Following the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah launched a comprehensive campaign aimed primarily at restoring civilian infrastructure in the areas inhabited by its Shiite base (Bekaa, Dahieh, and southern Lebanon). The campaign also includes direct assistance to those Shiite families affected by the war.
The state of Lebanon is not involved in the reconstruction. It is the state of Hezbollah that is leading the reconstruction campaign (only) in the Shiite areas and with significant Iranian assistance, in both money and in Iranian professionals who operate physically on the ground.
Sheikh Ali Damoush, the recently appointed head of the executive council, said that the budget required for the reconstruction was provided “by the grace of the dear Iranian people, who agreed to support the Lebanese people and did not stop for a moment to support the Lebanese people…”
We estimate with high certainty that the civilian reconstruction campaign serves as a cover for the presence and military activity of IRGC – Quds Force members in Lebanon, whose goal is to assist Hezbollah in military reconstruction. Furthermore, the civilian reconstruction activity also serves as a cover for the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
The Iranian pattern of using social, humanitarian, and medical organizations as a cover for their military and intelligence operations in Lebanon will likely intensify in the near future. A similar pattern was observed during the earthquake in Syria in February 2023.
The primary goal of the civilian assistance and reconstruction activities is for Hezbollah to regain its legitimacy among its supporters, by taking responsibility and repairing the damage caused by the war. Another central goal of the campaign is to convey a message of stability, strength, and presence.
Hezbollah defined the reconstruction campaign as part of the “resistance” activities. According to Naim Qassem Hezbollah’s leader, “The houses that were destroyed will return to being more beautiful than they were.” Hezbollah parliament member Hassan Fadlallah noted that “Hezbollah is fulfilling its role in confronting the enemy, and our choice is to be in the service of our people… The reconstruction portfolio has to do with the alliance and ensuring the resistance.”
Hezbollah’s reconstruction campaign is a crucial part of its efforts to spread its message of victory and to glorify Hezbollah’s achievements. The campaign is mainly directed inward, i.e. influencing the perceptions of Hezbollah’s base, which suffered massive damage because of Hezbollah. We see the use of narratives such as, Hezbollah won, Hezbollah’s participation in the fighting proved itself, glorifying the resistance, highlighting the threat to Israel, and regaining operational control.
During the first months of the war until September 2024, Hezbollah operated support mechanisms in various levels for the affected Shiite population, with an emphasis on southern Lebanon. For example, it provided thousands of dollars in direct compensation payments from Hezbollah to those whose homes were destroyed in southern Lebanon and had no alternative home, distribution of diesel fuel, and more, including in villages adjacent to the Israeli border.
In August 2024, we identified a database detailing the amount of diesel fuel supplied by Hezbollah to villages in southern Lebanon during some months of the war. The database in our possession details the months of April 2024 to July 2024, in which Hezbollah supplied 484 thousand liters of fuel to 72 villages in southern Lebanon. Needless to say, all these villages are distinctly Shiite villages, which are part of the “Shiite base” supporting Hezbollah.
With the intensification of the war, starting from September 2024, the above-mentioned aid activities were mostly halted. In November 2024, the process of recovery and a partial and gradual return of Hezbollah’s civilian activities began again, mainly in supporting displaced people and the displacement centers (see details below).
The Structure and Organization of The Reconstruction and Compensation Activities
With the enforcement of the ceasefire, Hezbollah announced reconstruction activities in the Bekaa Valley, Nabatieh and Tyre, which included conducting surveys and mapping damages, sending teams of engineers and experts to assess the damages in order to provide compensation and rebuild homes and return them to their owners.
Sheikh Ali Damoush, head of the executive council, announced the launch of Hezbollah’s “Promise and Commitment” project, to rebuild the extensive destruction in southern Lebanon and throughout the country.
The social unit operating under Hezbollah’s executive council is the main body responsible for handling the displaced Shiites population.
The Jihad al-Bina organization, operating under the social unit, is responsible for the reconstruction process, including the construction and restoration of infrastructure. It is important to note that the Jihad al-Bina organization is also responsible for building all of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure (See the article on Jihad al-Bina).
The person responsible for the reconstruction portfolio in Jihad al-Bina is the chief engineer Hussein Khair al-Din, CEO of the civil engineering and development company “Meamar.”
The civil engineering and development company “Meamar for Engineering Development SARL” has been chosen as the main contractor for the reconstruction. The literal meaning of the name “Meamar” is “building.” The company was established in 1988 and carries out various engineering projects. Its headquarters are located in Harat Harik in the Dahieh, and it also has subsidiaries. In 2020, it and its subsidiaries were subjected to American sanctions.
The founder of “Meamar” is Sultan Khalifa Assad, formerly the deputy and senior advisor of Hashem Safi al-Din, the previous head of the executive council and successor of Nasrallah, who was assassinated by Israel on October 4, 2024, about a week after Nasrallah’s assassination.
Assad is the senior figure in Hezbollah’s central municipal authority and has held this position at least since 2011. Since 2019, Assad has been responsible for managing dozens of companies affiliated with the organization’s executive council. Assad was also subject to American sanctions.
Khair al-Din, CEO of Meamar and the person responsible for the reconstruction portfolio in Jihad al-Bina, stated that the company has deployed offices in all affected areas of Lebanon. Each office is headed by a manager and staffed by engineers, contractors, and other relevant professionals. The engineers will inspect all damaged residential, commercial, and infrastructure units, fill out forms, assess the costs of their rehabilitation, and issue payment to their owners for the reconstruction process.
All the data and the overall assessment of the situation are consolidated in a central management room, which manages the campaign and approves the compensation payments and their recipients. Hezbollah’s civilian area officials are involved in the engineers’ field surveys process, providing additional approval for the compensation and overseeing its transfer to the affected individuals. The payments were made directly through the branches of Al-Qard Al-Hassan bank, which resumed operations after its branches and sites were attacked by the IDF during the war.
A notable example of this is Sheikh Muhammad Khalil Hammadi the official responsible for the western Bekaa area. In a recent report published by Al-Aad TV channel, Hammadi explained that they had finished distributing over 4,000 compensation checks for 95 percent of the affected people, totaling over three million dollars, based on the inspections and surveys conducted by the western Bekaa engineering teams under Hammadi’s responsibility.
On January 22, Hezbollah announced that Hammadi was assassinated by gunfire as he left his home in the town of Mashara in western Bekaa. We estimate there is a direct link between his involvement and responsibility for financial compensation and his assassination.
Hezbollah also launched the ” Samidoun” (“Resilient”) platform, which provides material assistance for the displaced Shiites and the victims of the war. Its purpose is to collect data on the displaced people and manage the aid in a more organized manner (the financial aid ranges between $300 to $400 per family, and the material assistance includes food and supplies like winter gear and other necessities). In the Bekaa Valley, Hezbollah also launched the “Popular Aid Fund,” an organization comprising thousands of volunteers, which deals with monitoring war-related matters and their consequences.
Field Activity
According to a report by the World Bank, the damage in Lebanon is estimated at around 100,000 housing units, ranging from complete to partial destruction. The first compensations were distributed by Hezbollah to those who lost their only home. These recipients were compensated with $14,000, equivalent to one year’s rent (depending on the place of residence) and the purchase of furniture.
Temporary housing solutions were allocated in designated locations. In the city of Beirut, for instance, 154 centers hosted about 11,000 displaced Shiite families from the south, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Dahieh. This is in addition to homes housing around 32,000 more families. All these are funded by various institutions and associations. Abbas Yaghi, the official in charge of displacement affairs in Beirut on behalf of Hezbollah, noted that the aid included, among other things, the supply of approximately 90,000 food rations distributed in the displacement centers and Shiite homes.
With the arrival of winter, they began distributing 22,000 blankets in Mount Lebanon, in addition to distributing 48,530 blankets in displacement centers and 35,876 blankets to homes. The aid included not only food and blankets but also general clothing, coats, mattresses, tarps, cooking gas, water, fuel, cleaning supplies, baby formula, diapers, feminine hygiene products, medicines, heaters, and more.
In early January 2025, the Jihad al-Bina organization published a table with data on the progress of the reconstruction of homes damaged by the war. The table detailed five areas of operation: villages south of the Litani River, villages north of the Litani River and western Bekaa, Beirut and Dahieh Baalbek and Harmel, and the last area is northern Lebanon.
Towards mid-January 2025, Jihad al-Bina announced that compensation payments (through Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank) in the western Bekaa area reached 95 percent.
According to the Al-Akhbar newspaper (Hezbollah’s main news outlet), the total amount paid by Hezbollah as of the end of January in shelter allowances, rehabilitation compensations, and others amounted to approximately $400 million for about 140,000 affected individuals. These amounts were transferred to the eligible individuals within a period of 55 days. The average amount paid for each case was about $2,860. The maximum amount paid reached up to $14,000 depending on the extent of the damage to buildings and housing complexes, and this amount does not include the construction of new buildings that were completely destroyed.
According to a report published by Jihad al-Bina, the total number of housing units surveyed by January 20, 2025, reached 268,317 in 448 villages and towns. This was done by an engineering team consisting of 466 engineers. In Dahieh the number of housing units inspected by the engineering teams reached 86,900 units, and in the area south of the Litani River, the number of housing units inspected reached 77,232 units. In the area north of the Litani River, the number was 70,158, in the Bekaa Valley 33,811, and in Mount Lebanon 216.
Expansion of the Campaign
On January 28, 2025, Hezbollah launched the reconstruction project in the villages near the border with Israel. The project was inaugurated under the auspices of Hezbollah parliament member Hassan Fadlallah. Two hundred engineers began locating and mapping the damages in the area in preparation for the reconstruction and renovation of the buildings.
On January 31, a survey project for the reconstruction of villages near the border area with Israel in the Tyre district was launched. The event was held under the auspices of Hezbollah parliament member Hussein Jashi. Also present at the ceremony were the chief engineer of the project, Hussein Khair al-Din, the director of the first Jabal Amel district in the Jihad al-Bina Institute, the engineer Salim Murad and the mayor of Simeon, Abd al-Qader Safa al-Din.
On January 22, the “Vata’unu”(Help / Assist) association, operating under the sponsorship of Hezbollah, launched the “Gateways of Heaven” campaign to accompany the return of displaced people to the border villages in southern Lebanon. The association organized the inauguration ceremony of the voluntary activity program for the month of Ramadan, which will begin on February 28, under the title “Gateways of Heaven Campaign.” The launch event was sponsored by the Iranian cultural advisor in Lebanon, Kamil Bakirzadeh, and attended by a group of social activists, supporters, and volunteers.
Financial Difficulties?
At the end of January 2025, Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank partially froze compensation payments until February 10. Hussein Khair al-Din, head of the reconstruction portfolio in Jihad al-Bina and chief engineer, claimed that the halt in payments and issuing checks was due to technical reasons only and was not related to funding. He emphasized that “the funding is available, and we continue with our work.”
On February 11, 2025, after about two weeks of suspension, Al-Manar published an announcement from Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank, informing that the bank would resume compensation payments starting Monday, February 10, at all relevant branches.
It is possible that Hezbollah needed a break to reorganize its financial resources for the reconstruction campaign with Iranian assistance, after the mapping processes indicated the extent of the damage.
The Irrelevant American Warning Regarding Iranian Aid
With regard to the Iranian aid, the Americans issued a warning, but unfortunately, it was sent the wrong address that has no influence in the matter.
Former US administration envoy Amos Hochstein warned the Lebanese government about Iranian involvement in the country’s reconstruction process after the war. Hochstein emphasized that any involvement of Iran, whether through Iranian companies or direct aid, would jeopardize the full implementation of the ceasefire and undermine stability in the country.
However, former Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati informed the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, that the only entity offering aid for Lebanon’s reconstruction is Iran. Mikati suggested to Johnson not to create obstacles for Lebanon’s reconstruction and not to prevent Iranian aid from reaching Lebanon, because if the funds do not come through the Lebanese government, they will arrive through other channels and be distributed by Hezbollah.
As we described in this article, Mikati’s statements are disconnected from reality (whether intentionally or not). In practice, Iranian funds reach Hezbollah directly anyway and are distributed (only) to the Shiite base.
The Captive Audience (Shiite Base) is Frustrated
Despite what has been publicly stated by Hezbollah officials and media outlets affiliated with Hezbollah, it has recently become evident that among Hezbollah supporters, there is growing frustration due to delays in compensation payments, non-payment of compensations, or compensations that are insufficient for rebuilding homes.
Additionally, many complain about the assistance mechanism: in many areas, the victims were asked to repair the damages using their personal funds and submit the receipts to Hezbollah for reimbursement. This method has caused anger among the Shiite base, which claimed to have spent all their money during the war on rent payments or finding shelter elsewhere after leaving their homes in areas of intense fighting. Therefore, they have no money left to pay for repairs and renovations after returning to their ruined homes.
However, despite the aforementioned, we do not anticipate mass public protests against Hezbollah. The Shiite base, which is a captive audience by Hezbollah, will continue to support Hezbollah due to ideology, indoctrination, fear of Hezbollah’s security unit, and economic dependence on Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructures managed by the executive council.
The executive council is responsible for the independent civilian mechanisms of Hezbollah’s state, which aim to “maintain” the Shiite base supporting Hezbollah. Through independent and functioning civilian mechanisms, parallel to the non-functioning Lebanese state mechanisms, Hezbollah continues to run a state within a state.
