The Sunni Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which also include Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman (Qatar, due to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood axis, is not included in this pragmatic bloc), face a complex strategic challenge: how to navigate the current and future threat posed by the Iranian-Shiite axis, and its pursuit of regional hegemony.
A key factor influencing the considerations of the Sunni Gulf states is the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program.
After a significant portion of the Iranian axis was eroded by Israel during the Iron Swords War, and severe damage was inflicted on the capabilities of Hezbollah, Hamas, the collapse of the Assad regime, and tens of thousands of Shiite militia members in Syria, Iran’s nuclear program remains the central and final enabler for Tehran to realize its hegemonic aspirations.
The uncertainty surrounding the future of the nuclear program, and threats from Iran to strike with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs against any party perceived as cooperating in an attack on this program, are causing the Gulf states to adopt a hedging strategy.
This strategy is designed to minimize potential damages and maximize opportunities under two main scenarios: a scenario of an attack on the nuclear program (an Israeli attack or a combined Israeli-US attack), or a new nuclear agreement between the Trump administration and the Ayatollah regime in Tehran.
The ongoing talks between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue, alongside Iran’s continuous progress in uranium enrichment, form the immediate backdrop for the Gulf states’ moves.
The latest IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) reports (May 29, 2025) raise significant concern.
The quarterly report indicated that Iran has significantly increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, and now possesses an amount sufficient (over 400 kilograms) for almost ten nuclear bombs. Simultaneously, a separate report detailed Iran’s historical violations of its commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the presence of undeclared nuclear material at suspicious sites like Turquzabad (a village in Tehran province), which was linked to a past covert military nuclear program, as well as ongoing attempts to mislead inspectors.
The reports indicate significant Iranian progress and ongoing lack of transparency, heightening fears of near-military nuclear capabilities. In recent days, the American envoy Steve Witkoff submitted a proposal for a nuclear agreement to Iran, mediated by Oman. However, official Iranian sources stated that Tehran is formulating a negative response, calling the proposal a “non-starter” and claiming that the talks are “deteriorating towards collapse.” President Trump clarified on June 2 that the U.S. will not allow any uranium enrichment by Iran.
On June 4, according to international media reports, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Khamenei, refused the American nuclear deal proposal and is reportedly unwilling to accept any restrictions on Iranian uranium enrichment.
He was quoted as saying: “Who are you to tell us whether we (Iran) can have a nuclear program or not? We will not give up the ability of uranium enrichment.”
Israel, for its part, consistently signals its readiness to act militarily against the nuclear sites when it identifies the right timing.
Given the situation, the Sunni Gulf states are preparing for two scenarios:
- A military attack: Combined (American-Israeli) or primarily Israeli, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities.
- A new nuclear agreement: The signing of a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the United States.
Such an agreement might limit the Iranian nuclear program, but also, from the perspective of the Gulf states, it could grant legitimacy to certain aspects of the Iranian program and shift the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor.
Such an agreement might leave uranium enrichment infrastructure in Fordow and Natanz within Iran, and open the door to the removal of sanctions on Iran, which would allow the terror regime to funnel billions towards efforts to rebuild its proxies across the region, and to strengthen its offensive missile program.
Publicly, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed support for an agreement, but with significant reservations.
At the core of the Gulf states’ strategy lies a distinct gap between their overt diplomatic moves aimed at reducing military tension with Iran and its proxies, and covert actions or strategic alliances designed to counter Iran.
This complexity is not accidental but rather a deliberate feature of their policy.
Being smaller powers than Iran in terms of geographical depth and stand-off capabilities, a direct confrontation with Iran is undesirable for them.
Maintaining a degree of ambiguity regarding their true stance on Iran and their future actions serves as a flexible position, allowing these states to maneuver and adapt to rapidly changing regional dynamics, such as a breakthrough in U.S. – Iran talks, or conversely, a sudden escalation.
Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is pursuing a cautious yet assertive line regarding Iran. On one hand, the Kingdom does not shy away from criticizing Iran’s regional behavior and its support for Shiite militias, but on the other hand, it continues dialogue as a means to prevent escalation and promote Saudi interests.
One of the most prominent expressions of this policy was the visit of the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, to Tehran in April 2025. During the visit, Prince Khalid met with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. According to international media reports, the purpose of the visit was, among other things, to convey a calming message to Iran, stating that Saudi Arabia would not support an American or other attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, nor would it support a ground offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.
The importance of this message is amplified against the backdrop of previous Iranian threats to attack any base used by the Americans for a potential strike. During the visit, Prince Khalid delivered a letter from the Saudi King Salman, which reportedly dealt with issues of “Palestine,” Yemen, bilateral security, and the US-Iran talks, while expressing support for negotiations and even offering Saudi mediation.
The visit to Tehran, along with the reported refusal to allow the use of American bases in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Iran, signals a Saudi effort to avoid Iranian missile fire in the scenario of an attack on the nuclear program.
The Saudi Kingdom seeks to decouple, as much as possible, its security from being automatically dragged into US-led or Israeli-led confrontations against Iran. This is an attempt to manage regional threats through direct diplomacy, even with a bitter enemy.
Reports from April 2025 indicate that Saudi Arabia, alongside Qatar and Kuwait, informed Tehran that it would not allow the US to use its military bases on their territory for an attack on Iran. This refusal also includes a ban on logistical support for such actions, such as aerial refueling or reconnaissance flights.
This stance aligns with the messages conveyed by Prince Khalid bin Salman in Tehran and directly addresses the Gulf states’ concern about not being in Iran’s line of fire.
However, one should not confuse the attempt to avoid Iranian attacks with a genuine shift in the Saudi stance towards Iran.
There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia continues to see Iran and its proxies as a central threat to the Kingdom’s security and stability.
During and around President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2025, significant progress and agreements in principle were reported in the defense domain between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The highlight was reports of a historic framework agreement for arms deals valued at approximately $142 billion, including advanced air defense systems like THAAD, transport aircraft, precision munitions, and modernization of Saudi forces. One must ask, why is Saudi Arabia investing so extensively in building up this force? What is its reference threat? The only possible answer is Iran.
Regularly, we receive reminders about the true state of relations between the two countries. On May 29, a senior official in the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that Saudi Arabia had stopped issuing visas to thousands of Iranian Hajj pilgrims after the arrest of a senior Iranian cleric, close to Khamenei, occurred in Mecca (the holy city in Saudi Arabia), following the publication of an offensive video against the Saudi Kingdom.
On September 15, 2019, Saudi Aramco’s central oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais were attacked by Iran using UAVs. The attack severely disrupted Saudi oil production (by about 50%) and caused a shock in global energy markets.
Additionally, for years, since Saudi Arabia began its intervention in the Yemeni civil war in 2015, the Iran-backed Houthis have launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and UAVs towards various targets in Saudi Arabia, including oil facilities, airports, and cities. Therefore, among decision-makers in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt as to who their main enemy is.
The United Arab Emirates also employs a hedging strategy towards Iran, combining diplomacy, economic interests, development of independent capabilities, and security cooperation.
Similar to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has also clarified its interest in a nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Iran due to concerns about the economic and stability repercussions of military action.
The Emirates maintain diplomatic relations and extensive economic ties with Iran, especially the Emirate of Dubai.
This mutual economic dependence serves, according to Emirati hopes, as a shock absorber and a communication channel.
Alongside this, the UAE has remained a central party to the Abraham Accords and maintained public ties with Israel during a year and a half of multi-front war, especially against Hamas in Gaza.
Similar to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has also experienced and been burned by Iranian fire in attacks attributed to Houthi rebels from Yemen, particularly during January and February 2022. These attacks targeted strategic sites, including Abu Dhabi International Airport (capital of the UAE) and oil facilities, resulting in casualties and disruptions.
Intermittent additional threats and some attacks for which responsibility was claimed by various groups identified with Iran occurred in previous years and in the years that followed.
This situation raises the possibility that the Gulf states are utilizing/relying on Israel to do the ‘dirty work’ and also to transfer the consequences to it for dealing with the Iranian threat.
The Gulf states desire the containment of Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, but at the same time, they wish to avoid direct military confrontation and devastating Iranian retaliation against their critical infrastructure and economies.
Israel, on the other hand, sets clear red lines regarding the Iranian nuclear program and has demonstrated a willingness to act kinetically against threats from Iran and its proxies.
Therefore, it may be perceived as being prepared to take risks that the Gulf states are unwilling to take.
On one hand, the supposed ‘reliance’ on Israel does not necessarily stem from cynical exploitation, but from a deep shared threat perception.
Both the Gulf states and Israel view a nuclear Iran and its regional proxies as a central and even existential threat.
Israel has a more overt history and proven willingness to use preemptive force against threats perceived as existential.
For the Gulf states, an Israeli attack might achieve the goal of damaging Iran’s nuclear program without requiring their direct involvement, thereby, theoretically, deflecting the main brunt of immediate Iranian retaliation from themselves.
On the other hand, it would be advisable for Israel to demand significant returns from the Gulf states, including intelligence information, or even flight rights.
It is already likely that significant cooperation exists behind the scenes regarding intelligence sharing, a ‘sky picture,’ early warning about Iranian threats, and more.
The Abraham Accords created a formal framework for such cooperation, especially for the UAE.
The UAE’s intention in signing the Abraham Accords was, among other things, to act strategically together with Israel to counter Iran.
According to international media reports in recent years, secret talks have taken place between senior Israeli and Saudi military officials, alongside other Arab states, under American auspices, to discuss coordination against Iranian threats.
This indicates an existing infrastructure for this type of cooperation.
The quiet and not-so-quiet alliance between the Gulf states and Israel is likely defensive in nature and conditional on circumstances.
It is not a formal offensive alliance. Still, thus cooperations provides significant reasons to trouble the Iranian regime.
The Gulf states are managing a rational, dual-track strategy in a high-risk environment.
The Gulf states’ risk hedging strategy requires them to navigate turbulent waters, attempting to balance sometimes conflicting interests:
- National security: The need to counter Iran’s nuclear program and the activities of its regional proxies.
- Regional stability: Economic development, diversification of income sources (e.g., Saudi “Vision 2030”), and attracting investments. Regional conflict severely harms these interests.
- Economic considerations: Maintaining oil exports, developing non-oil-based sectors.
- Avoidance of direct confrontation: The core of their hedging strategy – the attempt to avoid becoming primary targets of Iran.
However, it is important not to get carried away in interpreting the Gulf states’ moves in this context, and to remember that they do not for a moment forget who threatens their existence and future.
Sources:
- https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/17/middleeast/saudi-defense-minister-visits-iran-intl
- https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/the-gulf/artc-saudi-arabia-uae-kuwait-refuse-to-let-us-use-air-bases-for-iran-attack
- https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47321
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-factors-drive-us-israeli-differences-irans-nuclear-challenge
- https://www.cfr.org/article/saudi-iranian-meeting
- https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/262
- https://www.grc.net/documents/6836b628acc8aSaudiArabiaUSIranNuclearTalksStrategicImperativeEngagement2.pdf
- https://gulfif.org/saudi-arabia-changes-its-tune-on-nuclear-negotiations-with-iran/
- https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/centre-for-researches-and-studies/the-future-of-irans-nuclear-program-under-trumps-coercive-diplomacy/
- https://time.com/7287313/iran-israel-strike-report-nuclear-us-trump-history-context-explainer/
- https://www.newsweek.com/iran-may-hold-key-trumps-nuclear-revolution-2077538
- https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2025
- https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-government-frees-iranian-cleric-gholamreza-ghasemian-after-being-arrested-for-obscene-concerts-remarks/articleshow/121484409.cms
- https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220627-secret-talks-between-israel-saudi-military-chiefs-wsj-reveals/
