The resurgence of the Syrian Civil War has presented a dynamic for Israel that is more complex than meets the eye. It includes both strategic opportunities and significant risks. While these developments might temporarily disrupt Iranian influence and entrenchment activities in Syria, the long-term consequences could prove equally challenging for Israel.
The current escalation centers around Syria’s northwest, particularly in Idlib Province, where remnants of various rebel factions have concentrated.
Two key players in this resurgence include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of rebels that took shape in 2017 and forms an umbrella organization for tens of militias. The number of operatives acting under this framework is estimated at tens of thousands. This coalition controls all of Idlib, and forms, de facto, a local government. The militias acting under HTS are mainly Sunni Islamist Salafis, with roots in Al Qaeda.
The second actor is the Syrian National Army (SNA), the nationalist Syrian force that is funded, trained, and equipped by Turkey.
These factions are exploiting Hezbollah’s reduced presence, after Hezbollah shifted its focus to rebuilding its battered forces in Lebanon, and addressing ongoing tensions with Israel.
Iran, which heavily supported President Bashar al-Assad during the earlier phases of the Syrian civil war, has invested in Syria’s military infrastructure as well. This includes weapons production facilities critical for arming Hezbollah, including sites for producing advanced weapons, such as Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Studies (known by its French acronym, CERS) sites. The rebel factions’ territorial gains threaten these assets, potentially disrupting the arms pipeline to Hezbollah and impairing Iran’s regional ambitions.
Such disruption offers Israel a short-term strategic advantage by limiting Hezbollah military capabilities and harming Iranian entrenchment efforts. The weakening of the Iranian – Shi’ite axis could reduce the immediate threat to Israel’s northern border, providing breathing room for Israeli defense strategy.
However, the weakening of one threat does not inherently lead to stability. The rebel groups gaining ground in Syria are not necessarily favorable to Israel or regional stability. HTS, for example, remains deeply rooted in extremist ideology, despite its attempts to rebrand itself as a locally focused organization. It is impossible to know how such actors will behave in future.
There is also growing concern about these factions acquiring advanced military capabilities, including chemical weapons, as they overrun Assad regime-controlled territories. Such developments could pose direct threats to Israel’s security and lead to renewed instability along its borders.
Turkey has played a significant role in supporting factions in Syria, particularly through its influence over the Syrian National Army. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known for his affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood, seeks to reassert Turkey’s influence across the Middle East. Ankara’s involvement complicates the situation, as Turkey’s strategic interests may conflict with those of NATO allies, particularly the United States.
Additionally, the prospect of a fragmented Syria governed by competing militias mirrors the chaotic early years of the civil war. Such a scenario would demand increased Israeli investment in border security and intelligence to monitor multiple hostile actors, some of whom might exploit the chaos to target Israel.
Israel must balance the short-term benefits of disrupted Iranian influence with the long-term risks of extremist empowerment and regional instability. A fragmented Syria could result in advanced weaponry falling into non-state actors’ hands, necessitating robust countermeasures.
The main message remains clear: extremism, whether Sunni or Shi’ite, poses clear threats. A strategy that addresses both versions of this threat is critical. The international community must also be firm against Shi’ite jihadists – and not only Sunni ones.
If Sunni jihadists take over Damascus (assuming they are not blocked by pro-Assad forces and their rearguard action in northern Syria), and if they proceed further south, it is far from clear that Israel would benefit from having Al Qaeda variants on its Golan Heights border.
