The IDF transition to Stage C in Gaza

The IDF is nearing the transition from Stage B in the war against Hamas – characterized by intensive combat involving divisional maneuvers and operations across Gaza – to Stage C, which features more targeted operations and significantly smaller forces.

According to IDF assessments, the shift to Stage C is made possible by the dismantling of Hamas’s regional hierarchical military structure in Gaza, which was made up of brigades and battalions with centralized command and control capabilities, and its replacement with disorganized local terror cells that have shifted to independent guerrilla warfare tactics.

Stage A of the war, which lasted from the Hamas-led massacre on October 7, 2023, until October 27, 2023, saw the IDF focus on airstrikes and the concentration of ground forces along the border with Gaza in preparation for a ground invasion. Stage B involved broad, intensive ground fighting that began in Gaza City and northern Gaza, identified as the most major Hamas strongholds, and later expanded to other areas of Gaza (with a significant slowdown in momentum in the middle of the stage).

Next, Stage C will focus on intelligence-based targeted operations and pinpoint raids, while maintaining Israeli freedom of action in the Strip. Essentially, the end of the operation in Rafah, where the 162nd Division is active, will mark the end of the intense phase of the war and the beginning of the transition to Stage C, which could last for years, reminiscent of the raids that continue to this day in the West Bank after Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 (despite the differences in scale).

Meanwhile, the IDF’s 99th Division continues to maneuver in Gaza City, and the 98th Division is active in Shuja’iyya, in an operation that began as a surprise raid on Hamas sites. Surprise encirclements carried out by the IDF in the Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City (by the 99th Division in combination with infantry and armored forces) around an UNRWA complex, which had become a renewed Hamas command site, may serve as a model for Stage C operations in the future.

The operation, conducted in the depth of the Strip, achieved significant control and damage to Hamas capabilities, while quickly deploying forces to relevant locations, exemplifying freedom of action in the heart of the Strip in a manner unimaginable nine months ago.

Unprecedented close air support for ground forces by the Air Force, the integration of command and control systems from various IDF branches and Military Intelligence, and the growing intelligence hold of the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence in the Strip, rebuilt after nearly 20 years of Israeli absence in the area, are significant enablers for the transition to Stage C.

During an assessment conducted by Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar in Rafah on July 14, with senior IDF officials from the Southern Command and the 162nd Division, military operators detailed that “the enhanced Shin Bet activity within the Gaza Strip and the intelligence derived from its operations create a significant intelligence and operational multiplier.”

This increasing intelligence coverage is essential for sustaining a routine of targeted raids in the future, and already contributes to the daily elimination of a significant number of terrorists in Gaza, alongside strikes against Hamas leaders in the Strip.

For example, on July 13, the Air Force and Southern Command targeted the commander of Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, and the commander of Hamas’s Rafah Brigade, Ra’afat Salama, in Al-Mawasi near Khan Younis. Such strikes, with the July 13 strike being the most significant since the beginning of the war, alongside  the systematic identification and destruction of Hamas capabilities and infrastructure, and the commitment to future ‘mowing the grass’ operations to prevent Hamas’s rebuilding efforts with Iranian assistance, form the foundation for sustaining Stage C in the future.

At this stage, IDF forces will have missions to continue dismantling existing capabilities, alongside preventative efforts to stop Hamas from rebuilding capabilities such as anti-tank squads, rocket production and launch sites, tunnel restoration, command centers, terrorist recruitment, and attempts to reestablish Hamas’s regional frameworks.

Hamas is also expected to try to rebuild its local weapons production industry, developed over two decades with Iranian funding and expertise. This industry relied on the use of dual-use materials imported under Israeli supervision, the smuggling of raw materials through tunnels from Sinai (under the Philadelphi Route), and smuggling weapons through tunnels from Egypt.

The transition to Stage C allows the IDF to continue to neutralize terror infrastructure while maintaining full freedom of action, but it does not address the question of political control in the Strip, as Hamas continues to seize much of the aid entering Gaza and uses this to signal to the Gazan population its intention to maintain control.

Moreover, Hamas’s “Da’wa” infrastructure, a civil-social framework built to support the construction of the Hamas terror army, will also require monitoring and dismantling actions by Israel for years to come. The UN in Gaza, through UNRWA, has essentially become a proxy force for Hamas to promote its jihad vision at both civilian and military levels.

As a prerequisite for all this, the IDF will have to maintain control over three critical areas: the Philadelphi Route, the Netzarim Corridor, and a one-kilometer-wide security zone along the border with Israel.

There is no doubt that physical control of the Philadelphi Route and the Netzarim   Corridor is ideal. However, Israel may exercise control not necessarily through a permanent physical presence.

Control over the Philadelphi Route along the Gaza-Egypt border will prevent the restoration of Hamas’s smuggling network and help suppress the hopes of the Qassam Brigades to quickly rebuild themselves.

Control over the Netzarim Corridor will allow Israeli control over movement between northern and southern Gaza, hindering Hamas’s aspirations to rebuild its regime and military-terror power in northern Gaza. This corridor could also serve as a springboard for future IDF forces to reach Hamas locations based on precise intelligence.

The one-kilometer-wide security zone along the border with Israel must function as a sterile zone, literally.

The importance of the sterile area in providing timely warning of infiltrations into communities close to the border will be relevant as long as there is no moderate regime in Gaza