The 7th week of the IDF’s ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon:
Numerous reports of an alleged ceasefire agreement in progress mark the seventh week. Hezbollah will remain determined to secure several “victory images” before implementing such an accord, especially at this point.
In the preceding week, hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah persisted, characterized by Hezbollah’s rocket and UAV assaults on Israeli cities and communities and IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructures in Lebanon.
The IDF’s ground operation in Lebanese territory has advanced to a depth of 5–6 kilometers from the border (the second village line). This region continues to provide a direct threat to Israeli communities, especially with anti-tank missile fire, mortar fire, and rocket fire.
Airstrikes targeted hundreds of Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, including numerous locations in the Dahieh quarter of Beirut. These targets consisted of weapons manufacturing facilities and armament depots that Hezbollah had developed over the years within the civilian population of Beirut.
In recent decades, Hezbollah has established numerous production sites and weapon storage facilities in the center of the Dahieh quarter of Beirut, where hundreds of missiles and rockets of various types, intended for targeting the State of Israel, have been produced and systematically concealed in densely populated civilian areas within the city. Furthermore, Hezbollah “designated” several launch sites in the city center, close to the weapons storage facilities (see our special report on this topic from February 2021 regarding Hezbollah’s Fateh-110 missile system located in Beirut).
Additional airstrikes were carried out in other areas in Lebanon, with an emphasis on Tyre and Nabatieh, where headquarters, weapons depots, buildings and other terrorist infrastructure were attacked, as well as military assets belonging to the ‘Radwan’ and ‘Aziz’ units, which are responsible for attacks against Israel from the western region in southern Lebanon.
To mitigate civilian casualties, the IDF publishes daily advance warnings and notifications of impending assaults to facilitate the evacuation of individuals from regions where Hezbollah has established its terrorist infrastructure. The IDF disseminates the warnings through various media channels, and this week, it sent numerous daily alerts to the inhabitants of Lebanon, informing them of targeted attacks in various regions of the country.
The IDF is simultaneously conducting operations against Unit 4400, which enables the supply of armaments to Hezbollah via Syria, with a focus on debilitating Hezbollah’s military capabilities in Lebanon. The IDF struck approximately 10 bridges across the Orontes River on the Lebanon-Syria border.
A subsequent IDF strike targeted the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s structures and command centers in the Al-Mazzeh district of Damascus, leading to the elimination of two top organization members who were orchestrating terror plots against Israel.
IDF forces located and neutralized numerous weapon systems throughout their ground offensive in southern Lebanon. Loaded and ready-to-fire rocket launchers are deployed throughout the area and underground infrastructure. Certain confiscated weapon stocks were designated for an incursion into the Galilee.
During the past week, 191 attacks were carried out from Lebanon against Israel. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 167 attacks, including 36 attacks for which had no further indications. The weekly number of attacks increased compared to the previous week when 176 attacks were carried out. Similarly, the number of rocket fire incidents rose this week to 155, compared to 146 the previous week. There was an increase in the use of UAVs – 28 incidents this week compared to 22 last week. The breakdown of the fire by ranges remained almost identical to the previous week.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
During the past week, 2 civilians and 8 soldiers were killed in Hezbollah attacks. So far, 43 Israeli civilians and 75 IDF soldiers have been killed in the fighting against Hezbollah in the northern arena, a total of 118 people.
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 68,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently. It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).
Since the beginning of the war, 4,837 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.
Since September 2024, we counted 8 attacks on the northern region, characterized by heavy rocket barrages (all over 70 launches). The last barrage attack focused on Haifa and the Krayot was on November 11, 2024 (80 launches). On October 8, there was another targeted attack on Haifa and the Krayot, marked by a heavy barrage consisting of 85 launches. In addition, two additional attacks were carried out with heavy barrages, which also included Haifa and the Krayot but were not focused only on them. Since the beginning of the maneuver, Hezbollah has focused its attacks on the large cities in the north. This intentionally creates a narrative of victory and attrition, particularly when the consequences are potentially lethal. A statistical analysis shows that since the beginning of November, there has been an actual decline in the average number of daily attacks compared to October (25 attacks per day in November so far, compared to 37 in October).
Since the beginning of November, we know of over 850 launches that crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon. This figure derives from the IDF, which only publishes daily data on significant rocket barrages on Israeli territory.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel
(November 11) There were 30 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 17 of them. Attacks were carried out toward the cities of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, Ma’alot Tarshiha, Nahariya, Acre, the Krayot, Haifa, Rosh Pina, and Hazor HaGalilit. Hezbollah carried out barrages of rockets and heavy missiles, including about 50 launches toward Karmiel and about 80 launches toward the area of Nahariya and Krayot, injuring 6 civilians, including a one-year-old toddler.
(November 12) 19 attacks were carried out from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 13 of them. Attacks were carried out on communities near the border such as Manara, Malkiya, Dishon, Kfar Yuval, Zarit, Shomera, and Kiryat Shmona, and more distant cities such as Nahariya, Acre, Haifa, and the Krayot. A direct hit on a building in the city of Nahariya killed two civilians and wounded two others. In addition, three munitions were fired at the Tel Aviv area and a Hezbollah suicide UAV exploded in the yard of a kindergarten in the city of Nesher, near Haifa. Due to the resourcefulness of the kindergarten teacher, who heard sirens from nearby cities, the children were rushed by her into a protected area, thus saving their lives.
(November 13) There were 26 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 16 of them. Attacks were carried out on communities near the border such as Avivim, Yaron, Kiryat Shmona, Margaliot, and Shlomi, and more distant cities such as Safed, the Krayot, and Nahariya. In addition, Hezbollah fired a barrage of rockets and missiles of about 20 rockets toward the community of Kfar Vradim and about five more in the Tel Aviv area.
(November 14) There were 30 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 21 of them. Attacks were carried out against communities near the border such as Dovev, Kiryat Shmona, Dishon, Matsuva, Shlomi, Baram, Metula, Misgav Am, and Margaliot, and to more distant cities such as Ma’a lot Tarshiha, Haifa, and the Krayot. A Hezbollah UAV exploded in the Elyakim area (about 50 km from the border between Israel and Lebanon), wounding two soldiers.
(November 15) There were 36 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 26 of them. Attacks were carried out toward the cities of Nahariya, Krayot and Haifa, along with attacks on communities near the border such as Manara, Margaliot, Kiryat Shmona, Misgav Am, and Yaron.
(November 16) There were 30 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 22 of them. Attacks were carried out against Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya, Haifa, the Krayot and Safed. Hezbollah fired about 10 munitions into the Haifa area. One of the munitions hit a public building in the city center.
According to Hezbollah, it fired Nasr-1 and Fajr-5 rockets toward Haifa.
(November 17) There were 19 attacks from Lebanon against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 16 of them. Hezbollah launched about 20 munitions to the Krayot and Acre areas and about 15 additional munitions to the Upper Galilee and Western Galilee.
Pay close attention to the area from where Hezbollah fired rockets at Haifa this week. The rockets were fired from an area belonging to the Lebanese army that used to be a military base, near a sports compound near the village of Ansar. These rockets were launched from a distance of over 70 kilometers. The IDF Spokesperson reported that the IDF destroyed the launcher.
Hezbollah and other organization casualties
Hezbollah stopped regularly publicizing its casualties. However, social networks publish announcements about the funerals of operatives killed. Based on reports on social media, we identified at least 219 Hezbollah operatives who were killed this week. However, the number of casualties is presumably higher.
As of October 8, 2023, about 1,900 Hezbollah operatives that we managed to document were killed. Most of the operatives killed originated south of the Litani River.
2 senior PIJ operatives were eliminated in the IDF attack in Syria and two Amal operatives were eliminated in another attack. According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 108 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal Movement, Al-Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Fatah and the Democratic Front.
Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures
This week, 8 senior Hezbollah commanders were eliminated, including the commander of the Al-Khiam sector, the commander of the Hajar sector’s anti-tank system in the Nasser unit, the commander of the Tebnit sector, the head of the Khager compound, the head of operations of a Radwan Brigade, the battalion anti-tank commander in the Radwan Coastal Force, and a company commander in the Radwan force.
In the November 17 attack in Beirut, around Ras al-Naba, Muhammad Afif, Hezbollah’s head of communications and spokesman, was eliminated.
In another attack in Beirut on November 17, according to local reports, a senior Hezbollah Southern Front official in the Mar Elias area was attacked. According to various reports, the target of the attack was Mahmoud Machi. Some reports define him as commander of the Southern Front (Ali Karki’s replacement) and some reports define him as commander of operations on the southern front. No further details are available at this time.
As of October 8, 2023, 170 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, among the senior figures killed were Jihad Council members Fouad Shakar (head of the strategic divisions), Ibrahim Aqil (head of the operations division), Ali Karki (commander of the Southern Front), Suheil Hussein Husseini (head of the headquarters), and Hashem Safieddine (Nasrallah’s intended successor).
- 7 Senior Hezbollah leaders (4.1% of those eliminated)
- 24.1% of those eliminated, a total of 41, belonged to the Radwan unit, including acting unit commanders Wassam al-Tawil (January 2024), Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi (September 2024) and deputy unit commander Mustafa Ahmad Shehadi (October 2024).
- 28.8%, a total of 49 of the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units was placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
- 31, constituting 18.2%, commanders of various ranks killed in the ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon.
- 13, constituting 7.6%, are operatives in Hezbollah headquarters.
- 7 senior operatives from the air unit, including the unit commander, were eliminated.
- 3 others from Hezbollah’s air defense system.
- Two senior operatives and the commander of Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon (Unit 4400).
- An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
- 2.9% of those eliminated, a total of 5, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
- 6.5%, 11 senior operatives from the rocket missile array, including the unit commander and the unit commander in southern Lebanon.
Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon
(Nov 12/13/14/15/16/17) Attacks on Hezbollah headquarters, weapons production sites, warehouses, and other infrastructure in the Dahieh quarter of Beirut.
(October 14) Buildings and headquarters of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force were attacked in Nabatiyeh, including a building used by Hezbollah’s Badr unit.
(October 16) Hezbollah targets in Tyre were attacked, including headquarters, weapons depots, buildings, and other terrorist infrastructure belonging to the Aziz unit.
(November 17) The elimination of Hezbollah’s media chief and spokesperson, Muhammad Afif. He was killed in an airstrike while he was in the main Baath Party building in Beirut in the Ras al-Naba area of Beirut.
Muhammad Afif was in charge of Hezbollah’s combat information unit (Al-Alam al-Harbi). Hezbollah’s combat propaganda department is responsible for media documentation of military activity. Combat propaganda is an inseparable part of Hezbollah’s military activity and is responsible for publishing photographs and propaganda videos deriving from this activity.
Hezbollah – General:
During the first months of the war, up until mid-September 2024, before the escalation of the conflict, Hezbollah operated aid mechanisms at various levels for the affected Shiite population. An example of this is Hezbollah’s direct payment to those whose homes were destroyed in southern Lebanon and who did not have an alternative residence (those who met the conditions received $12,000). Starting in September, aid activities in general were disrupted and even halted.
In general, it is evident that after about two months in which Hezbollah’s civilian and social activity was disrupted, there are signs of recovery and a partial, gradual return of activity can be seen among the Shiite population. The recovery is evident, first of all, in the support of IDPs and their absorption centers. In recent days, it seems that Hezbollah has been working in Beirut to launch the Samidoun (“Eitanim”) program, whose objective is to collect data on the displaced persons and to manage the aid in a more orderly manner (see program website – https://samidoun.co/link/index?SID=13d18be3-d68e-4130-bd65-aa39501fd817 ). In the Bekaa Valley as well, Hezbollah launched the Popular Aid Fund, a body numbering thousands of volunteers that monitors all matters related to the war and its consequences.
(November 14) Hezbollah operatives who tried to smuggle weapons and combat equipment in their cars towards southern Lebanon were apprehended by Druze residents of the village of Rashia in the Bekaa area. The video shows the large quantity of weapons they were carrying. Hezbollah operatives were attacked by the villagers because they endangered them. Internal Lebanese tensions between the sects continue to increase in light of the fact that Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into war.
(November 14) Nabil Mamlouk, a Lebanese journalist was attacked by Hezbollah operatives after he refused to stop his documentation in the city of Tyre.
Hezbollah’s modus operandi, which exploits global business platforms for its criminal business activities around the world, which generates a lot of money and serves as a platform for its terrorist activity, is well known. In recent years there have been reports of various civilian vessels allegedly purchased by Hezbollah through collaborators or reports of vessels used by Hezbollah to cover front companies linked to large business companies owned by various businessmen. Imad Amhaz, who was arrested on November 1, may be connected to Hezbollah’s maritime infrastructure operating under cover under such a business platform. For further information, see the attached article – Imad Amhaz’s arrest and the connection to Hezbollah’s maritime infrastructure operating under civilian cover.
Lebanon – General:
(November 14) At the end of his three-day visit to Lebanon, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix stressed that “UN Security Council Resolution 1701 remains the framework for a return to stability – based on it.” During a meeting with several senior Lebanese officials, Lacroix stressed the need for “the commitment of both Lebanon and Israel to fully implement their obligations under the resolution.” Meeting with members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of UNIFIL donor countries, he expressed his “sincere gratitude for their continued support for security and stability along the Blue Line,” noting that “peacekeepers from some 50 countries continue to do their best to carry out their missions under very difficult and challenging conditions.”
(November 15) Ali Larijani, senior advisor to the Iranian supreme leader, met in Beirut with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati.
During the meeting, Mikati stressed that “what is needed is to support the position of the Lebanese state in terms of implementing UN Resolution 1701 and supporting national unity, and not taking positions that create sensitivities among any Lebanese group and be in favor of one side at the expense of the other.” He stressed that “the Lebanese government gives priority to a ceasefire and the full implementation of Resolution 1701, without any amendments or interpretations contrary to the content and implications of the resolution.” Larijani noted that “Iran supports any decision made by the government, especially Resolution 1701, and supports the election of any president agreed upon by the Lebanese.”
Larijani also met with Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese parliament and Hezbollah’s supervisor of ceasefire negotiations. As of today, Nabih Berri is part of the problem. But at the same time, he is the only part that can bring about a solution. See the attached article – Nabih Berri is part of the problem and part of the solution at the same time for expansion.
(November 16) The Public Health Emergency Activities Center of Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health reported that the total number of dead and wounded since the start of the fighting until Friday, November 15, was 3,452 dead and 14,664 wounded.
UNIFIL:
(November 15) A shell hit an outpost of the Italian battalion of the UN force in the village of Shema in the western sector, there were no casualties, but damage was caused. The shell did not explode, and the unexploded ordnance was evacuated from the post.
(November 17) A group of individuals, including at least one-armed person, blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the village of Badias. The patrol was able to “proceed along the scheduled path” but was fired at around 40 times. “The patrol arrived safely at the UNIFIL base at Deir Kifa”. The Lebanese army was notified about the event. The patrol vehicles exhibited indications of gunfire, but there were no injuries.
This is another example of UNIFIL’s limited ability to act against armed militias in Lebanon in general and against Hezbollah as a terrorist army in particular.
Located 200 meters from the UNIFIL base, west of Kafr Kila, is a structure within a civilian area where Hezbollah’s operational equipment and munitions were discovered. The structure also housed apparatus for training and instruction. UNIFIL vehicles traversed past the building daily, many times each day. Unaware? Overlooked? Resolution 1701 was predestined for failure. The Lebanese Army was both incapable and disinclined to implement the resolution. Even on the day following the conflict, the Lebanese Army will neither desire nor possess the capability to implement an agreement.
The Syrian arena:
(November 13) An IDF attack against weapons smuggling routes used by Hezbollah on the Lebanon-Syria border. The attack is part of the IDF’s ongoing activity to damage Hezbollah’s arms smuggling and renewing or its force. Unit 4400 is at the center of its activity, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran through Syria to Lebanon.
(November 14) Buildings and headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in the Al-Meza neighborhood of Damascus were attacked. Two Islamic Jihad operatives, one commander and another senior operative were eliminated in the attack. In another airstrike on the same day, the Syrian regime’s transit routes on the Syrian-Lebanese border used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons were attacked.
Uncommonly, the IDF claimed responsibility for these attacks.
Syria General
(November 11) The Jordanian authorities announced that they had thwarted drug smuggling using a drone that came from Syria.
(November 12) In response to the attack on American bases, US Central Command forces attacked nine different Iranian targets in Syria in Mayadeen east of Deir ez-Zor.
(November 13) The Iranian parliament passed a law to lower tariffs and increase the free trade zone between Iran and Syria. The law included several provisions reflecting ongoing efforts to increase economic cooperation and trade between Iran and the Syrian regime by systematically reducing trade barriers.
(November 16) After his visit to Beirut, Ali Larijani, Khamenei’s senior advisor, visited Damascus for a meeting with Bashar al-Assad and a visit to the holy Shi’ite site of Saida Raqiya in Damascus.
(November 17) President Assad hosted Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasir Zadeh and his delegation; they discussed strengthening security cooperation between the countries.
Shiite Axis – General
(November 12) A UAV launched toward the American base in the CONCO gas field by pro-Iranian militias was reportedly intercepted.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq:
During the past week (November 11-17), the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for 23 UAV attacks against targets throughout Israel. The IDF intercepted 14 UAVs launched from Iraq and another fell in an open area. In the other incidents, no further indications were reported.
From November 2023, when the Islamic resistance in Iraq began carrying out attacks against Israel, until November 11, 2024, they assumed responsibility for 310 attacks against Israel.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
(November 13) On November 9-10, US Central Command forces reportedly carried out a series of precision airstrikes on multiple Houthi weapons storage facilities located in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. These facilities contained a variety of advanced conventional weapons used by the Iranian-backed Houthis to target American and international military and civilian vessels in international waters in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
(November 12) The Houthis claimed responsibility for launching a number of cruise missiles and UAVs at the U.S.S. Lincoln aircraft carrier. In addition, they claimed responsibility for launching ballistic missiles and UAVs at two American destroyers in the Red Sea. The British Maritime Trade Centre reported an attack on a commercial ship in the Red Sea, and American sources reported that there was no attack on the U.S.S. Lincoln aircraft carrier.
(November 17) The Houthis launched a UAV toward Israel. The UAV was intercepted in an open area in the Lachish area after it entered Israeli territory.
Since October 2023, there have been 226 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States and other targets.
