The municipal elections in the capital city and in the core base areas of Hezbollah: Beirut, the Beqaa (Baalbek, al-Hermel, Zahle, Rachaya, and Western Beqaa) and South Lebanon, opened on May 18, 2025, and continued until May 24. The results of these elections are another indicator (this time in the civil sphere) that Hezbollah is here to stay, and that the statement that Hezbollah was significantly weakened after the war is not absolute and extensive.
Indeed, these elections can be seen as a display of the preservation of Hezbollah’s civil power – the power that enables its military power. It is possible that the spirit of the elections will make it even harder for the Lebanese government to bridge the gap between the declarations and talk of weakening Hezbollah’s military power – an organization whose core ideology is “armed resistance” – an identity that is non-negotiable – and the rifle on its flag is not a decoration, but a statement – and taking meaningful actions to actually weaken Hezbollah’s military power.
The Beqaa Region: Clear Victory for the Joint List of Hezbollah and Amal
In the Beqaa region—mainly in the eastern Beqaa, in the Baalbek and Hermel area—Hezbollah has for many years enjoyed political, organizational, and military hegemony. The “Development and Loyalty” list (التنمية والوفاء), which unites Hezbollah and the Amal Movement under one umbrella in the elections, succeeded in sweeping victories in local councils without any real competition, whether due to the inability of independent elements to organize, or due to political pressure and implied threats.
These successes consolidate Hezbollah’s status as a regional power center not reliant only on its military or parliamentary strength, but also on local governance that serves as an infrastructure for social and community action, and sometimes also financial management. For Hezbollah, elections are not viewed as a technical tool but as an opportunity to renew its public mandate in the eyes of the Shiite base, while maintaining its grip on regional institutions considered vital for preserving its political power.
In the Beqaa, voter turnout ranged between 30%–47% depending on the region.
Beirut: Very Low Voter Turnout with a Behind-the-Scenes Victory for Hezbollah
In Beirut, the political landscape was more fragmented, yet Hezbollah ultimately maintained the upper hand. Although Hezbollah did not openly participate with its own list, it operated behind the scenes to support lists affiliated with the “March 8 Alliance.” The “Beirut United” list, which enjoyed the support of Hezbollah’s allies, won the majority of seats in the municipal council. This achievement is especially significant given the very low voter turnout (around 20%), indicating that the voter mobilization capacity of the list was more effective than that of its rivals.
In contrast, the independent “Beirut My City” list, composed of professionals, activists, and representatives of civil society, achieved symbolic gains but failed to break through the wall of public apathy and the electoral power of the lists supported by traditional political blocs.
Hezbollah’s electoral organization in the Beirut area published a sort of victory announcement, expressing, among other things, appreciation and thanks to the “faithful resistance public,” who participated in the elections and contributed to achieving the required goals in the face of political and social challenges while maintaining balance, stability, national partnership, and coexistence…
South Lebanon: Hezbollah Dominance
On May 24, 2025, South Lebanon held the final round of municipal elections in Lebanon, taking place in districts where the “Shiite duo” — Hezbollah and Amal — wield significant and widespread influence. The elections were held against the backdrop of the war with Israel. Despite the challenge, residents of the south came to vote even in towns significantly damaged.
Residents of villages near the border, which were almost completely destroyed as a result of the war with Israel—such as the village of Kila in the eastern sector—voted in polling stations set up in Nabatiyeh. Residents from other border villages (western sector) voted in the city of Tyre.
Hezbollah continues to display political and organizational strength in South Lebanon. Close cooperation with the Amal Movement brought Hezbollah to control the local lists in most villages and cities and to win the majority—and sometimes all—municipal seats. While some towns experienced limited electoral competition, in others no voting took place at all, no lists were presented, and the council selection was determined in advance agreements.
For example, out of 144 towns included in the election round south of the Litani River (South Lebanon Governorate—which includes four main regions: Tyre, Marjayoun, Bint Jbeil, and Hasbaya), in 72 towns no elections were held due to pre-existing internal agreements. In 71 of these, the joint list of Hezbollah and Amal gained control. In only one town did a local clan gain control by agreement.
In the 72 towns south of the Litani where elections were held, 35 are not Shiite or have a clear majority of another sect (Christians, Druze, Sunnis), and therefore the Hezbollah–Amal list did not run in them from the outset.
Voter turnout data reflects a clear trend of decreased participation compared to the previous municipal elections in 2016. The decline likely stems from political fatigue, a severe economic situation, and direct security consequences. However, in certain areas—especially in Sidon and Nabatiyeh—relatively high turnout was maintained, indicating continued community engagement and strong internal political drive, mainly driven by Hezbollah and Amal’s organizational mechanisms.
Official Voter Turnout Data in South Lebanon Compared to 2016:
| Region | Turnout 2016 | Turnout 2025 |
| South Lebanon Governorate | 43.17 | |
| Nabatiyeh Governorate | 36.65 | |
| Nabatiyeh | 49 | 45.82 |
| Hasbaya | 47 | 37.85 |
| Marjayoun | 43.2 | 35.19 |
| Tyre | 49 | 40.25 |
| Bint Jbeil | 42.5 | 29.05 |
| Jezzine | 53 | 43.01 |
| Sidon | 52.69 | 45.97 |
Summary:
According to an analysis of the election results, Hezbollah, through its regional and organizational alliance structures, managed to establish full municipal control in the Shiite districts, while presenting political stability in its strongholds—South Lebanon and the Beqaa. In Beirut, Hezbollah dominates through allies, regional campaigns, and quiet support for cooperative lists.
Civil and opposition lists partially penetrated central cities but still struggle to break the hegemony of established forces, especially in peripheral areas.
In the South Lebanon elections—in South Lebanon and Nabatiyeh governorates—about half of the towns were excluded from the electoral contest due to prior agreements between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. These agreements, seen as a mechanism of organized political control, led to the selection of an overall of 109 local councils without competition (including north of the Litani)—of which 89 followed agreements by Hezbollah and Amal.
The election process was particularly notable in border villages, many of which were destroyed in the war, and their residents voted in nearby cities like Tyre and Nabatiyeh.
Various Hezbollah and Amal representatives, including members of parliament, emphasized that the vote was seen as a message of determination and civil standing against “the Israeli enemy’s plan to turn the south into an empty and battered region.” According to them, the very holding of the elections, wide participation, and the political agreements reached—all express the resilience of the southern public and the consistent choice of resistance as a way of life.
The elections serve as further evidence that local governance in Lebanon is not merely a field of municipal services, but also a political battlefield reflecting broader sectarian, security, and ideological power relations.
Despite the severe blow it sustained, Hezbollah is far from disappearing and appears to still dominate on the local and electoral levels. Even if there are feelings of frustration in the Shiite base, in areas affected by the war, a decrease in public support expression (voter turnout), and disappointment toward public officials—these are still not translating into a real change in the general electoral balance of power.
The civil growth engine of Hezbollah – “the Resistance Society,” which is Hezbollah’s Shiite base—is maintained and supported by Hezbollah’s extensive civil infrastructure. This infrastructure is managed by the Executive Council and functions in parallel to the collapsing and non-functioning Lebanese state infrastructure.
Although Hezbollah is dealing with many financial difficulties related to reconstruction in general and civil reconstruction in particular—difficulties that directly affect the Shiite base—it is still a functioning infrastructure currently managing a large civil reconstruction campaign. This is a very significant aspect of Hezbollah’s survival.
