On July 18 Mohammad Hamad Jabarah was killed while driving in his pickup truck in the village of Ghaza located in the southern Bekaa Valley. He is known as the commander of the Khaled Ali unit inside Hamas-Lebanon. He is commonly referred to by the nickname “Sami” and was born in the year 1973.
Hamas in Lebanon and Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah in Lebanon both claimed ownership over Jabara. The military-terrorist faction of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah in Lebanon (al-Fajr) was incorporated into the Military wing of Hamas-Lebanon.
The Khaled Ali unit, together with the al-Shamali unit (its commander is Walam Abu Shanab, nicknamed “Bilal”), are the main operational units of Hamas-Lebanon military branch and are subordinate to Hamas’ Construction Bureau. Under them there are hundreds, and possibly even several thousands, of terrorist operatives who are deployed throughout Lebanon, mainly in the geographical areas where the ten main Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are located.
The units encompass activities related to the utilization and building up the force. These activities include the recruitment of operatives, provision of training, and specialized instruction in areas such as sniping, anti-tank tactics, and UAV operation. Additionally, they engage in the development and production of weaponry, (including rockets, attack UAVs, and miniature submarines). Furthermore, these units organize operational squads and prepare terrorist plots specifically targeting Israel.
The Khaled Ali unit oversaw Project Sa’ad, which was carried out covertly and concealed as a civilian operation. The objective of the project is to autonomously manufacture and assemble rockets. To hide the project from the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, it was conducted at civilian locations inside the Palestinian civilian population, specifically in the Hammarah area of the Bekaa Valley or the Sidon area.
We published a special report in October 2021 that covered Hamas-Lebanon’s infrastructure and activities. Among other things, information about the aforementioned two units, their activities, and commanders.
Despite the declaration of unity in defense of “Palestine” and “Al-Quds” (Jerusalem), the Shiite axis’ “joint operations room,” and current cooperation and coordination between Hamas and Hezbollah, there is an inherent tension between Hamas, which brands itself as “the protector of all Palestinians,” and Hezbollah, which brands itself as the “protector of all Lebanese.”
This friction results in a conflict of interest. Hezbollah considers Palestinians as mere guest to the Lebanese stage. Based on the buildup (conducted while hidden from Hezbollah) and the autonomous military acts carried out or capable of being carried out by Hamas from Lebanon, it suggests that Hamas does not consider itself to be “just a guest” in Lebanon.
Hamas Lebanon poses a challenge to Hezbollah from inside. We should remember the fickle history of Hamas’ relations with the radical Shiite axis led by Iran in general and with Hezbollah in particular.
It is our understanding that Hezbollah’s “affectionate-embrace” of Hamas is all in the name of interests. Hezbollah uses Lebanon’s Hamas as another tool against Israel and as a tool that serves the general narrative of “the liberation of Palestine and Al-Quds”. In our estimation, In the future, Hezbollah will strive to dismantle or at least greatly limit the power of the Lebanese Hamas with the understanding that in terms of cost versus benefit, the threat to it is more significant than the benefit of using Hamas-Lebanon as an additional and powerful organization against Israel.
