Executive Summary
Halting Iranian support for Hezbollah, isolating Hezbollah within Lebanon’s domestic political landscape, and stopping the migration of non-Shi’ite communities from Lebanon – which gives Hezbollah a demographic advantage – would, in our assessment, help curb the dangerous transformation of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and enhance its ability to act against Hezbollah.
Maps attached to this report describe the current state of the LAF, detailing its missions, leadership structure, regional commands, and the three branches – land, air, and sea. Additionally, they provide insights into special units and professional headquarters.
The LAF has been undergoing significant demographic shifts, leading to a trend of ‘Shi’ization.’ This shift is driven by Lebanon’s natural demographic changes and the abolition of mandatory military conscription. Hezbollah benefits from this transformation, as it seeks to fill the ranks of the LAF with members from its own Shi’ite sect.
Currently, the LAF has a clear Muslim majority, and there is a high probability that it also has a Shi’ite majority due to this trend.
The Shi’ization of the LAF affects the degree of cooperation between its soldiers and officers with Hezbollah, increasing Hezbollah’s influence over the Lebanese military.
In the Lebanese army, there are commanders, officers, soldiers, and units that perform their duties with the sole authority of the state. However, there are some commanders, officers, and soldiers belonging to the Shiite community who collaborate with Hezbollah, allowing them to operate freely and bypass international agreements, such as UNSC Resolution 1701.
The functioning of unit commanders, particularly those collaborating with Hezbollah, directly affects the activity and effectiveness of the units under their command. As long as there are senior Shiite officers serving in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese army will struggle to carry out its tasks as required.
This transformation undermines the LAF’s willingness and capability to enforce international agreements, particularly those concerning Israel. It effectively neutralizes the LAF as a counterweight to Hezbollah.
The continued functioning of commanders, officers, and soldiers who collaborate with Hezbollah, acting against the Lebanese government’s policy, undermines the implementation of international agreements, affects the army’s operations, and effectively forces Israel to take defensive measures. Regrettably, the “spirit of the commander” who cooperates with Hezbollah trickles down. Removing them from the army is necessary to change the situation in southern Lebanon.
On January 26, 2025 – the original expiration date of the ceasefire test period – the LAF failed to prevent Lebanese individuals from reaching areas where the IDF was deployed.
This failure occurred because the LAF and Shiite commanders neither wanted nor was able to confront Hezbollah, a pattern consistent with its inaction alongside UNIFIL since the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in 2006.
Shi’ization also threatens the LAF’s broader legitimacy within Lebanon and could impact Western military aid and cooperation.
Since 2006, the United States has provided the Lebanese army with about $3 billion in aid, of which about $750 million is in financial aid. Some of the Western-supplied equipment, including anti-tank missiles, surveillance, and night vision systems, has previously leaked to Hezbollah and may continue to do so in the future.
The fundamental assumption of key Western supporters of the LAF (the U.S., France, and the UK) – that the LAF can serve as a counterbalance to Hezbollah 0 is fundamentally flawed. This assumption ignores the ongoing trends and disregards the LAF’s policy of containment and cooperation with Hezbollah over the past 18 years.
Several incidents along the border in recent years suggest circumstantial links between Hezbollah’s interests and direct LAF attacks on the IDF. These incidents are difficult to explain without Hezbollah’s involvement or, at the very least, the LAF’s willingness to assist Hezbollah.
Family ties between Hezbollah operatives and LAF soldiers increase the likelihood that Hezbollah will use the LAF, particularly in southern Lebanon, as a supporting platform, human shield, or even as a direct proxy. Additionally, this situation facilitates the leakage of Western military knowledge and weaponry to Hezbollah.
If the trend of Shi’ization in Lebanon – and within the LAF specifically – is not curbed, we assess that the LAF will continue its gradual, long-term transformation. Ultimately, this could lead to the LAF ceasing to function as a national army detached from Lebanon’s sectarian struggles and instead becoming, at least in part, a Hezbollah proxy or even merging with Hezbollah’s military forces.
