A Policy in Dispute: How Should Israel Act Toward the New Regime in Syria?

By Dr Zoe Levornik.

The policy Israel has pursued in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime has sparked controversy both within Israel and internationally. President Trump’s meeting with Syrian President al-Sharaa on May 14, 2025, further intensified this issue and the questions of whether Israel’s policy is too aggressive and undermines its own long-term security interests and regional stability, and whether Israel should reconsider its approach and work toward building trust and dialogue with the new regime, in the hope that future cooperation with Damascus could be established and a new regional order can be created.

Trump and al-Sharaa’s meeting in Saudi Arabia, described as a historic meeting, reinforces the question of whether there is an opportunity for normalization and whether Israel should change its policy toward Syria. During the meeting, Trump presented Syria with several demands, including joining the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations with Israel, and addressing terrorist elements within the country. The meeting between the two took place a day after Trump announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria. The demands presented to Syria were not set as preconditions for the lifting of sanctions.

It is important to note that despite Trump’s announcement, the lifting of sanctions is a complex technical process that will take time and be carried out gradually. Furthermore, it is not yet a permanent removal but rather a temporary six-month waver, after which the U.S. administration will need to decide whether to continue suspending the sanctions or reinstate them.

The position the Trump administration has taken toward Syria presents a challenge for Israel. According to several reports, the sanctions were lifted against Israel’s request (and in response to requests from Saudi Arabia and Turkey), and some view this as a move that isolates Israel in the region and indicates that it is no longer a top priority for the United States.

The U.S. demand for normalization, and Syria’s apparent willingness to comply with it, will undoubtedly increase pressure on Israel to advance the process, including withdrawing from the buffer zone where the IDF is deployed inside Syria, as well as halting Israeli strikes on Syrian territory.

Currently, al-Sharaa’s charm offensive—as some have already begun to call it—has succeeded in securing the lifting of sanctions without any real commitments from Syria or concrete evidence of steps that promote regional stability and security, alongside growing criticism of Israel’s policy.

Al-Sharaa is careful to convey a conciliatory message toward Israel and the international community, emphasizing that Syria does not pose a threat. Since coming to power, al-Sharaa has been actively working to establish diplomatic relations with regional and Western countries. The goal behind al-Sharaa’s diplomatic campaign is the lifting of sanctions on Syria and securing aid and support. The cost of rebuilding Syria is estimated at $400–600 billion, making it clear that its future depends on long-term, extensive international assistance. The U.S. and European countries have made the removal of sanctions conditional on Syria’s protection of all its citizens, equal rights for all, and the preservation of stability, rule of law, and order throughout the country.

Therefore, al-Sharaa’s commitments to the West and to Israel must be understood in the full context—as stemming from Syria’s interest in presenting an image that appeases and reassures Western nations, leading to the lifting of sanctions and securing support for Syria.

Notwithstanding al-Sharaa’s statements, the reality in Syria—including ongoing violent clashes with Alawites and Druze—indicates that the regime is struggling to assert its authority even over its own forces, which are composed of a diverse mix of individuals, some of whom are not even Syrian, and some of whom openly continue to espouse radical Islamist ideology. Their loyalty to al-Sharaa and the new regime remains questionable.

Despite his efforts, al-Sharaa has yet to succeed in uniting the various groups and factions within Syria.

For example, the agreement signed with the Kurds has yet to be fully implemented, and Kurdish forces continue to maintain more than 1,000 fighters in the Sheikh Maqsood neighborhoods in northern Aleppo and in Ashrafiyeh near the western coast, including senior commanders, military vehicles, and weapons stockpiles. They have even sent large military reinforcements to the Deir ez-Zor area following the withdrawal of international coalition forces.

The regime has also failed to reach any understandings or agreements with the Druze. Moreover, despite declarations by Syria’s Minister of Defense, Murhaf Abu Qasra, that most major militias have been dismantled and integrated into regime forces, it appears that in practice there has been no real disbanding of the militias. Rather, they have been incorporated into the Syrian army while retaining their internal structure and command. In some cases, they even continue to operate in the same areas as before, which could, in the future, undermine the regime’s stability.

On May 20, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed concern that internal division and instability in Syria could lead to the collapse of the regime within a matter of weeks. In other words, uncertainty about Syria’s future is currently very high.

The main challenge facing Syria and al-Sharaa today is the need to balance projecting a moderate and conciliatory approach toward the West with the need to gain legitimacy and consolidate domestic support—particularly among the more extremist factions that formed the base of his support. In recent weeks, for example, there has been a growing trend of defections to ISIS among Salafist organizations, partly due to dissatisfaction with al-Sharaa’s perceived ‘Western-leaning’ direction.

It seems that Syria’s restrained and conciliatory stance toward Israel is not necessarily evidence of a deep shift in ideology or policy, but rather a reflection of current necessities. The new regime cannot currently afford a direct confrontation with Israel. The priority now is to rebuild Syria, establish state institutions, and secure external aid.

This seemingly moderate image is no guarantee that the regime will not become hostile toward Israel in the future. This would not be due to Israeli policy, but rather due to the radical Islamist ideologies and beliefs with which the new leadership is associated.

On May 20, the European Union officially announced the removal of all economic sanctions imposed on Syria, with the exception of those targeting associates of the former Assad regime and a ban on arms trade. This decision aims to support the country’s reconstruction after years of conflict and to allow the Syrian banking system access to international financial markets. The decision to lift sanctions despite ongoing instability stems from fears of a complete state collapse and an opportunity to distance Syria from the Shiite axis while strengthening regional stability.

Israel, on the other hand, cannot rely on promises and declarations—it must judge the new regime by its actions. The burden of proof lies with al-Sharaa.

Among the claims made against Israel’s policy, it has been argued that its presence and strikes in Syria undermine Syrian sovereignty and contribute to instability in the country.

However, it is important to note that Israel’s policy is not the source of instability in Syria, as instability existed long beforehand. Its roots lie in the country’s internal conflicts, sectarian, ethnic, and religious divisions, years of civil war and foreign intervention, and a severe economic crisis.

In fact, Israel’s policy is a preventive response to a potential threat that may arise due to the instability and the new regime’s difficulty in asserting control over all factions in the country and maintaining order and security in Syria. Accordingly, the primary aim of most Israeli strikes in Syria has been to destroy stockpiles of weapons and military equipment (possibly including chemical weapons) left behind after the fall of the Assad regime, to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and subsequently being used against Israel.

During their meeting, Trump demanded that al-Sharaa take action against terrorist organizations currently operating in Syria, including jihadist militants, Palestinians, and ISIS.

Subsequently, during the month of May, leaders of Iranian-backed Palestinian factions who were affiliated with Bashar al-Assad’s regime were forced to leave Syria due to increasing pressure from the country’s new government. The measures taken included the confiscation of assets, demands for disarmament, and restrictions limiting the factions’ activities to social domains only. Among the leaders who left were Khaled Jibril, son of the founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Khaled Abdul-Majid, Secretary-General of the Popular Front; and Ziad al-Saghir Secretary-General of Fatah al-Intifada.

These actions are part of a new Syrian government policy aimed at reducing Iranian influence in the country and meeting international demands—particularly from the United States—for the lifting of sanctions. This move reflects a significant shift in Syria’s policy toward the Palestinian factions, which had enjoyed broad freedom of operation under Assad’s rule and are now required to adapt to a new political reality in which their military activities are restricted, and they are limited to civilian and social work only.

While this is a positive development in terms of dealing with the Palestinian factions, the same determination is not evident when it comes to jihadist militants. On the contrary, as of now, jihadist operatives are integrated into the Syrian army rather than being expelled from the country. Addressing terrorist organizations in Syria requires comprehensive and systematic action, but so far the Syrian regime has shown neither the capability nor the willingness to undertake such an effort.

Another reason for Israel’s strikes in Syria is deterrence—setting boundaries with Turkey and attempting to prevent Turkish intervention in the country that could pose a threat to Israel’s security. While the threat posed by Turkey is different from that posed by Iran, and it remains unclear how Turkey-Syria relations will develop and how much influence Ankara will ultimately have, Turkey’s hostility toward Israel and its intention to become a key player in Syria are evident.

If Israel waits to see how the situation develops (a mistake it has made in the past in both Lebanon and Gaza) and relies on the new regime not to allow a Turkish takeover of Syria, it may find itself facing a concrete threat and a fait accompli—at a point when it is too late to act or when a much riskier intervention would be required. The strikes Israel has carried out thus far, as a message against Turkish entrenchment in Syria, have been targeted and served as warning signals to both Turkey and the Syrian regime. The preferred approach is to act early and prevent the situation from escalating.

The threat from Iran, although weakened, still exists. Iran continues to stir unrest in Syria, and regardless of Israel’s policy, it will find actors willing to cooperate in ways that advance Iranian interests in Syria against Israel. Therefore, in this case as well, Israel is acting to detect and neutralize potential threats before they materialize on the ground.

Another risk that Israel has already addressed on multiple occasions is the activity of Palestinian organizations in Syria. Despite symbolic arrests, Islamic Jihad and Hamas have continued operating in Syria.

Alongside military operations, Israel is also working through diplomatic channels, including, according to reports, indirect (and even direct) talks with Syria to prevent escalation and create understandings with the new regime. Israel does not rule out the option of normalization with the new regime in Syria but is not rushing to abandon the military option as long as it identifies threats across the border that the Syrian regime is not addressing.

Israel is taking a proactive approach to eliminating threats at an early stage, deterring adversaries, and sending clear messages regarding the red lines it sets for the new regime. There may indeed now be an opportunity to establish relations with al-Sharaa’s Syria, but this can only be realized once the regime consolidates its authority internally and externally and recognizes Israel’s demands for maintaining its security and removing threats.

Israel’s policy towards Syria should be measured and gradual—walk, don’t run. No option should be ruled out in advance and without guarantees for Israel’s security. Israel must act cautiously, balancing its security needs on the one hand and preserving the diplomatic option on the other.