On March 22, 2025, six rockets were launched from Lebanese territory towards the town of Metula. Some of the rockets fell within Lebanese territory, while the rest were intercepted. This marks the third shooting incident into Israeli territory since the ceasefire took effect on November 27, 2024. The first incident involved the firing of two mortar shells into the Mount Dov area on December 2, 2024, and the second incident was a rifle bullet fired from the village of Maroun al-Ras, which hit a car in the settlement of Avivim on March 16, 2025.
The launch of the six rockets was carried out from the area of the villages of Arnoun – Yohmor, located near and north of the Litani River, approximately five kilometers northwest of Metula. The Lebanese army did not detect the preparation activities for the rocket launch and did not prevent the launch itself. After the launch, the Lebanese army managed to locate the site from which the rockets were fired.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam warned against attempts to drag Lebanon back into the cycle of war. However, neither of them assigned responsibility to any party and called on all entities in southern Lebanon to prevent any violations that could threaten Lebanon.
In response to the rocket launches, the IDF carried out extensive air and artillery strikes in two waves of attacks in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. According to local reports,the strikes targeted at least 22 areas. Command centers, launchers, weapon depots, and other terrorist infrastructure were attacked, as well as several Hezbollah operatives that were eliminated.
As of today, Hezbollah remains the dominant force in southern Lebanon. The launch site is within the geographical responsibility of the Badr Unit. In any case, Hezbollah should be regarded as responsible, even if it did not “pull the trigger” directly or was unaware of the intention to carry out the rocket launch. In the event of terrorist activity against Israeli territory, regardless of who is behind it, Israel’s response should always be directed at Hezbollah, as indeed occurred.
Who carried out the rocket launches?
At this point in time, it is unknown who exactly carried out the rocket launches. Beyond the possibility of Hezbollah’s involvement, it is possible that the launch was conducted by Palestinians affiliated with Hamas Lebanon or operating under its direction (such as Jama’a al-Islamiyya) or any other Palestinian faction (like PIJ, etc.) collaborating with Hamas Lebanon. If the rocket launches were indeed carried out by Palestinians, they might have originated from one of the five refugee camps in the Tyre area (Borj El-Chmali, Rachidyieh, Al-Bass) or Sidon (Ein el-Hilweh, Miyeh Miyeh).
It is also possible that the launches were carried out by one of the other terrorist organizations that collaborated with Hezbollah during the last war and acted as its proxy, such as the Syrian Socialist Party in Lebanon, for example.
Did Hezbollah know in advance about the launch if it was not the one who carried it out?
The primary working assumption is that any terrorist activity against the state of Israel originating from southern Lebanon is coordinated and approved by Hezbollah. During the last war, all other terrorist organizations operating against Israel from southern Lebanon indeed acted under Hezbollah’s command as its proxies.
However, in 2021, during the fighting in the Gaza Strip (“Operation Guardian of the Walls”), Hamas-Lebanon launched several rockets from the eastern sector towards Kiryat Shmona area. According to our analysis conducted at the time, we assessed that the launch was carried out without Hezbollah’s knowledge, causing significant embarrassment to Hezbollah and harming its interests.
If Hezbollah did not carry out the rocket launches, it is possible that it was aware of the attack in advance and approved it by “turning a blind eye” and through a risk management approach, or perhaps even provided some logistical support. On the other hand, this seemingly contradicts Hezbollah’s interest and desire for “rehabilitative quiet”—that is, its aim to rebuild its operations and infrastructure in southern Lebanon as discreetly as possible, under the radar, based on the assumption that any activity in this context, especially direct action against Israel, would provoke an Israeli response.
Hezbollah is well aware that responsibility for any direct terrorist activity against Israel from southern Lebanon will ultimately fall on it, leading to an Israeli military response that would harm its interest in maintaining “rehabilitative quiet.” This fact might actually strengthen the assessment that Hezbollah was unaware of the rocket launches and was embarrassed by them.
Approximately seven hours after the rocket launches, and during the Israeli military response, Hezbollah issued a public statement claiming it was not involved in the rocket fire. Hezbollah also reaffirmed its commitment to the ceasefire. It stated that Israel’s accusations were merely an excuse to justify continued strikes and emphasized that Hezbollah stands behind the Lebanese state in addressing the situation.
The relatively delayed timing of Hezbollah’s response might indicate embarrassment and surprise.
The Palestinian population in Lebanon (at least two hundred thousand, residing in ten major “refugee camps” across Lebanon) and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating within it no longer see themselves as mere guests in Lebanon. They consider themselves locals. This population poses a significant challenge to Hezbollah. Hezbollah attempts to embrace the Palestinians with a “bear hug” and provides them with substantial civilian assistance.
According to our understanding, before the war and especially afterward, Hezbollah’s goal has been to limit independent Palestinian terrorist activities from Lebanese territory against Israel as much as possible. Hezbollah seeks to control these actions to avoid being surprised by their consequences and to ensure they serve Hezbollah’s interests, at a timing that suits it, without harming Hezbollah.
This strategy does not always succeed for Hezbollah. It is possible that the recent rocket launch incident was one such case where Hezbollah’s control failed.
