On November 27 at 4 a.m. (Israel time), the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon went into effect after a year and two months of war. The heads of the municipalities in northern Israel promptly declared that this ceasefire was premature and failed to provide the necessary security for the residents to return to their homes. Is that so?
The IDF significantly damaged Hezbollah before signing the ceasefire agreement.
The organization’s two most senior leaders were eliminated (Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din), most of its senior military leadership was eliminated, and more than 170-unit field commanders and senior military echelons in the Islamic Jihad Council were killed. The elimination of Hezbollah commanders, highly experienced individuals long recognized for their terrorist activities and serving as centers of knowledge in their respective fields, has caused significant damage to the organization.
In addition to causing damage to Hezbollah’s leadership and senior military echelons, the IDF also targeted numerous Hezbollah operatives. Estimates suggest that the IDF killed between 2,500 and 3,000 activists and wounded thousands more. Numerous activists lost their ability to operate effectively.
The IDF managed to severely damage the infrastructure and command of the Radwan unit. In fact, Radwan, with the support of the geographical units, no longer posed the clear and immediate danger of an invasion and conquest of the Galilee. Hezbollah cannot implement its plans for an invasion of the Galilee today, neither in the original broad format along the entire sector nor in a more limited format. However, it must be remembered that there is never 100 percent security. Therefore, it is impossible to completely rule out the possibility of local infiltration attempts by individual squads with lone operatives, which could include Palestinians and not necessarily Hezbollah.
Nasser and Aziz, two geographical units deployed south of the Litani River, sustained severe damage in addition to the Radwan unit. The damage to them includes senior command, many operatives, and firepower.
The IDF also severely damaged Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arrays. According to our assessment, before the war, Hezbollah had about 75,000 missiles and rockets of all types and ranges. Based on statements by senior Israeli security officials, the IDF has destroyed at least 70 to 80 percent of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arsenal. This means that Hezbollah still has thousands of missiles left in its possession, and it could continue to launch dozens of launches a day into Israeli territory for up to a year. Furthermore, the extent of the damage to Hezbollah’s ability to independently manufacture and assemble weapons, which is crucial for prolonged operational redundancy, remains incalculable.
On the other hand, Hezbollah’s fire policy in the past two months, which was much less than estimated, proves that damage has also been done to the strategic systems of precision missiles and missiles with medium (80 to 200 kilometers) and long-range (over 200 kilometers). The IDF also concentrated its offensive efforts on other components of Hezbollah’s strategic systems, including cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. A significant portion of these systems were deployed and stored in the Dahieh, where the IDF intensively attacked 330 different targets, especially in November 2024 (compared to 140 targets attacked in Dahieh during the Second Lebanon War in 2006).
Hezbollah maintains a widely dispersed UAV array. The UAVs are operated both by the Radwan unit, the geographic units, and Hezbollah’s air unit—Unit 127. In our assessment, before the war, Hezbollah had about 2,500 UAVs of all types (not including drones). Although the IDF has worked hard to damage this array and its commanders (with an emphasis on Unit 127), it seems that considering its decentralization and deployment throughout Lebanon, and the ability to assemble UAVs independently on Lebanese soil, Hezbollah has managed to maintain operational redundancy, as demonstrated by the continuous increase in the use of UAVs from January 2024 until the ceasefire. As seen in November 2024, there were 103 UAV attacks, the highest number since the beginning of the war (each incident usually involved several UAVs).
The IDF thwarted and destroyed Hezbollah’s anti-tank missile array, which included thousands of various types of missiles intended for the Galilee invasion. The ground maneuver stopped at a line 5–6 kilometers from the border with Israel, but the IDF “cleansed” these areas and removed weapons and military equipment on a very large scale, destroying and blocking much subterranean infrastructure.
Additionally, the IDF inflicted damage on Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure that facilitated military terrorist activities. The IDF targeted Hezbollah’s independent financial system, including Hezbollah’s bank, Al-Kard al-Hassan Bank, and money exchange offices operating under Hezbollah’s control, causing damage to sites affiliated with the Executive Council, responsible for construction, energy, and the entire system supporting and enabling Hezbollah’s fighting machine.
In addition, the IDF concentrated its continuous offensive efforts on Hezbollah’s weapons smuggling infrastructure from Syria to Lebanon, with an emphasis on damaging the storage infrastructure of Hezbollah’s armaments unit in the area of the town of Al-Qusayr, near the border with Lebanon, west of the city of Homs in Syria, and damaging the logistical infrastructure of Unit 4400, which is responsible for the smuggling. Among other things, the IDF attacked official and unofficial border crossings, eliminated commanders of Unit 4400, and attacked a strategic weapons smuggling tunnel. The Iranian corridor and the smuggling infrastructure will be a critical component in Hezbollah’s future reconstruction and military buildup.
The main achievements of the IDF during this offensive, described above, proved a very impressive intelligence and operational capability. This capability stands in stark contrast to the trauma and intelligence and operational failure of October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip.
Considering this, many Israelis are now asking – is this enough?
The details of the agreement between Israel and Lebanon were revealed in the global media. It is not clear who signed the agreement with whom, but one thing is clear – Hezbollah and the Iranians are parties to the agreement. It was signed with their approval and consent. The Lebanese government is the proxy for the signing. Unfortunately, many details remain unknown. The details of the agreement itself have not been published, but 13 of its main points have been published, as well as the main points of the American letter of guarantees.
It is clear to all that the agreement will indeed bring about a ceasefire, as the parties have committed. The big question is for how long?
All sides wanted this ceasefire. It was important for Israel to end the Lebanese front in order to bring back the residents of the north, to rehabilitate the communities, and also to rehabilitate and refresh the army – in order to be better prepared for the next stages of fighting, apparently against Iran, which continues its advance toward nuclear weapons in full force (and perhaps also against the Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen, depending on their future conduct). Prime Minister Netanyahu made this clear in his Nov. 26 speech.
It was important for Hezbollah and Iran to reach a ceasefire that would stop Israel’s crushing of the infrastructure and leadership of Hezbollah (the main Iranian proxy) and to allow Hezbollah to recover. And therein lies the gap – if Hezbollah can rehabilitate, it can once again threaten Israel’s citizens with another massacre. This is what Israel wants to prevent.
The residents of the north woke up this morning to the beginning of the cease-fire with mixed feelings. On the one hand, there is hope to return home to a normal life. On the other hand, there is great concern that Hezbollah will rebuild its military infrastructure on the Lebanese hills that overlook the Israeli communities along the contact line, in a way that will enable it to launch anti-tank missiles at homes and carry out another massacre like Hamas carried out on October 7.
On the evening of October 7, 2023, Hezbollah was already fully prepared to carry out an invasion of the Galilee and a massacre. We were aware of this preparation throughout 2023 and issued warnings about it. Hezbollah was surprised and chose not to join Hamas, which preceded it and “outshined it,” partly due to Hezbollah’s reluctance to become Hamas’ “second fiddle.”
At the Alma Center, we have discussed the contents of the forming agreement extensively over the past year. We focused on three components: disarmament, an effective oversight mechanism, and a deadline that would allow Israel freedom of action. On the face of it, it seems that the three components are in the agreement. However, upon examining the published 13 points, numerous uncertainties arise, casting doubt on the feasibility of achieving a genuine solution and averting Hezbollah’s potential to threaten Israel once more.
The first problematic item is the reference to the UN Security Council resolution that ended the previous war in 2006, Resolution 1701 – the parties “recognize the importance of the resolution.” What does the phrase “recognizing the importance” mean – why is there no mutual commitment to implement Resolution 1701 and in fact a commitment to disarm Hezbollah in all areas south of the Litani – up to 25 kilometers from the Israeli border?
The second problematic clause deals with the production and smuggling of weapons, according to which “any sale, supply and manufacture of weapons or materials related to weapons to Lebanon shall be under the supervision and control of the Lebanese government.” However, Hezbollah is officially a member of the Lebanese government. Today, the minister responsible for the entrances and exits from Lebanon, including the border crossings into Syria and the Hariri International Airport, is a Hezbollah member.
According to reports, the agreement explicitly states that “all unauthorized facilities involved in the production of weapons and weapons-related materials will be dismantled” and that “all military infrastructure and positions will be dismantled, and all unauthorized weapons will be confiscated”…
However, the crucial question is who will oversee the implementation of the agreement? Everyone can clearly see that UNIFIL, and the Lebanese army failed to fulfill the mission that was set for them 18 years ago, both due to their inability and unwillingness to do so. Therefore, according to the current agreement, there is talk of an American-French committee that will oversee enforcement. According to the agreement, “Israel and Lebanon will report any possible violation of their obligations to the committee and to UNIFIL.” And then what will happen? The published information does not clarify the committee’s enforcement powers. Furthermore, based on the aforementioned information, will Israel be required to divulge sensitive intelligence data to UNIFIL, which could potentially reach forces in Lebanon? What will happen once Israel bears the cost of sharing such sensitive intelligence information? It is not clear from the agreement who will ultimately approach the point that the IDF will report, act against Hezbollah infrastructure at the point, or stand up to Hezbollah operatives. In writing these lines, we have a difficult feeling of…
Have been there, done that…
According to reports, the Lebanese army will be responsible for the enforcement. The Lebanese army will deploy thousands of its troops in southern Lebanon. Although the published articles of the agreement mention “deployment on the borders,” they do not explicitly state that the goal of this deployment is to prevent the transfer of weapons.
Additionally, Resolution 1701 explicitly tasked the Lebanese army to act, with UNIFIL’s assistance, to establish a zone free of any illegal weapons south of the Litani, but this did not happen. The current agreement does not specify what would prompt the Lebanese army to behave differently and cease its current cooperation with Hezbollah. Many soldiers and officers from the Lebanese army cooperate with Hezbollah and assist it in intelligence, access and use of military infrastructure, and the like. To this, we should add that about 45 percent of the soldiers and officers of the Lebanese army, which numbers about 65,000 soldiers, are Shiites. The ethnic common denominator naturally leads to an ideological common denominator…
The bottom line is that the agreement’s content fails to provide a clear answer to the phrase “effective enforcement mechanism”, resulting in further ambiguity.
Regarding the issue of the deadline, according to reports, the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon will be completed within 60 days. The agreement does not say what will happen if Lebanon does not disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani during these 60 days, and what will happen if Israel proves Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani, including in areas that the IDF did not reach during this period.
At the same time, during the 60 days, Lebanese residents will be able to return to live in the hills overlooking the Israeli communities along the contact line. The agreement ignored the obvious Israeli operational need to create a buffer zone, and as of this writing (the afternoon of November 27), there are already quite a few reports of a population returning to the line of contact near the border with Israel, including Hezbollah operatives. As has become clear in recent months, the Lebanese residents have allowed Hezbollah to hide rocket launchers, tunnel openings, and equipment for the invasion inside their homes. Who can guarantee that this will not happen again, given that Hezbollah continues to function as a social movement and political party in Lebanon?
And this is a critical point – the state of Lebanon has not changed its relations with the state of Hezbollah. Hezbollah continues to be a member of the Lebanese government and to maintain its civilian systems, which enable it to create dependence of the Shiites in Lebanon on the organization – and thus continue to establish the tactic of human shields. As long as the Lebanese state does not declare Hezbollah a terrorist organization, as many countries around the world have done, nothing will change. Moreover, Iran has already promised that it will fund the reconstruction of Hezbollah and the reconstruction of Lebanon – the Dahieh in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and the villages in the south. This was also the case in 2006, when, under Iranian auspices, Hezbollah’s Construction Jihad rebuilt the destroyed houses, and in the process buried the organization’s military infrastructure, with an emphasis on the underground infrastructure and the “land of the tunnels.” The current agreement does not address these issues at all, but these are fundamental issues. As long as they are not addressed, there will be no better future for the Lebanese and Israelis on both sides of the border.
In addition to the details of the agreement that were published above, the main points of the American letter of guarantees were also published in the Israeli media (published on the Telegram channel of Moriah Asraf and Doron Kadosh). Here too, many questions arise:
On the one hand, it said that “Israel and the United States intend to share sensitive intelligence regarding violations, including any infiltration by Hezbollah into the Lebanese army.” At the same time, however, it was reported that “the United States may share information provided by Israel with agreed third parties (the Lebanese government and/or the Commission) in order to enable them to address the violation.” Once again, the question arises regarding the protection of intelligence sources and the ability to share intelligence on the assumption that it will reach dubious elements.
Both US President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke of Israel’s freedom of action to defend itself, with American guarantee and even cooperation against “destabilizing Iranian activity in Lebanon.” On the face of it, this is good news – but the main question here is how to act against this activity and what is defined as destabilizing?
The reality that emerged in Lebanon after the 2006 war, as we believe it may be now, is that Hezbollah does not fire at Israel and ostensibly “keeps quiet.” However, its operatives will rebuild the military infrastructure under civilian cover and under the guise of human shields. Does such activity fall under the category of “threats emanating from Lebanese territory”? Is every weapons truck that crosses the Syrian border into Lebanon defined under this category?
These questions are ostensibly answered in the letter of guarantees, which reportedly states that “Israel reserves the right to act at any time against violations in the area of southern Lebanon, and that outside of southern Lebanon, Israel reserves the right to act against the development of threats directed against it, if Lebanon is unable or unwilling to thwart these threats, including the entry of illegal weapons into Lebanon through borders and crossings.”
However, according to reports, Israel will have to notify the United States in advance if it wants to take these steps. So, will any attack on a weapons truck on the Syrian-Lebanese border require Israel to get a green light from the United States? Will Israel need a green light from the White House for any response to a Hezbollah operative’s appearance near the border? How does this work out given operational needs, such as rapid response time to a threat, for example?
At the end of the day, the conclusion from all these is that the Middle East is measured by actions. The texts are drafted in a political way that allows each side to interpret them in a way that is convenient for them (including the international mediator/supervisor). In the end, the decision is in the hands of the Israeli government – at what point the IDF forces will receive an order from the Israeli government to act against Hezbollah’s violations, which are clear to everyone that they will come.
It is absolutely clear to us that Hezbollah is here to stay, that the Iranians will try to support Hezbollah all the way, and that there will be no 100 percent security. After all, as noted above, at the time of writing this document, there were already reports of Hezbollah operatives approaching the border fence in the Metula area, while IDF forces were driving them away by firing warning shots in the air.
The last time it took 18 years, and the residents of the north feel that they were miraculously saved from a massacre. This time, the monster must not be allowed to grow. The United States will have to give Israel the backing it promised and not compromise with Lebanon on the deceptive moves of Hezbollah and Iran.
The test of Israeli behavior the day after is a critical test. Israel will have to deal decisively with every weapon truck that crosses the Syrian border (the military lifeline and military reconstruction and buildup), every operative who returns to southern Lebanon, and every military infrastructure that is rehabilitated (a potential future invasion). There is a risk that Hezbollah will respond and life in the north will once again be disrupted and will not return to normal. But this is a calculated risk that must be taken, especially now that Hezbollah is weak.
To what extent can UNIFIL and the Lebanese army be trusted? Unfortunately, the answer is simple: it is not possible.
Israel will have to complete the defense envelope in the north by deploying a dense physical defense system that will be integrated with a civilian defense system in the communities. In addition, Israel will have to declare a national project for immediate implementation, aimed at shield-protecting the communities in the north (homes and public buildings).
In his November 26 speech, President Biden spoke of the agreement as a step toward peace in the Middle East. But there will be no peace in the Middle East as long as one side (Iran and its proxies) wants and operates on an extremist ideological and religious basis to destroy the other side – Israel. Peace will come to be between two parties who come IN GOOD FAITH. That’s not the case. Therefore, Iran must not be allowed to be involved in any way in the reconstruction of Hezbollah. Effective mechanisms must be established to thwart the transfer of funds to Hezbollah. The most important thing is that the international community must demand that Lebanon outlaw Hezbollah, while threatening with sanctions. If this does not happen, there will be no future, neither for Lebanon nor for northern Israel.
To clarify the issue, we will conclude with a statement written on November 20, 2024, by Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of the Al-Akhbar newspaper (Hezbollah’s main mouthpiece): “The current conflict is only one round of war against Israel, which must be destroyed. To this end, Hezbollah will work to rehabilitate its capabilities and regain its strength…”
