By: Tal Beeri and Boaz Shapira
On December 3, the rebels of the “Fatah al-Mubin Operations Room” (affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) released a video showing a suicide UAV attack launched by their forces targeting a facility in the Masyaf area in western Syria.
To our assessment, the attacked building is located within the well-known compound of Institute 4000 (Sector 4) of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS). The structure appears to function as the site’s main administrative offices, situated separately from the production and weapon storage areas.
In recent years, Iranian efforts have intensified to increase their influence at the CERS, particularly at Institute 4000. The primary focus of Institute 4000 is the development and production of rockets and missiles, with a specific emphasis on precision-guided munitions (PGM) for Hezbollah. Other activities include manufacturing UAVs, bombs, and missile propellants.
The Masyaf area lies west of the primary combat zones between the rebels and Syrian regime forces, but the recent days suggest an emerging rebel effort to advance in its direction.
It is worth noting that since the onset of the current rebel offensive against regime forces on November 27, the rebels have taken over two significant CERS sites near Aleppo, as part of their operations over the past week. The first site, located west of Aleppo, is likely linked to Department 340. The second site—comprising two large compounds, the Defense Factories Compound and the Suleiman Compound—is situated near the town of al-Safira, approximately 25 kilometers southeast of Aleppo.
CERS facilities across Syria, particularly those in Masyaf and Aleppo, have been targeted multiple times in recent years, including during the past year amidst the “Iron Swords” war. These strikes, often attributed to Israel, have reportedly caused certain disruptions and delays in the CERS’s activities but have not, in our assessment, entirely halted or neutralized them.
In May 2024, we published a position paper on the CERS, recommending a comprehensive strike to destroy all CERS facilities in Syria. We argued that eliminating the CERS sites would represent a strategic blow to Iran’s efforts in Syria, significantly impairing its weapons development and production initiatives as well as its arms supply corridors to Hezbollah and various militias. This recommendation remains pertinent given Iran’s sustained efforts to deliver arms to Hezbollah during the war with Israel and in its post-war recovery and rearmament strategy.
Moreover, it is critical to remember that the CERS serves as a platform for chemical weapons expertise, production, and capability retention. This represents a significant strategic capability under the Syrian regime, with Iranian involvement, and raises concerns about the potential transfer of such capabilities to Hezbollah.
As of this writing, our recommendation is further reinforced by the reality that CERS sites have either fallen under the control of extremist rebel organizations or are at risk of doing so.
