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By: Dr. Zoe Levornik.
Background to the Attack
The attack in Iran came after yet another round of attempts to reach a diplomatic solution. In the months leading up to the attack, the United States and Iran held negotiations in an effort to reach a new nuclear agreement. In response to the inconsistent statements from the American administration regarding the terms of the agreement, Iran’s leadership expressed a firm stance that it would not agree to dismantle its nuclear program or to halt its uranium enrichment.
The effort to stop Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy has been ongoing for more than two decades. Even before the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), satellite imagery and intelligence reports indicated that Iran was violating its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For example, the construction of the enrichment facility in Fordow is estimated to have begun between 2002–2004, but Iran did not report its existence to the IAEA until 2009, when it was revealed by U.S. intelligence.
Violations continued even after the nuclear deal, eventually leading to the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. One example is Iran’s obligation to redesign the Arak reactor so that it would not be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium and to fill the reactor core with concrete. In 2016, Iran claimed it had done so and even provided images that were later found to be fake, part of a deliberate deception campaign targeting the West. Since 2018, Iran has accelerated its efforts to advance its nuclear program, including the use of advanced centrifuge models (such as IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6), which significantly reduce the time required to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.
Over the past two years, various assessments indicated that Iran was only weeks or months away from achieving military nuclear capability and was nearing the status of a nuclear threshold state. Iran had the ability to enrich enough uranium for five nuclear bombs within about a week, and enough for eight bombs in less than two weeks. The prevailing assumption was that the only missing components were some of the technological elements required for a nuclear warhead (specifically, the weapon configuration design and the explosive triggering system). In the weeks leading up to the attack, intelligence reports revealed that Iran was operating a covert program to develop these components (referred to as the “weapon group”) and was just one decision away from producing a nuclear weapon.
For two decades, Iran used negotiations as a means to buy time and lull the West into complacency, all while continuing to advance toward military nuclear capability. In the past two years, both the actions and rhetoric of Iran’s leadership signaled a firm determination to build the bomb—or at least to reach a point where it could produce several bombs in a short period of time. For Israel, this created a critical juncture: the growing threat alongside the opportunity to act against Iran’s nuclear facilities and ballistic missile program.
Some described Israel’s attack as illegal, ignoring the fact that for decades, Iran has actively worked toward the destruction of the State of Israel by supporting and arming its proxies along Israel’s borders, with the goal of launching a multi-front terrorist assault and ground invasion—as was carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023. All the while, Iranian leaders have repeatedly declared their intention to destroy Israel (and the United States). While Iran violates its obligations under international agreements to which it is a signatory, it is Israel that is expected to uphold international law and refrain from exercising its right to self-defense.
Israel’s strike in Iran was focused solely on military and strategic targets—nuclear facilities, ballistic missiles, and UAVs—that pose a direct threat to Israel. In contrast, Iran deliberately targeted population centers, including hospitals, killing 28 civilians in blatant violation of international law.
In a short and precise operation, Israel (together with the United States) achieved tremendous results by damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missiles, air defense systems, and military leadership. Contrary to fears and expectations, the operation did not drag the region—or the world—into a prolonged and difficult war. The well-timed strike actually prevented a far more dangerous escalation.
The Iranian Nuclear Program in Regional and Global Perspective
Iran’s nuclear program must be understood in the context of the Iranian leadership’s regional and global ambitions. It is one component of Iran’s broader strategy for regional and global influence and control, alongside other elements such as the establishment of proxy forces across the Middle East and beyond, and the development of a ballistic missile program.
For over two decades, Iranian leadership has consistently maintained that its nuclear program is intended solely for civilian use and that Iran has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. Among other arguments, it has claimed that nuclear weapons contradict the principles of Islam. At the same time, Iran has always insisted on its irrefutable right to develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes and energy production—and has declared that it will not give up this right, regardless of international sanctions and pressure.
The nuclear program has always been closely tied to three dominant narratives that shape Iranian national identity: independence, justice, and resistance to the West. A long history of external intervention has led to a deep sense of vulnerability and distrust toward foreign powers within Iran. Foreign interference—particularly by Western countries—has been seen as having weakened and made Iran dependent. The nuclear project is perceived within Iran as a means to restore the country’s independence, status, and power on the global stage, and to preserve its freedom of action in the international arena.
Iran’s nuclear program has been defined as a matter of national identity and pride. For example, former President Hassan Rouhani stated that the Iranian nuclear program is not just about Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology—it is a matter of national pride and Iran’s path to establishing its place in the world.
Iranians view Western efforts to prevent them from acquiring nuclear capabilities as an infringement on their sovereignty, as well as a double standard, an act of injustice, discrimination, and hypocrisy. Countries that possess nuclear weapons are trying to deny Iran the right to nuclear technology. As a result, Iran refuses to compromise, the ability to resist the West is seen as worth more than the cost of economic and diplomatic sanctions.
For example, former president Ahmadinejad said that, “there are a number of countries that possess both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. They use their atomic weapons to threaten other peoples. And it is these powers who say that they are worried about Iran deviating from the path of peaceful use of atomic energy! What we say is that these countries themselves. have long deviated from peaceful usage. These powers have no right to talk to us in this manner. This order is unjust and unsustainable.”
Following the Israeli strike, Iran threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One argument that resurfaced after the attack was that if Israel were to join the NPT and allow full oversight of its nuclear facilities, then Iran would be willing to give up its nuclear program. However, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities does not stem from a perceived threat from Israel, but rather from a desire for independence and regional influence. Iran’s criticism of Israel has always focused on the double standard and the international community’s preferential treatment of Israel, not on fears that Israel might use nuclear weapons against Iran. Even during the Israeli attack, no such concern was expressed within Iran.
In recent years, we find a shift in the rhetoric of Iran’s leadership. Senior Iranian officials still emphasize that the country’s nuclear program is intended for civilian purposes, but they now add that, if necessary, Iran will not hesitate to develop nuclear weapons. Statements about the possibility and likelihood of Iran moving toward militarizing its nuclear program have become more direct and frequent.
As early as 2021, Mohammad Alavi, then Iran’s Minister of Intelligence, stated that despite the Supreme Leader’s prohibition on developing nuclear weapons, increasing pressure from Western countries could lead Tehran to develop its own weapons. He explained, “A cat that is cornered behaves differently than a free cat,” and if Western nations push Iran in that direction, it would not be Iran’s fault.
In November 2024, Kamal Kharazi, an advisor to the Supreme Leader, said that Iran would change its nuclear doctrine if an external threat were to emerge.
Both the current and former heads of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization have stated that Iran possesses the necessary technology to produce nuclear weapons.
In recent years, Iran appears to have become more determined and less willing to compromise on its nuclear program. Its defiance and refusal to comply with Western demands have grown stronger. It is possible that as Iran’s nuclear program advances, its leadership felt less vulnerable and more confident in standing up to the West—even threatening to develop nuclear weapons if threatened or attacked.
Did the Israeli Strike in Iran Undermine the Diplomatic Effort or Strengthen the Chances of Reaching an Agreement?
Those who criticize the strike claim it took place while negotiations were underway and harmed the chances of reaching a diplomatic solution. It is currently unclear whether Iran will return to the negotiating table or not. What is clear, however, is that the negotiation process that existed prior to the strike did not succeed in halting Iran’s nuclear program. On the contrary, Iran’s violations of the agreements indicate a cynical exploitation of the process by the Iranian leadership and a lack of willingness to compromise or abandon its nuclear ambitions.
Under the cover of diplomacy, Iran became a nuclear threshold state.
The full extent of the damage caused to Iran’s nuclear program is not yet known with certainty, but there is no doubt that a significant delay was inflicted, setting Iran back by months or possibly years. In addition to the nuclear facilities themselves, which sustained substantial damage, the elimination of senior nuclear scientists has dealt a blow to key centers of knowledge. As a result, Iran will likely struggle to restore the program, at least in the immediate term.
This means that if Iran does return to the negotiating table, discussions could focus on preventing the reconstruction and restoration of the facilities, rather than attempting to persuade Iran to dismantle those that existed prior to the strike.
The damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, combined with an agreement that prevents reconstruction, could delay the nuclear program by many years. In contrast, even if an agreement was reached without the strike its likely would not have succeeded in rolling back progress or preventing Iran from at least becoming a nuclear threshold state.
Iran has suffered severe blows over the past year. Regionally, it has seen the collapse of the Shiite axis it spent years building, and now, it has sustained direct damage to its military capabilities. Its standing in the region has been significantly weakened, which could make Iran even more determined to obtain nuclear capabilities due to a sense of vulnerability, threat, and humiliation. On the other hand, given its current political, military, economic, and social weakness, Iran needs time to recover and will struggle to continue resisting the West. It needs sanctions relief and will likely want to avoid further attacks. Therefore, despite its defiant rhetoric, Iran’s leadership may adopt a more pragmatic approach following the strike.
If and when negotiations with Iran resume, the nuclear program can no longer be treated in isolation from Iran’s broader strategic ambitions. The nuclear program is part of Iran’s national identity and its desire for regional and global influence. A future agreement must prevent Iran from continuing to pose a threat to the world in general, and the Middle East in particular. As such, the agreement must be comprehensive. At the same time, any deal with Iran cannot be perceived as an attack on its independence and sovereignty—otherwise, Iran will reject it.
Iran is currently at a very low point, and therefore, following the “stick,” there must also be a “carrot”: an incentive that ensures Iran can maintain its regional status, even if not as a nuclear or threshold nuclear state. Given the resistance to foreign intervention and Western involvement—especially after the war with Israel—it may be more effective to let regional actors (who are also acceptable to Israel) lead the negotiations and help build trust in the diplomatic process during its initial stages.
