The Northern Arena and the Shiite Axis – Weekly Review of Events and Key Data (30 Sept. – 6 Oct.)

This week, IDF forces began a focused and circumscribed ground operation in southern Lebanon:

Since the beginning of the maneuver, about 440 terrorists have been eliminated, including 30 commanders of various ranks (as of October 5). In southern Lebanon, the IDF exposed underground staging compounds near the border, including large quantities of weapons intended to be used by the Radwan Force during an invasion of Israel. The IDF uncovered enormous quantities of weapons hidden by Hezbollah in the homes of civilians in southern Lebanon. In addition, underground infrastructure is being destroyed, the most prominent of which so far is about 250 meters long, located about 300 meters from the border. The infrastructure contains command rooms, combat kits ready for a terrorist raid and large quantities of weapons. In addition, living quarters are equipped with showers, a kitchen, food caches and more.

At the beginning of last week, Hezbollah denied the claims that Israel had begun a ground maneuver in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s claims of responsibility for attacks against Israel, initially claimed that they carried out against IDF forces trying to infiltrate villages in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah even claimed that it had managed to get the IDF to withdraw. A few days later, Hezbollah changed its statements and admitted that the IDF was present inside southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s claim of responsibility was updated accordingly: “In support of the steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and in solidarity with its courageous and honorable resistance, in defense of Lebanon and its people, and in response to Israel’s cruel violation of cities, villages and civilians.”

Hezbollah is trying to encourage its supporters, claiming that Hezbollah is succeeding in thwarting and preventing the Israeli advance into Lebanese territory. The reality, of course, is completely different.

The ambulances of the Islamic Health Organization (Hezbollah’s Health Ministry) are platforms in the service of terrorism:

The Shiite axis’ proxy use of medical platforms to cover their military activity is well known in all the arenas in which they operate. Transportation of operatives and weapons via ambulances and the establishment of headquarters and ammunition depots in and/or near medical buildings are central to Hezbollah’s human shield tactics (see details below).

Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure is being exploited by Hezbollah for military buildup and reconstruction:

Hezbollah constantly exploits some of Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure for its military buildup. Today it is using it to replenish and rehabilitate its arsenal. Hezbollah is concentrating its efforts on transferring weapons from Syria to Lebanon through the Jdeidat Yabus-al-Masana crossing, the main civilian land border crossing between Syria and Lebanon (see details below).

Most of Hezbollah’s launches during the past week were carried out on communities near the border (142):

Hezbollah takes direct responsibility for attacking Israeli communities. Sometimes it claims that it is attacking a military force that is there, and sometimes it explicitly says that it is clearly firing at a civilian target. In practice, there is no truth in many cases in which Hezbollah claims to attack IDF forces in communities. Hezbollah fires directly at civilian targets.

The main weapon used by Hezbollah is high-trajectory fire, which Hezbollah uses to fire at IDF forces in Lebanon and deep into Israel.

This week, a total of 253 attacks were carried out against Israel, which included the firing of at least 500 rockets and missiles. This is a very high number of attacks, which until recently was the average monthly attack rate.

The Lebanese arena:

War data:

This week, 10 IDF soldiers were killed in a ground maneuver in southern Lebanon. Two other soldiers were killed in the explosion of a drone launched from Iraq.

As a result of Hezbollah attacks, 25 civilians and 35 IDF soldiers have been killed in Israel so far, a total of 60 people.

In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 68,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently.

It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).

The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 31 December 2024.

According to the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, since October 7, 196,000 dunams have been charred in hundreds of locations across northern Israel (as of September 11, 2024).

During the past week 257 attacks were carried out on the northern border of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 143 attacks against Israel.

Since the beginning of the war, 3,468 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.

Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel

(September 30) There were 24 attacks against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 13. Hezbollah fired about 10 rockets at the city of Haifa.

(October 1) 32 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 15 attacks. In one of the attacks, Hezbollah fired missiles at Tel Aviv and Samaria, more than 100 kilometers from the Israeli-Lebanese border, wounding two civilians. Hezbollah claimed that the missiles were aimed at the Glilot base. In another attack near central Israel, Hezbollah claimed to have attacked an Israeli Air Force base.

(October 2) 52 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 27 attacks. Most of the attacks (32) were carried out on communities near the border with Lebanon; Hezbollah claimed that the villages were attacked because there were military forces in them. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 8 attacks against IDF forces in the area of the villages of Yaroun, Maroun a-Ras and al-‘Adaisseh using small arms, IEDs, high-trajectory fire and anti-tank missiles.

(October 3) 56 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 34 attacks. Most of the attacks (37) were carried out on communities near the border with Lebanon. Hezbollah fired rockets at the cities of Safed, Tiberias, Katzrin, Acre and Haifa. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 8 attacks against IDF forces in Lebanon, using high-trajectory fire and explosive devices.

(October 4) 44 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 24 attacks. 25 attacks were carried out on communities near the border with Lebanon. Hezbollah fired rockets at the Krayot area, an area of about 200,000 residents, the cities of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, Karmiel, Katzrin, and the area of Caesarea (about 70 km from the Israeli-Lebanese border). Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 6 attacks against IDF forces in Lebanon.

(October 5) 27 attacks were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 14 attacks. Hezbollah fired about five missiles at the Jezreel Valley, two missiles at Haifa, about 30 at Karmiel and another at the cities of Katzrin, Safed and Sakhnin.

(October 6) 19 airstrikes were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 13 attacks. Hezbollah fired two surface-to-surface missiles near the city of Hadera. In addition, Hezbollah fired at Misgav, Margaliot and the cities of Shlomi, Safed, Ma’a lot Tarshiha, Haifa and Karmiel.

Hezbollah and other organization casualties

Hezbollah stopped its routine announcing of its operative fatalities. However, the social networks publish announcements about funerals of operatives killed against the backdrop of posters of Hezbollah fatalities. Based on reports on the networks, we identified at least 69 Hezbollah operatives killed this week. But the numbers are much higher. According to figures published by the IDF, since the beginning of the maneuver last week, about 440 terrorists have been eliminated.

As of October 8, 2023, about 726 Hezbollah operatives that we managed to document have been killed, but the actual number is already apparently close to about 1,000 fatalities. Most of the operatives killed originated south of the Litani River (464 operatives killed, constituting 63% of all the operatives killed).

In addition, three senior figures in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing in Lebanon were eliminated this week: Sa’id Alaa Nayef Ali, a senior figure in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, and Muhammad Hussein Ali al-Mahmoud, who served as Hamas’ executive wing in Lebanon, and Fathi Sharif, head of Hamas’ Lebanese arena. It was also reported that two Amal operatives, belonging to the Al-Abbas Force, the elite unit of the Amal movement were killed in southern Lebanon, – see article.

According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 79 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal Movement, Al-Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Fatah and the Democratic Front.

Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures

This week, seven senior Hezbollah operatives and commanders were eliminated: the commander of the weapons transfer unit from Iran to Hezbollah (Unit 4400), the commander of the Imam Hussein Division militia, Dhu al-Faqar Hinnawi (see details about the militia below), the commander of the Har Dov area, a senior official in the weapons production administration, the head of Hezbollah’s communications system, and a company commander in the Kafr Kila area. Additionally, the IDF reported that during the ground operation in Lebanon, 30 commanders of various ranks were eliminated.

In addition, the attack in Dahiya (October 4) attempted to eliminate Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Executive Council and Nasrallah’s intended successor. No final verification has been received at this time, but he is known to be “out of touch.” It is possible that along with Safi al-Din, head of Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus, codenamed Mortada, was in the same location at the time of the attack.

Note: In light of the disappearance for about a week of Ismail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, there are assessments (which as of this writing are unfounded) that Qaani was together with Hashem Safi al-Din at the time of the attack.

As of October 8, 2023, 116 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, among the senior operatives who were eliminated were Jihad Council members Fouad Shakar (head of the strategic divisions), Ibrahim Aqil (head of the operations division) and Ali Karki (commander of the southern front).

• 5 senior Hezbollah leaders (4.3% of those eliminated)
• 25.9% of those eliminated, a total of 30, were from the Radwan unit, including acting unit commanders Wassam al-Tawil (January 2024) and Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi (September 2024).
• 17.2%, a total of 20 of the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units was placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
• 30, representing 25.9%, of the commanders of various ranks were killed during the ground operation in southern Lebanon.
• Four senior operatives from the air unit, including the unit commander, were eliminated.
• Three others from Hezbollah’s air defense system.
• Two senior operatives and the commander of Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon (Unit 4400).
• An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
• 4.3% of those killed, a total of 5, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
• 7.8%, 9 senior operatives from the rocket missile array, including the unit commander and the unit commander in southern Lebanon.

Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon

(September 30) the IDF attacked and destroyed an air defense systems storage site just 1.6 kilometers from Beirut International Airport. Available information suggests that inside were Iranian-made and supplied Sevom Khordad air defense systems delivered to Hezbollah. Such systems pose a significant threat not only to military aircraft but also to international commercial flights. From the ground, we can see the target building up close and how it is placed in a densely populated area used as a human shield.

(October 1) In the early morning hours, the IDF Spokesperson announced that IDF forces had begun a focused and defined ground operation against Hezbollah targets in several villages near the border in southern Lebanon, from which there was an immediate and imminent threat to Israeli communities on the border.

(October 1-02) In an airstrike in Beirut, Muhammad Jaafar Katzir (Haj Salah), head of Unit 4400, Hezbollah’s arms transfer unit to Lebanon, was killed. His brother, Hassan Jaafar Qusayr, a senior Hezbollah figure, was also eliminated on October 2 in Damascus. Hassan was Nasrallah’s son-in-law.

(October 2) An airstrike in Beirut killed Dhu al-Faqar Hinnawi, commander of the Imam Hussein Division militia. Hinawi enlisted in Hezbollah and was responsible for engineering in the Aziz unit and in charge of Hezbollah forces in the Aleppo area. He was later appointed commander of the Imam Hussein Division militia, with the full support of Qassem Soleimani and Hassan Nasrallah.

The militia is a framework for exercising force with important capabilities for Hezbollah, and is composed of thousands of operatives with different identities from across the Middle East. Since the beginning of the war, the militia has moved its headquarters to Lebanon and operates in close coordination with Hezbollah’s Southern Front units. The militia takes an active part in the fighting and has carried out many terrorist attacks against Israel from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, including an anti-tank attack, UAV and extensive rocket fire at northern Israeli communities. In our understanding, Lebanon contains Lebanese militia operatives, who are actually Hezbollah operatives who were “loaned” to it. The militia took part in launching explosive UAVs deep into the State of Israel, including a UAV strike in November 2023 on a school in Eilat.

On October 3, the Bint Jabal municipality building used by Hezbollah as a staging place and a building for storing weapons was attacked (another example of human shield tactics).

(October 3) An airstrike in Beirut targeted Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters, including Hezbollah operatives, collection equipment, headquarters and other infrastructure.

(October 3) Hezbollah’s Har Dov commander Khader al-Shihabiya was eliminated. Khader was responsible for firing missiles at Majdal Shams in July, killing 12 children. Khader commanded hundreds of rockets and anti-tank launches at IDF outposts on Mount Dov, Mount Hermon and the northern Golan Heights.

(October 3) An airstrike attacked an underground tunnel running from Lebanese territory into Syrian territory, about 3.5 kilometers long, used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons and store them underground. The network was operated by Unit 4400, the unit responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and its branches to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, infrastructure was attacked at the Mitzna border crossing between Syria and Lebanon, where weapons were transferred to Hezbollah.

(October 3) Muhammad Yusuf Anisi, a senior operative and knowledge center in Hezbollah’s weapons manufacturing directorate, was eliminated. Anisi was one of the leaders of Hezbollah’s precision missile manufacturing project and was a unique knowledge center with technological capabilities in the field of weapons manufacturing. Anisi joined the Hezbollah terrorist organization more than 15 years ago and was an expert in mechanical engineering. He devoted his training to strengthening the organization with strategic weapons.

(October 4) Muhammad Rashid Skafi, head of Hezbollah’s communications network, was eliminated. Skafi served as head of the communications system since 2000, was close to senior Hezbollah figures and had extensive experience and authority. Skafi invested great efforts in developing continuous communication between all Hezbollah units and formations, in routine and emergency situations, and in order to maintain the continuous flow of information in the organization. The communications network serves as a staff unit responsible for maintaining media continuity, and is responsible, inter alia, for the development, maintenance and use of Hezbollah’s communications systems in routine and emergency situations.

(October 4) An airstrike in Beirut reportedly targeted an underground bunker where senior Hezbollah officials were meeting. Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Executive Council and Nasrallah’s successor, was also in attendance. At this stage, no further details or results of the attack are known.

(October 4) The road leading from the Syrian land border crossing (Jdeidat Yabus) to the Lebanese border crossing – Al-Masnaa – was attacked. You can see the location of the attack (see: photo). This is a major route for transferring Iranian and other equipment and weapons for Hezbollah. Hezbollah constantly exploited some of Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure for its military buildup. Today it is using it to replenish and rehabilitate his arsenal.

(October 5) An airstrike against an apartment in the city of Tripoli in northern Lebanon eliminating Saeed Atallah Ali, a commander in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing in Lebanon. Ali led terrorist attacks against Israeli targets and recruited operatives. Another attack eliminated Muhammad Hussein Ali al-Mahmoud, who served as Hamas’ executive wing in Lebanon and directed terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria.

(October 5) The IDF revealed that an underground infrastructure about 250 meters long, located about 300 meters from the border, had been destroyed. Inside the infrastructure, the forces located command rooms, ready-made terrorists combat kits and large quantities of weapons for the day of command. In addition, living quarters equipped with showers, a kitchen, food caches and more.

During the week, targeted airstrikes hit dozens of Hezbollah targets in Dahiya, Beirut. Prior to the strikes, numerous measures were taken to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, and in many cases, advance warnings were issued to residents to evacuate certain areas of the city.

Hezbollah – General:

The map presented by the IDF spokesman shows the western attack area of Radwan—the coastal area. As part of the larger plan, Radwan intended to invade the Galilee in six different sectors, from Rosh Hanikra in the west to Mount Dov in the east. The invasion plan was publicly presented as early as 2014 in a television report on Al-Mayadeen, a channel affiliated with Hezbollah.

(October 2) At the invitation of Hezbollah’s media unit, media personnel and journalists toured several residential buildings and institutions attacked by Israel in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah, of course, is trying to show that the sites attacked are completely civilian structures. This, of course, is a cognitive-propaganda effort within the framework of Hezbollah’s human shield tactics.

(October 3) In light of the IDF attack on the unofficial land border crossings between Syria and Lebanon, which are used to transfer weapons for Hezbollah, especially the crossings in the northeastern Beqaa Valley, Hezbollah is concentrating efforts on transferring weapons from Syria to Lebanon through the Jdeidat Yabus-al-Musna crossing. Jdeidat Yabus (Syrian side) and Al-Masnaa (Lebanese side) is the main land border crossing between Syria and Lebanon. The Jdeidat Yabus – Al- Masnaa crossing has been used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons since the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Hezbollah uses various types of vehicles under civilian guise to transfer weapons. The crossing has always served as a central route used by Hezbollah. This crossing is an important component of Hezbollah’s ability to rehabilitate.

(October 3) After the IDF Spokesperson’s Arabic spokesman revealed that Hezbollah was using the civilian Al-Masnaa crossing to smuggle weapons, Lebanese Transportation Minister Ali Hamia (a Hezbollah member) held a press conference in an attempt to repel the claims. Ali Hamia denied and claimed that all border crossings, including al- Masnaa, were under government supervision and that the trucks were being inspected.

(October 4) Ambulances belonging to the Islamic Health Organization (Hezbollah’s Health Ministry) are platforms in the service of terrorism. Hezbollah’s mouthpieces and pro-Hezbollah channels try to echo a campaign claiming that the IDF deliberately targets ambulances belonging to the Islamic Health Organization – Civil Defense. This organization belongs to Hezbollah and directly assists Hezbollah’s military terrorist activity. The Shiite axis’ proxy use of the medical platform to cover their military activity is well known in all the arenas in which they operate. We saw that Hamas and the PIJ in the Gaza Strip also adopted this tactic. Transportation of operatives and weapons by ambulance and the establishment of headquarters and ammunition depots in and/or near medical buildings are central to Hezbollah’s human shield tactics. Every ambulance attacked during the IDF’s ground maneuvers in Lebanon is not an innocent ambulance. It is actually a platform that serves terrorism

Lebanon – General:

(October 3) A Russian cargo plane with humanitarian aid landed in Beirut.

(October 4) The US State Department announced that it would provide $157 million in humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in support of populations affected by the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel: “This funding will meet the new and existing needs of internally displaced persons and refugees within Lebanon and their host communities. The aid will also support those fleeing to neighboring Syria.”

(October 4) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Beirut and met with Parliament Speaker and Amal Movement head Nabih Berri and Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati. The meeting dealt with developments in the current situation in Lebanon and the region, as well as political and on the ground developments in light of the escalation between Israel and Lebanon.

According to the Lebanese government’s Crisis Management Unit (October 5), 289,245 Syrians and 93,033 Lebanese crossed from Lebanon to Syria between September 23 and September 30.

(October 5) The UAE sent medical aid to Lebanon, including medicines and medical equipment totaling about 240 tons.

The Syrian arena:

(September 30) There were reports of an attack on a Hezbollah facility launching UAVs in the Homs region. 8 Hezbollah operatives were killed.

(October 1) Two airstrikes were reported in the Daraa area and at the al-Thaala military airbase on the outskirts of As-Sweida in southern Syria.

(October 3) According to local reports, several warehouses located about 800 meters from the Russian Hmeimim base (19 km south of Latakia and 4 km from the city of Jableh), northwestern Syria, were attacked. In December 2023, we raised the possibility that the airport at the Russian Hmeimim base serves as a new gateway for the corridor of air weapons transfers from Iran to Syria and from there, by land, to Hezbollah. The publication was based on monitoring Iranian cargo flights, starting in May 2023, through companies and planes affiliated with the IRGC. It can be assumed that the warehouses were attacked because of the presence of Iranian weapons in them. The question arises as to why weapons were stored in these warehouses? Are they intended for the Russian Hmeimim base to serve as a kind of defense against attack? Or perhaps because of logistical convenience in transporting the weapons from the plane to the warehouses, given their proximity to Hmeimim?

(October 5) There was a report of an attack on the Palmyra military airfield, east of Homs. According to reports, new anti-aircraft systems delivered to Iranian forces present in the area were attacked.

(October 6) Reports of an attack on three vehicles with Iraqi license plates south of Homs. An attack on ammunition depots in Homs was also reported. One of the airstrikes was on the road leading to Qusayr, a major crossing route used by Hezbollah between Syria and Lebanon.

Syria -General:

(October 2) As part of the Russian-Syrian cooperation, Russia distributed 235 aid packages to families in cooperation with the municipality of Al-Mashra and the governor of Quneitra Province (southern Syria).

(October 5) After visiting Beirut, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Damascus for the first time since taking office.

Shiite Axis – General

(On October 1) Iran launched approximately 200 ballistic missiles towards Israel. Most of the missiles were intercepted, and three civilians were injured. According to Iran, the attack was carried out in retaliation for the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah, and Abbas Nilforushan, the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon (who was killed alongside Nasrallah). Iran fired ballistic missiles of the Emad, Qadr, and Khyber Shekan types, and possibly also the Fateh-1 (not confirmed). Israel announced that it would respond severely to the attack.

(On October 1) the Victoria military base at Baghdad International Airport was attacked with missiles fire. One of the missiles landed within the base.

Additionally, on the same day, the Ain al-Asad base in western Iraq was attacked with missiles.

(On October 5) the American base at the Conico gas field in northern Deir ez-Zor was targeted using several missiles and UAVs launched by pro-Iranian militias.

(October 4) The Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for attacking three targets in the Golan Heights and Tiberias. Two UAVs were reportedly launched from Iraq and crossed into Israeli territory in the Golan Heights. One UAV was intercepted by the IDF and the other exploded in the Golan Heights, killing two soldiers and wounding 24 others. This is the first attack by the Islamic resistance in Iraq against Israel that has caused casualties since these attacks began in November 2023.

During the past week (October 1-7), the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for 13 attacks against Israel. In three incidents, interceptions of UAVs were reported, and in one incident a UAV exploded in the Golan, causing casualties. In the other incidents, no further indications were reported.

Since November 2023, the Islamic resistance in Iraq has begun to carry out attacks against Israel and by October 7, 2024, they have claimed responsibility for 190 attacks against Israel.

Yemen – Houthi-land:

During the past week, coalition forces managed to strike six UAVs that posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.

(October 4) US Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out airstrikes against 15 Houthi targets in areas in Yemen. These targets included offensive military capabilities of the Houthis.

(October 6) Houthi leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi gave a speech marking the anniversary of October 7, noting that the Houthis had launched over 1,000 missiles and UAVs. According to him, the Houthis attacked 193 ships linked to Israel, the United States and Britain and managed to shoot down 11 American UAVs.

Since October 2023, there have been 211 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States and other targets.