hinted that the agreement is supposed to be similar to the one with the Kurds, and within its framework, the various government ministries will return to operate in Suwayda and the regime’s security organizations will be able to deploy and operate throughout the district. In addition, it appears that the armed Druze organizations will be subordinated to the security organizations and integrated into them, but at this stage it is not clear in what form.
The signing of these agreements (if an agreement with the Druze is indeed signed) is a significant success for the new regime. First, it allows to neutralize two significant centers of opposition that had the potential to destabilize the rule. Secondly, it integrates them into the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes of Syria, thereby further contributing to the legitimacy of the regime. It should also be noted that the SDF controls a large geographical area that includes oil and gas infrastructure, and that control of this area will also allow for closer supervision of the border with Iraq and Turkey. The agreement also neutralizes, for now, Kurdish separatist aspirations.
For the Kurds, the agreement might be a way to reduce the pressure from Turkey, which seeks to distance the Kurds from its border areas and limit their activity.
The signing of the agreement with the Druze, if it does happen, is also important, as they have been one of the strongest forces in Syria over the years. The consent of the spiritual leadership in Suwayda to work alongside the regime can calm tensions not only with Jabal al-Druze, but also with other Druze concentrations in the country. This move can also ease tensions with Israel and reassure the West regarding the new regime’s attitude towards minorities (especially against the background of past week’s clashes with the Alawites).
However, the signing of the agreement with the Kurds also raises a number of questions. First, the agreement as presented is very general. It does not contain in-depth details regarding any of the clauses and is mainly declarative. Thus, for example, it does not mention what the status of the Kurds in the country will be and whether their political, social structure and autonomy will be preserved. The agreement also does not address which areas refugees and displaced persons will be allowed to return to and whether they include the territories that Turkey and the SNA forces have seized in northern Syria. In addition, it is unclear how profits from the operation of the gas and oil fields in this area will be distributed.
Secondly, Turkey’s stance on the agreement remains unclear, as does its involvement in drafting it, if any.
Also, although the agreement states that the state will provide protection to the displaced, it is unclear if this is coordinated with Turkey and the SNA forces and whether al-Sharaa will act against them if they do not honor the agreement.
Another important issue, which is not directly related to the agreement, but is related to the developments in Syria, concerns the American presence in the country and relations with Israel. As mentioned, there are indications that the US intends to withdraw its forces from Syria, and this requires a reevaluation of the US position regarding the Kurds and the new regime in Syria and its ability to influence it after its departure.
Regarding Israel, and despite the tension and IDF operations in Syria, it is clear that there is also some dialogue with the new regime. This is evident from the intention to allow Druze workers to work in Israel, as well as in the plan to allow 100 Syrian Druze sheikhs to visit Israel.
Finally, and despite the optimism that the al-Sharaa regime is conveying regarding the stabilization and rehabilitation of the country, it should be remembered that the situation in Syria is still unstable. Al-Sharaa has not yet reached agreements with the SNA in the north of the country and with the leaders of the 8th Brigade in the south. In addition, and despite the declarations regarding the defeat of the remnants of the Assad regime, there are still quite a few local organizations of supporters of the former regime in Syria, and it is likely that they will continue to operate in the foreseeable future. To this should be added the fact that al-Sharaa leads a relatively moderate and pragmatic stance compared to other factions in Syria, and it is not certain that these will cooperate with him regarding the rights of women and minorities, Syria’s rapprochement with the West, and more. Another issue concerns the sectarian tensions in Syria. As seen last week, these are not expected to subside soon and are likely to be a significant factor in shaping the inter-sectarian, inter-religious, and political relations in Syria, especially against the background of the involvement of various states in the country.
