In a situation assessment we published in May 2025 regarding Hezbollah’s condition, we wrote that, in light of the instability in Syria, the Iranians and Hezbollah have not abandoned their intentions to reestablish a foothold on Syrian soil. The motivation remains. This could manifest, among other things, through cooperation with local forces, based on various interests—primarily in exchange for money.
On July 2, the IDF Spokesperson reported that IDF forces arrested four local Syrians in southern Syria, in the villages of Umm al-Lux and Ain al-Batsali —about two to three kilometers from the border (south of the town of Rafeed). These individuals were operated by Iran with the intent of carrying out terrorist activity against IDF forces. On November 3, 2024, the IDF arrested Ali Suleiman al-Aatsi in the same area, near the town of Saida. He was also operated by Iran and was engaged in intelligence gathering on IDF forces in the buffer zone for the purpose of future terrorist activity.
According to our assessment, the Iranian units involved in operating local Syrians include Branch 4000—the special operations directorate of the IRGC Intelligence Organization—or Unit 840, the Quds Force’s special operations unit. Unit 840 has previously succeeded in planting two explosive devices near the Israeli border fence in the aforementioned area (in August and November 2020).
From tactics to strategy… Against the backdrop of reports that the U.S. is reducing its troop presence in Syria, having withdrawn some of its forces from northeastern Syria, and is reportedly planning to withdraw from the At-Tanf area in southeastern Syria as well, it can be assessed that Iran’s and Hezbollah’s motivation to reestablish a foothold in Syria will increase even further. In the event that U.S. forces withdraw from At-Tanf, we assess that southern Syria will become significantly more exposed to potential Iranian influence and presence.
