Executive Summary
The months of May-June 2026 were marked by a significant acceleration across all axes of Turkish activity – military, economic, support for terrorism, and rhetorical escalation – as Ankara becomes an increasingly dominant actor in Syria with each passing month.
On the force-build-up front, Syrian forces participated for the first time in EFES-2026 – the Turkish Air Force’s annual flagship military exercise, held from April 11 to May 22, 2026 in Izmir – alongside forces from 50 countries. On the sidelines, Ankara announced an expansion of its military support to Syria: training, operational planning, and logistical assistance.
On May 11, 2026, the Turkish warship TCG Meltem made the first-ever official visit of its kind to the Syrian port of Latakia. In addition, Turkish arms exports broke records – a warship was sold for the first time to a NATO member – Romania – on June 20, joining the KAAN fighter jet export deal with Indonesia (48 aircraft worth $10 billion), a deal signed in June 2025.
On the economic front, Ankara is advancing the Hejaz Railway corridor through Syria to Saudi Arabia – a move analysts view as undermining Israel’s regional role, as it creates a direct overland corridor from Turkey through Syria and Jordan to Saudi Arabia, competing with Israel as a regional transit hub, as envisioned by the American IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe) corridor initiative.
Turkey’s Trade Minister set a target of $5 billion in trade with Damascus in June.
On the terror axis, the IDF and Shin Bet revealed on June 21, 2026 that five senior Hamas figures were operating to produce attacks in Judea and Samaria directly from Istanbul – with Erdoğan’s open backing, as he promised the organization: “Just as we protect our own children, so we will protect you.”
On the rhetorical front, Jerusalem–Ankara relations deteriorated to a new low: Erdoğan declared on June 10, 2026 that Israeli strikes on Lebanon “now endanger Turkey as well.”
Turkey is no longer merely a regional actor – it may be becoming the central strategic axis threatening Israel in the future.
Shin Bet and IDF Announcement: Hamas Operating Terror in Judea and Samaria from Turkey
On June 21, 2026, the IDF and Shin Bet published a joint announcement naming five senior Hamas figures operating from Turkey and directing attacks in Judea and Samaria. Ayman Shrawna recruited operatives and managed attacks directly from Turkey. Muhammad Mallah, from the Tulkarm area, divides his time between Turkey and Qatar and transferred funds to finance terror in Judea and Samaria. Majed Jabha assisted in arms smuggling used in a November 2023 attack. Walid Abu Nassar financed the terror infrastructure in Bethlehem and operates from Turkey. Salam Yaish recruited terror operatives and also operates from Turkey.
According to the announcement, dozens of attacks were thwarted in the past year thanks to ongoing surveillance of Hamas’s Turkish branch. Turkey’s refusal to arrest these operatives – or even pressure them to cease their activities from its soil – makes Turkey an active conduit for terrorism against Israel.
Hamas operative Musa Akkari – a US-designated terrorist who participated in the kidnapping and murder of Border Police officer Nissim Toledano in 1992, was released in the Shalit deal in 2011, and currently operates from Turkey – revealed that Erdoğan personally told Hamas members: “Just as we protect our own children, so we will protect you.” The announcement is not born of sentiment – it reflects clear Turkish policy that enables Hamas to operate against Israel from a safe distance.
Turkish Force-Building and Defense Exports on the Rise
Against the backdrop of a 28% rise in Turkish defense exports in the first four months of 2026 compared to the same period last year – surpassing the $2.8 billion threshold on June 20, 2026 – Erdoğan announced the export of the first warship to a NATO and EU member state, Romania, and noted that Turkey is simultaneously building over 50 warships (more than 15 for export). Defense and aerospace exports reached $996 million in May 2026 alone.
The KAAN fighter jet – a fifth-generation aircraft developed entirely in Turkey by TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries), intended to replace aging F-16s in the Turkish Air Force – is entering serial production: the first production contract for 20 aircraft for the Turkish Air Force was signed on May 12, 2026, with deliveries expected between 2028 and 2030.
In the background: the KAAN export deal with Indonesia – 48 aircraft for $10 billion – was signed in June 2025 and constitutes the largest defense export in Turkish history. According to a Reuters report this month, Turkey ranks among the world’s leading manufacturers of armed UAVs.
In the missile domain: the Tayfun Block-4 ballistic missile – a Turkish surface-to-surface ballistic missile (manufactured by Roketsan and unveiled at IDEF 2025) with a range of 800 km and speed of Mach 5 and above, launched from mobile launchers mounted on tactical vehicles – is entering mass production. The Yıldırım missile (manufactured by the same Turkish company and designed by the Turkish Ministry of Defense) with a range of 6,000 km – the first intercontinental ballistic missile developed entirely in Turkey – was unveiled at the Turkish SAHA defense exhibition on May 5, 2026. This accumulation of capabilities is turning Turkey into a regional military power with a genuine ability to threaten Israel.
Turkey in Syria: Growing Security Presence
For the first time in history, approximately 50 Syrian soldiers participated in the EFES-2026 exercise in Izmir, including a drill combining flight and airborne assault operations using Turkish helicopters. Libya also joined the exercise for the first time.
On June 18, a Syrian military delegation visited the Turkish National Defense University in Istanbul – another step in a series of institutional measures deepening cooperation between the two countries. Background: since 2025, the two countries have been negotiating Turkish access to Syrian air bases – an agreement not yet concluded as of May 2026 – but even in its absence, the TCG Meltem visit demonstrates the pace at which Turkish military presence on Syrian soil is growing.
Turkey serves as the primary engine for rebuilding the Syrian army: according to several reports, it is set to supply al-Sharaa’s forces with UAVs, air defense systems, and precision missiles.
Israel has explicitly stated that the establishment of a permanent Turkish base south of Damascus, or the deployment of advanced Turkish anti-aircraft systems in Syria, would constitute a red line.
The strategic implication Israel is determined to disrupt: Turkey is attempting to create a graduated presence from northern Syria toward the southern border with Israel, which could undermine the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of operation over Syrian territory.
The Turkey-Syria Economic Axis: Targeted Integration
On June 9, the trade ministers of Turkey and Syria met at the twin-cities economic summit of Gaziantep-Aleppo. At that summit, Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat set a target of $5 billion in bilateral trade within two years and $10 billion within five years. The Islahiye customs crossing is set to open soon.
Between June 9-10, 2026, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed memoranda of understanding for the revival of the historic Hejaz Railway – an Ottoman railway that once connected Istanbul to the Arabian Peninsula – through Syria and Jordan, with a planned extension to Oman. The investment in the Turkey-Aleppo segment is expected to reach approximately $100 million. The FDD – Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an American strategic and security research institution in Washington – explicitly describes this move as Turkey’s bid to undermine Israel’s regional role.
At the signing ceremony for the memoranda of understanding, Turkey’s Trade Minister did not conceal the geopolitical motive and stated: “Reducing Israel’s influence in the region, along with consolidating political and economic solidarity between us, will bring economic prosperity.”
In addition, Turkish Airlines resumed flights to Damascus after a 13-year hiatus.
The free trade zone project in Idlib and the upgrade of the Bab al-Hawa crossing continue to advance. Strategically, this constitutes an intentional economic integration aimed at anchoring Turkish influence in Syria for the long term.
Turkish–Israeli Tensions
On June 10, Erdoğan addressed members of the AKP – Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party – and declared that Israeli strikes on Syria and Lebanon “have reached a stage where they threaten Turkey as well.” He vowed to respond forcefully if Turkey’s rights in the Eastern Mediterranean are violated, and accused Israel of attempting to destabilize Africa and the maritime domain. Netanyahu responded by calling Erdoğan an “antisemitic dictator.”
On June 11, the rhetoric escalated further. Erdoğan compared Netanyahu to Hitler, while Likud MK Ariel Kallner declared Turkey to be “an enemy state in every sense” and Erdoğan “a dangerous dictator aspiring to restore the Islamic Caliphate.”
Culture Minister Miki Zohar also declared on June 11 that Turkey should be treated as an enemy state and “will pay a heavy price” if it comes to a confrontation with Israel.
Despite the trade embargo imposed by Erdoğan on Israel in May 2024, according to several reports, the BTC pipeline – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the main oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean running through Turkey – supplied jet fuel to Israel worth $924 million in 2025 through third-party countries.
Diplomatically, the gap between rhetoric and actual action reveals complexity – but the overall Turkish strategic direction continues to be hostile.
Conclusion
On the political-ideological front, as of June 2026, various reports indicate that US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack is advancing in Washington a vision in which Turkey steers the al-Sharaa government. Al-Sharaa is economically and diplomatically dependent on Turkey for international recognition and economic reform – and in return allows Ankara to expand its military and institutional presence on Syrian territory.
Turkey is no longer a peripheral actor in regional politics – it is a state shaping multiple axes of influence.
On the military axis – Turkey is expanding its presence in Syria and entering an era of indigenous production of fighter jets and ballistic missiles.
On the economic axis – it is advancing overland trade corridors designed to challenge Israel’s role as a land export hub between Asia and the Mediterranean.
On the terror axis – it hosts the Hamas headquarters responsible for the Judea and Samaria area and openly protects its operatives.
The rhetorical friction with Israel in June 2026 is the direct result of a consistent Turkish policy against Israel that has been building since 2010 and has been accelerating since October 2023. Israel will be required to decide – in the near term – how to respond to a Turkish strategic axis that is no longer content with intentions, but is translating them into infrastructure, alliances, and weapons that can be directed against Israel.
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