From symmetrical conflicts to asymmetrical ones, and back
Brig. Gen. (res.) Shahar Shochat and Yair Ramati
Background
Israel’s military, air and intelligence superiority has gradually drove and channeled our enemies to the edge and to an asymmetrical response, which has often proven to be quite effective: subterranean, high-trajectory, drones, a variety of UAVs, etc.
In a broad view of the air warfare arena, three periods can be portrayed:
- In the first, from the establishment of the State of Israel until the 1980s and 1990s, the State of Israel was subjected to a series of mostly symmetrical confrontations, vis-à-vis Arab states alongside superpower involvement in a bipolar world.
- The second, which has been slowly taking shape since the 1990s, is a gradual transition to asymmetrical confrontations, accompanied by diplomatic moves vis-à-vis the Palestinians and its neighbors.
- In the third, which has emerged in recent years, in view of the establishment of Iranian control over the proxy organizations around Israel in a second and third circle, an integrated world is emerging, which some would call a “hybrid”: symmetrical and asymmetrical at the same time.
The First Period: The Symmetrical Combat
Initially, since the War of Independence, the Israeli Air Force has engaged in combat against the air forces of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and others, under challenging conditions characterized by both numerical and at times qualitative disadvantages. The Israeli Air Force successfully coped with the air forces opposing it. The peak occurred during the Six-Day War.
With the appearance of the new air defense systems from the Eastern Bloc, during the War of Attrition and during the Yom Kippur war, the Israeli Air Force suffered significant losses and force erosion when it came to confronting these air defense systems. At the time, the phrase “The missile bent the plane’s wing” emerged.
From this point, the Air Force while continuing the conflict in a symmetrical format and, in less than a decade, built an operational capability that not only overcame the air-defenses but also the Syrian air array. It did this by combining sophistication, high-quality intelligence, technology (UAVs), and operational daring. This air superiority has been maintained to this day, more than 40 years since Operation ʻArtzav 19’ on June 9, 1982, during which and two days later, 19 surface-to-air missile batteries were destroyed, and 23 Syrian Air Force aircraft were shot down. In total, by June 1982, no less than 80 to 85 Syrian aircraft had been shot down in the First Lebanon War! Nevertheless – there were no casualties for the Israeli Air Force.[1]
Since that seminal event, and for several decades, the Israeli Air Force has maintained full control over the skies of the Middle East, both against enemy fighter jets and against their air defense systems. This is not obvious; see what is happening in Ukraine in the confrontation with the Russian Air Force (VKS).
The Second Period: Gliding into Asymmetrical Conflicts
The combination of the success of the Israeli Air Force, the new political climate, and the availability of statistical and accurate launch systems was gradually reflected in the crystallization of asymmetric capabilities by Palestinian organizations, Iran’s proxies, and others. Most of them, with continuous Iranian support.
In the first stage, high-trajectory weapons appeared – no longer regular and long-range ‘Scud’ missiles, in the hands of the countries around us, but an impressive collection of improvisational, standardized, and even improved rockets in unimaginable quantities, most of them in the hands of various proxies. Later, small UAVs of varying degrees of sophistication also appeared alongside them.
Together with the acquisition of high-trajectory rocket munitions, we witnessed terrorist activity of all kinds. The subterranean realm, which was imported from abroad, also became a challenging dimension in the arsenal of means used by the entities bordering Israel. And subsequently, UAVs, manufactured in Iran alongside commercial drones that underwent conversion upon their purchase.
In the face of all this, Israel’s air power became less relevant. Meaning, Israel’s superiority in the air and in intelligence has difficulty expressing its superiority vis-à-vis these new capabilities. Moreover, the presence of commercial drones and small inexpensive UAVs in the hands of the adversary creates a challenging situation for all research, development, and defense organizations in the western world:
This is a lethal combination of cheap products, usually available in markets that can be purchased in quantities of tens of thousands or more, easy to operate, easy to conceal and upgrade, and almost no training is required to launch them, i.e., ideal alongside advanced anti-tank missiles for asymmetrical conflict environments.
This capability is sometimes referred to as “the lone soldier’s air force”. Admittedly, Western R&D organizations and industries find themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to dealing with the merits of these products, and will almost always offer inferior, belated, or simply more expensive local products, which has one meaning: the advantage passes into the hands of the asymmetrical adversary.
Also in the maritime world, the foundations of fairly effective asymmetric warfare have emerged. Most of them are operated by the Houthis or the Ukrainians, who counterbalance quite a bit of the superiority of countries with modern navies. The method: Combined procurement of various anti-ship missiles, anti-tank missiles, mines and uncrewed surface vehicle – USV.[2]
The Third Period – The Hybrid: A Combination of Asymmetrical and Symmetric Threats
This is a new and intriguing period, which we have glided into very recently. Within this scope, the State of Israel is required to deal with threats and the combined capabilities of our adversaries. Certain threats, such as drones, UAVs, and rockets, are asymmetrical, while others are completely symmetrical. For example: modern UAVs, infantry forces, modern armaments, an Iranian fleet operating in the region, ballistic missiles, modern air defense, and probably soon also modern Russian fighter jets in the service of the Iranian Air Force.
Iran is to receive two squadrons of these advanced Russian twin-engine Sukhoi 35 fighter jets[3]
Challenges created by asymmetric threats
Technologically – Quite a few asymmetric threat applications are nurtured by civilian technologies or systems that enable dual use. In addition, to the drones mentioned above, access to UAVs has become easy and simple, including UAV conversion kits, the price of accuracy has dropped with the introduction of robust GNSS[4] receivers, efficient communication networks, semi-commercial satellite communications, and the like.
Infrastructure and professional manpower – From the moment dual-use systems and technologies permeate the market alongside the technological and engineering manpower that exists in the Middle East, the implementation becomes a question of timing only: “When?” and not “if”?
Economic– The availability of subsystems and technologies at a level that is “good enough”(in professional jargon), allows the adversary to convert vessels into USVs at costs that are one or two orders of magnitude lower than any other parallel Western industry.
Another central dimension – the time that passes between the appearance of the “need” and the launch of the “response.” This is an arena in which the West, and perhaps also Israel, sometimes find it difficult to cope with the initiative and the pace of changes dictated by the opposing adversary.
Summary
Israel does not select its enemies or the systems they will use in combat. Therefore, it is required to quickly identify and deal with threats that change from decade to decade. The event in which the superiority of the Air Force (and others) led our enemies down an asymmetrical path, making it sometimes difficult to express Israeli superiority, requires meticulous, forward-looking conduct combined with operational-technological flexibility.
Indeed, even in an asymmetrical environment, it is possible to operate with the efficiency, boldness, agility, and creativity that still characterize the defense industry and the various branches of the defense establishment, while maintaining the IDF’s inherent advantage in the future as well.
Shahar Shochat – is VP of Strategy in the Rafael Air Defense Systems Division and former Commander of the Israel Defense Forces.
Yair Ramati – is the chairman of RSL and a businessman. Former head of the “Homa” administration in the Ministry of Defense.
[1]https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/
[2] uncrewed surface vessels
[3] https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/481193/What-effect-does-receiving-Su-35-have-on-Iran-s-air-power-and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-35
[4] Global Navigation Satellite System is a general name for all the satellite navigation networks in the world: Galileo (EU), GPS (USA), GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou (China) along with satellite and other means for reception improvements.
