The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime by the rebels, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks one of the final echoes of the Arab Spring. The conflict, which began in Syria in 2011 with the goal of toppling Assad, concluded on December 8, 2024, more than 13 years after it started. Although this appears to be an internal Syrian event, it is important to note that the timing of the rebel offensive was very much influenced by circumstances related to the current state of Russia, Iran, and the Shiite axis. The severe blows inflicted by Israel on Iran and the Shiite axis, particularly on Hezbollah, along with Russia’s entanglement in the war in Ukraine, enabled the rebels to launch an offensive, knowing that the Syrian army would receive minimal (if any) support from its allies.
The end of Assad’s regime represents, for many in Syria as well as for countries in the Middle East and the West, the potential for the beginning of a new era in Syria and the region, one that holds many opportunities. This includes the establishment of a more representative government (though not necessarily Western-style democratic), the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees, and the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the rebels’ victory opens opportunities for realigning regional dynamics and drawing Syria closer to moderate Sunni states, as well as the West, thereby distancing it from Iran, Russia, and the Shiite axis.
Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), leader of HTS, is well aware of the hopes many place in him, as well as the potential for change contained in the overthrow of Assad. Accordingly, He has adopted a statesmanlike approach to help legitimize his leadership, possibly positioning himself as Syria’s future president. al-Sharaa has made statements indicating that he does not intend to impose Islamist rule or establish an autocracy. He has preserved existing governance structures, appointed an interim prime minister with a clear end date, urged respect for minorities and state institutions, and even publicly opposed restrictions on women. His “Salvation Government” has called for the return of Syrian refugees, pledged national reconciliation, and initiated talks with Arab nations to reopen embassies in Damascus. al-Sharaa also expressed himself in a relatively conciliatory manner towards Israel.
These moves are part of a broader effort conducted by al-Julani in recent years to shed his jihadist image. In this context he refused to pledge allegiance to ISIS (even fighting against them for a period of time), renounced ties to al-Qaeda, reverted to his original name, adopted Western-style attire (reminding of Ukrainian President Zelensky), and emphasized minimizing civilian casualties and avoiding vengeance. Al-Sharaa’s recent interviews with Western media have further reinforced this moderate and pragmatic image, signaling a clear overture to the West and moderate Sunni states.
However, despite these positive signals, al-Sharaa and Syria’s future government face numerous challenges in unifying and rebuilding the country. Each of these challenges poses a potential threat to Syria’s stability and the direction of the revolution.
Conflicting Ideologies
One of the primary challenges facing any future Syrian regime is the ideological divide among the various rebel factions. On one end of the spectrum are relatively moderate and secular groups seeking to maintain Syria’s character as it was under the Assads—largely secular and minimizing Islamic elements. On the other end are factions seeking to establish an extreme Islamist rule in Syria—possibly even a Muslim caliphate—with all that this entails. It should be noted that many of those supporting the Islamist identity come from the ranks of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Fatah al-Mubin Operations Room, which are led by al-Julani. Additionally, jihadists from around the world (Caucasus, China, Europe, and more) have joined these groups. If these forces will have a significant influence on the future government, it could impact Syria’s character and intensify its religious nature. Another possibility is that extremist groups could target the more moderate factions among the rebels, potentially even al-Julani himself.
This ideological tug-of-war may lead to internal conflicts, with extremists potentially targeting moderates—or even al-Julani himself. Turkey’s influence over certain rebel factions is a critical factor that could tilt the balance in this struggle. Lessons from other Arab Spring revolutions, such as those in Egypt and Libya, demonstrate the real risk of revolutions being “hijacked” by Islamist groups.
The struggle over Syria’s religious character and identity may become a significant point of contention involving Jolani, who is currently presenting a moderate stance. (To be fair, at this stage, it is unclear whether this effort is genuine or merely superficial) and those seeking a state with a religious government. In this context, it is important to note that Turkey’s support for certain rebel factions is a significant factor that could sway the balance on this issue.
An examination of other revolutions that occurred during the Arab Spring shows that they were often “hijacked” by groups associated with Islamist movements, and this remains a realistic possibility in Syria as well. The two most prominent examples in this regard are the revolutions in Egypt and Libya, which ultimately led to the rise of Islamist forces in power.
Sectarian Divides
Another significant challenge concerns the need to unite the diverse sects within the country, many of which carry grievances accumulated under Assad’s rule. These include major groups such as Kurds, Druze, and Sunnis, as well as various minorities like Alawites, Turkmen, Assyrians, Syriacs, and others.
The new government will need to take into account the aspirations, needs, and unique characteristics of each group, as well as the tensions and desire for retribution between different groups.
Among other challenges, the new government will need to address the Kurdish issue, as it is not certain that they will wish to remain part of Syria in the future. Their aspiration for an independent state, or at least for autonomy, could result in the loss of 30%-40% of Syria’s territory, along with gas and oil fields, essential for rebuilding the Syrian economy. This trend could intensify further due to the Kurds being pushed out of many areas around Aleppo and Manbij, as well as being driven east of the Euphrates by SNA forces operating under Turkey’s directives. Additionally, the departure of Arab factions from the SDF has left it almost exclusively Kurdish in nature.
Acts of revenge against Shia, Alawites, and former regime loyalists, already reported in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, might further deepen divisions and hinder efforts to create a unified Syrian identity.
Foreign Influence
As is well known, the Assad regime has been heavily reliant on the support of Iran and Russia, which has granted them considerable influence over Syria. The victory of the rebels, who oppose Iran and its proxies, has pushed the Shiite axis out of Syria, creating the potential for changes in the dynamics of foreign influence and relations in Syria.
As part of this shift, it appears that al-Julani is seeking to strengthen ties with moderate Sunni states and Qatar while pushing Iran out. So far, officials from HTS’s foreign relations office have met with ambassadors from several countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and Jordan. Additionally, it was reported that a similar meeting took place with the Italian ambassador and that Qatar has announced its intention to reopen its embassy in Damascus in the coming days.
These changes can certainly indicate a positive direction, but it is important to keep in mind these are not the only actors interested in Syria’s future.
Although, as of this writing, Russia has withdrawn many of its forces from Syria and it remains unclear what the scope of its future presence and role in the country will be, we assume it will not withdraw all of its forces, giving up its influence in the region. It should be noted that Syria has served as a military and political strategic foothold for Russia for several decades. Russia has invested significant amounts of money in Syria, and hundreds of Russian soldiers have lost their lives defending Russian interests in the country. Additionally, Russia has leased several military bases from the Assad regime for decades. In light of this, it can be speculated that Russia will seek to maintain its influence in Syria through various means, while attempting to push back Western influence.
A hint of Russia’s pragmatism could perhaps be seen in the replacement of Syria’s flag with the revolution flag at the Syrian embassy in Moscow, just two days after the fall of Assad’s regime.
Another country that will influence Syria’s future is Turkey. Erdogan, who supported the Idlib enclave in recent years, actively backs numerous rebel groups operating under his guidance.
The most prominent example of this is the military actions of SNA forces to push Kurds out of Aleppo, Manbij, and the areas west of the Euphrates, with the aim of creating a buffer zone free of Kurdish forces in northern Syria, to be controlled by Turkey’s supporters.
Erdogan’s intervention in Syria aims to serve several objectives:
The first, and most obvious objective, is weaken the Kurds and push them far from Turkey’s borders. It seems that this step is currently receiving some support form the US, who even helped broker an agreement for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Manbij.
Another goal is to remove Syrian refugees from Turkish territory. Many of the Syrian refugees who fled Syria during the civil war passed through Turkey on their way to Europe but some settled in the country. Similar to Jordan and Lebanon, the refugee issue in Turkey has also burdened the economy and created several internal tensions. After the war in Syria ended, Erdogan tried to meet with Assad to resolve this issue, but faced continued and public refusal. The toppling of the Assad regime, in which Turkey played a significant role, could allow Erdogan to return many Syrians to their homeland, and resolve the refugee issue in Turkey. The return of the refugees might also help Erdogan create a buffer zone against the Kurds, as he previously declared his intentions to resettle refugees in northern Syria, near the border with Turkey.
Turkey’s intervention in Syria also serves Erdogan’s ambition to turn Turkey into a regional power (and even restore the glory of the Ottoman Empire). His support for rebel groups could earn him influence in Syria, which could benefit Turkey in several ways:
-Possible control of the Syrian naval ports and establishing Turkish control over the north and northeast of the Mediterranean. This represents significant economic potential in terms of future energy infrastructure, transportation, and logistics
-Control over oil and gas fields in eastern Syria, if he succeeds in pushing the Kurds out of this region.
-Taking a significant role in the reconstruction of infrastructure in Syria and its future rebuilding.
Turkey’s intervention in Syria also holds certain risks that must be considered. The presence of numerous Islamist factions among the ranks of the rebels raises concerns that they may gain a significant foothold in any future government of Syria. In light of this, it cannot be ruled out that Turkey, and of course Qatar, will exploit this situation to increase the influence of factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Such influence could potentially spill over into Jordan in the future, undermining the stability of the kingdom and the region as a whole. In other words, there is a possible risk of creating a Muslim Brotherhood-supporting axis stretching from Turkey, through Syria to Jordan, and backed by Qatar (similar to the Shiite axis starting from Iran, through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon).
Erdogan’s support for certain rebel organizations, which effectively operate under his command, along with his recent radical statements against Israel and his antisemitic positions, pose a similar risk to Israel as well. In this context, there is a risk that Erdogan might use pro-Turkish proxy forces to attack Israel from the Golan Heights front, similar to the terrorist infrastructure established by Iran and Hezbollah in the Golan.
As mentioned, each of these challenges presents risks for Syria, and some also for the region. Potential scenarios include the fragmentation of Syria into several cantons (along sectarian lines), spiraling into an ongoing civil war, and even a complete collapse into, leading to chaos and the takeover of militias and armed groups, creating a no man’s land.
To mitigate the risks and challenges outlined above (of course, these are not the only ones, and there are many others), moderate Arab countries, as well as the U.S. and Europe, must actively support Syria’s stabilization and reconstruction, encouraging its alignment with the West and the Sunni axis.
This is likely to be a lengthy process that will take several years and encounter numerous obstacles along the way, but the potential for weakening the Shiite axis, enhancing regional stability, and rebuilding Syria certainly justifies the effort and resources that will be required.
