The Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya movement in Lebanon represents a significant portion of the Sunnis in the country and is the second largest Sunni political movement in Lebanon after Saad Hariri’s Future Movement. Within the movement, there are two rival political camps, one loyal to Turkey and Qatar, and the other allied with Hezbollah and the “Axis of Resistance”.
Hezbollah supported and fueled this rivalry in order to strengthen its alliance with Hamas, especially after the internal elections in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in August 2021 led to the strengthening of the camp supporting an alliance with the “Axis of Resistance”—in particular Salah al-Arouri (who Israel eliminated in Beirut at the beginning of the war), who engineered the internal elections of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and strengthened coordination with Hezbollah.
“Al-Fajr Forces” (“Dawn Forces”), the military wing of the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya movement in Lebanon, number, according to estimates, about 1,000 operatives.
They operate as an organic framework within Hamas Lebanon–Military.
During the war, “Al-Fajr Forces” operatives participated as part of Hamas in terrorist activity against Israel, in full coordination with Hezbollah.
From October 2023 until today, Israel has eliminated 15 operatives from al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya / “Al-Fajr Forces”. The latest, Sheikh Hussein Atwi, a very senior figure, was eliminated on April 22, 2025, south of Beirut.
While al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hamas stem from the same ideological roots—and with the movement’s military wing, the “Al-Fajr Forces,” effectively operating under Hamas’s Lebanese military command—reports from Lebanon point to a growing chorus within al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya urging a shift in direction. These voices are calling for a reassessment of the group’s relationship with Hamas, including greater distance and a reevaluation of their collaboration.
Based on the reports from Lebanon, tension within al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya increased following the Israeli eliminations of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya / Al-Fajr Forces operatives,
which caused some of the movement’s leadership to call for focusing on local and internal political activity within Lebanon—and not being part of Hamas Lebanon’s military terrorist activity (against Israel), which in its current situation, is under heavy pressure in all aspects, and any action on its part will lead to a severe Israeli response.
To our understanding, the voices calling for a change in approach are also being strengthened in light of the political, social, and security pressures within Lebanon in the context of the demand to disarm the Palestinian organizations in the refugee camps in Lebanon.
At this stage, we cannot assess the weight and influence, if any, of these voices within the movement, and whether they will ultimately lead to the desired change from their perspective that would cause al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya to sever ties with Hamas.
