The Lebanese Arena
IDF Activity in Lebanon:
On April 8, the IDF announced that it had attacked a weapons depot of Hezbollah’s air defense system in the Bekaa Valley in the depths of Lebanon, using fighter jets.
April 15 Attack on a structure used by Hezbollah in Tir Harfa.
April 15 Attack on a vehicle in Aytroun and elimination of a Hezbollah operative from its special operations unit.
April 16 IDF attack on a vehicle in Wadi Hujeir and elimination of a Radwan Unit operative.
April 16 Attack on a motorcycle in Hanin and elimination of a Hezbollah operative. Additionally, an attack on a structure used by Hezbollah in Aita al-Sha’ab.
April 17 Attack on a motorcycle in Aytroun and elimination of a Hezbollah operative.
April 17 Attack on a motorcycle in Blida and elimination of Ali al-Nabi Khazi, deputy commander of the Hezbollah Muhabib compound.
April 18 Attack on a gas station and a mobile structure in Ayta al-Sha’ab.
April 18 Attack on a vehicle at the southern entrance to the city of Sidon (Al-Ghaziyeh junction) and elimination of Muhammad Ja’afar Manah Assad Abdullah from Al-Khiam, in charge of the deployment and rehabilitation of Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure, with an emphasis on the area south of the Litani River.
April 18 Attack on a vehicle in the area between Rmeish and Ayta al-Sha’ab and elimination of a Hezbollah operative.
April 20 Attack on a vehicle in the Houla area and elimination of Hezbollah’s engineering officer in the Aadaissah area.
April 20 Attack on rocket launchers and additional Hezbollah military infrastructure in the Arnoun al-Shaqif and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas.
April 20 Attack on a vehicle in Kaouthariyet El Saiyad and elimination of Hussein Ali Naser, deputy commander of Unit 4400.
Hussein Ali Naser, also known as “Abu Ali Hassan,” from the village of Harouf, deputy commander of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, was eliminated on April 20 in an aerial attack while traveling in his vehicle on the road between the village of Al-Sharqiya and the village of Kaouthariyet El Saiyad in southern Lebanon.
Naser was responsible for smuggling weapons and funds into Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s rehabilitation and military buildup processes. He operated in cooperation with the Iranian Quds Force to smuggle weapons, including through the Beirut airport. He also acted to carry out arms purchase and smuggling deals across the border with Syria.
Naser was in contact with airport employees who secretly assisted in the smuggling operations. Recently, about 30 employees at the Beirut airport (cargo handlers, etc.) were suspended from their positions due to assisting Hezbollah.
The image below shows Hussein Ali Naser at the entrance to the terminal of the Baghdad International Airport, where he was photographed during one of his trips outside of Lebanon, possibly as part of his role and/or as part of a religious pilgrimage to one of the Shiite holy sites in Iraq.
Iraq currently serves as one of the intermediate stations for the transfer of funds and possibly additional equipment by air from Iran to Lebanon.
Lebanon General:
Report: Hezbollah uses the port of Beirut to smuggle weapons from Iran.
In recent weeks, reports have increased that Hezbollah is making use of the Beirut seaport to smuggle weapons from Iran through maritime routes, after losing the main smuggling route that passed through Syria and Iraq following the collapse of the Assad regime. Western intelligence sources claim that Iran has made repeated attempts to transfer weapons through the sea, under the direction of Units 190 and 700 of the Quds Force and with the help of a network of collaborators who assist in the transfer of weapons without inspection. It was also reported that Hezbollah’s foreign relations official, Wafiq Safa, manages the aid network from within the port itself as part of his relentless efforts towards Hezbollah’s military buildup.
Against the backdrop of these reports, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, together with the Minister of Transportation and Public Works, Fayez Ghosn, made a surprise visit to the port of Beirut on April 11. In a statement published by the President’s office, it was reported that Aoun emphasized the importance of strict government supervision of the goods arriving at the port, and in particular, adherence to accurate registration of all cargo. He called on the authorities to fully enforce the procedures and warned against leniency towards those who act against them.
In addition to the direct sea route from Iran to Lebanon through the Suez Canal, the Iranians will try, through their smuggling transport units, to restore the weapons smuggling corridor through Sudan. From there, they will continue through Libya (and possibly also through Egypt) to the Mediterranean Sea and from there to Lebanon. The success of this corridor could also affect the Gaza Strip if Israel withdraws from the Philadelphi Corridor area. Hezbollah is already preparing the entry gates in Lebanon and may even be preparing to receive the smuggling at sea. Concurrently, money continues to be smuggled through the air route from Iran to Iraq and Turkey and from there to Lebanon, and in addition, the Iranians and Hezbollah have not abandoned their activities and plans in the land route through Syria.
In this context, see the article we published on the subject: Recalculating Route – The Iran and Hezbollah Corridor to Lebanon.
Between demands for the disarmament of Hezbollah and attempts to calm internal discourse and the proposal to integrate Hezbollah operatives into the Lebanese army.
In the context of increasing international pressure, especially from the United States, and in light of the strengthening public demand to regulate Hezbollah’s military status, a trend of cautious internal dialogue is growing in Lebanon regarding the future of the weapons in the organization’s possession. The issue is at the center of the political debate in the country, with an attempt to formulate an agreed-upon framework that will balance the country’s sovereignty with the complex security and sectarian reality.
In recent days, Lebanese President Michel Aoun has been leading a move for political reconciliation and coordination with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, declaring in an interview with the newspaper “Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed” that “a decision on the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state has already been made – the only question remaining is the implementation of this decision.” Aoun added that “Hezbollah is showing responsibility and does not aspire to be drawn into a new war.” Aoun went on noting that the dialogue between the parties is taking place in a direct and positive atmosphere, while maintaining the status quo in the south of the country, directing the army in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
In an unprecedented statement, Aoun even proposed a plan for the gradual integration of Hezbollah operatives into the Lebanese army, clarifying that an independent framework in the style of the “Popular Mobilization Forces” in Iraq would not be established: “It will be possible to absorb their people into the army individually, within the framework of training as was done with other militias after the end of the civil war in Lebanon.”
In coordination with Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri plays a central role as a mediator between the forces. Berri called for the opening of a comprehensive national dialogue on the issue of Hezbollah’s armament – while avoiding populist struggles or unilateral coercion. According to political sources, Berri sees strengthening state institutions and integrating Hezbollah into the legal frameworks of the army as a supreme goal and is already working with all parties to lead a gradual and agreed-upon plan for disarmament.
At the same time, Hassan Fadlallah – a member of parliament on behalf of Hezbollah – also expressed openness to dialogue on a “comprehensive defense strategy,” provided that Israel ceases its ceasefire violations and withdraws from the occupied territories. His remarks were received positively by President Aoun and his entourage, who referred to them as a sign of the organization’s willingness to engage in dialogue, while maintaining internal stability in the country.
On the other hand, there are also other voices. A member of Hezbollah’s political-political council, Mahmoud Qamati, said that “the hand that touches our weapons will be broken,” emphasizing that no one in the world will be able to lay their hands on Hezbollah’s weapons. He stressed that Hezbollah does not aspire to hand over its weapons and added that the resistance is the basis of the defensive strategy, and that the discourse on the subject will happen when the conditions are right.
Wafiq Safa, responsible for coordination and liaison in Hezbollah, said on April 18 in an interview with Hezbollah’s Noor radio station, that only Hezbollah’s opponents use the phrase “disarmament of Hezbollah” on social networks. According to Safa, Hezbollah conveyed a message to the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, that Hezbollah would be willing to discuss Lebanon’s defense strategy only after Israel implements UN Resolution 1701, withdraws from Lebanese territory, releases Lebanese prisoners, and ceases its attacks on Lebanese territory. Safa further noted that before discussing the disarmament of Hezbollah and handing over the weapons to the state, the Lebanese army must be equipped with weapons that will enable it to defend Lebanon.
On April 18, in the evening, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem spoke and also addressed the issue, noting that Hezbollah would not allow any party to disarm it. Qassem noted that this idea is not relevant. The meaning of disarming the “resistance” means serving the enemy and a civil war – this will not happen. According to Qassem, these days they are giving diplomacy a chance, but this opportunity is limited. Hezbollah has many options and Hezbollah has no fear. Qassem continues with the threat that if they wish to continue testing Hezbollah’s (threshold of containment and patience), then they will discover at the appropriate time what Hezbollah’s reactions will be (he apparently also meant elements within Lebanon and also outside of it).
Even within the government, there are voices who believe that the move should be implemented partially and gradually, and not within the framework of a comprehensive agreement. Even the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, was quoted in the Al-Akhbar newspaper (Hezbollah’s central mouthpiece) as saying at the Lebanese government meeting on April 17 that Hezbollah is cooperating with the army and that the Israeli attacks are creating difficulties and obstacles.
However, President Aoun is determined to promote an institutional solution and seeks to avoid internal conflagration. According to him, “The political system in Lebanon is ripe for an agreement, and the time to advance the solution is now.” He also noted that there is continuous dialogue with the United States on the issue, but stressed that external pressure alone will not be enough – the international community must also assist in enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.
The current discourse, led by Aoun and Berri, constitutes, at least in its intensity, the clearest sign so far of a possible strategic change in Lebanon: a transition from confrontation over Hezbollah’s weapons – to institutional regulation based on national consensus, strengthening the army, and making 2025 a year in which the state’s exclusive control over legal weapons will be realized.
On the other hand, this prompts the question: is there a discrepancy between the public discussion and actions concerning Hezbollah’s disarmament (like removing their symbols in Beirut) and the reality of their continued military strength and Iranian-backed efforts to rebuild, including rearming, rehabilitating infrastructure, and enhancing intelligence and operational capabilities?
Even if the statements of the President of Lebanon are unequivocal and there is a real intention behind them, they must be proven by clear and effective actions.
Removal of images and posters of the Shiite axis and Hezbollah from the airport road and other areas in Beirut (but not in Dahieh…)
During the recent period, all the images, posters, and flags related to Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Guards, and senior Iranian officials, which were hung along the main road leading to the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut — one of the central and symbolic axes of the country — were removed. In place of the old signs, new signs were hung bearing the inscription: “Lebanon – a new era,” which seek to convey a new spirit of change, reconciliation, and renewal.
At one location where a new sign replaced a picture of Hassan Nasrallah, it was burned by unknown individuals at night.
Lebanese Army – Discovering a rocket launcher in southern Lebanon
On April 8, it was reported that the Lebanese army found a launcher and two rockets abandoned in one of the orchards in the area of the village of Al-Qlaileh in the Tyre district. The Lebanese army, through its engineering battalion soldiers, handled the neutralization and removal of the launcher and rockets and found no one involved in the incident. The engineering battalion belongs to the Support Brigade of the Lebanese army, which is an independent brigade, one of the 14 brigades of the army.
This is a known rocket launching area, which Palestinian terrorist operatives (mostly belonging to Hamas-Lebanon), who come from the refugee camps in Tyre, also use to launch from. However, according to the launcher’s image in this case (assuming it is authentic), it is likely that it is a launcher belonging to Hezbollah.
As of this writing, it is not possible to assess how effective the Lebanese army’s activity is in preventing Hezbollah’s activity in southern Lebanon in general and removing and neutralizing Hezbollah’s weapons in particular. The publications on this, which can be defined as reliable, are not many, and in addition, the intensity of IDF attacks against Hezbollah activity continues.
Hezbollah supporters expressed joy when a Lebanese army soldier was killed as a result of an explosion of weapons belonging to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
A Lebanese army soldier, Fadi Muhammad Jassim, from the town of Wadi Khaled in the Akkar Governorate in northern Lebanon (mostly Sunni population), was killed on April 14, 2025, as a result of an explosion during an engineering operation of his unit in Wadi al-Aziyeh in southern Lebanon to neutralize and remove weapons left by Hezbollah. Apparently, Jassim stepped on a mine planted in the area by Hezbollah.
The soldier’s death sparked many expressions of grief among many citizens in Lebanon. He was laid to rest in an official and extensive military funeral held in his village in Wadi Khaled, in the presence of army representatives, family, and many residents.
However, it does not appear that Hezbollah supporters on social networks were particularly saddened. For example, an X account holder named Hussein (an authentic and not a fictitious account) expressed joy at the soldier’s death, and among other things, wrote: “He died while searching for the weapons of the good guys,” referring to Hezbollah. The same account holder even added: “The army is only bearing down and pressing the resistance, so it is equal to the enemy army (Israel). I wish the same fate upon all who oppose us.”
Explosion of Ammunition in a Lebanese Army Vehicle and the Deaths of Four Soldiers
On April 20th, remnants of ammunition collected by the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, loaded onto an army pickup truck exploded, likely due to a malfunction or accident. The explosion occurred while traveling in the Brikaa-Qasiba area (it is unclear whether it was due to an accident with another vehicle or a malfunction). As a result of the explosion, an officer and three soldiers were killed.
Strengthening Ties Between UNIFIL and the Tyre District
In order to strengthen cooperation with local authorities, UNIFIL held a meeting on April 9th with the Union of Tyre Municipalities at the force’s headquarters in Shamaa in southern Lebanon. During the meeting, the commander of UNIFIL’s Western Sector, Nicola Mandolesi, emphasized the importance of building trust with the local community and the force’s commitment to supporting residents in cooperation with the Lebanese army.
The Mayor of Tyre, Hassan Dabouk, thanked UNIFIL for its continued support, and other mayors expressed their appreciation for the presence of the forces and the civilian projects they promote in the area. At the end of the meeting, it was noted that strong ties between UNIFIL and the residents are key to maintaining security and stability in southern Lebanon.
Unfortunately, as long as the mandate to enforce Resolution 1701 is not implemented, UNIFIL’s extensive civilian activities in cooperation with local residents will not prevent Hezbollah from continuing to operate, just as it did not prevent Hezbollah from establishing a massive terrorist infrastructure in southern Lebanon and did not contribute to maintaining security and stability in southern Lebanon.
The Spanish Battalion in UNIFIL Increases Joint Patrols with the Lebanese Army to “Improve Security in Southern Lebanon”
According to Lebanese sources, the UNIFIL Spanish battalion has recently expanded the scope of its joint patrols with the Lebanese army. According to the report, since the deployment of the Lebanese army in the area, cooperation between UNIFIL and the army has strengthened. The joint activities include increased patrols, clearing mines and unexploded ordnance, and establishing roadblocks at friction points.
50 Years Since the Lebanese Civil War
On April 13th, Lebanon marked the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war. The Lebanese state continues to bear the scars of one of the most difficult conflicts in its history. The war broke out on April 13, 1975, following an attack by Palestinian militants against a bus carrying Christians in the Ain al-Rummaneh neighborhood in East Beirut. In response, the Christian Phalangist militia opened fire, igniting the sectarian, political, and social conflicts that were already simmering beneath the surface in Lebanon. Tensions between Christians, Shia and Sunni Muslims, Druze, and Palestinians, alongside the involvement of regional and international actors, led to a bloody war that lasted 15 years.
The war, which claimed the lives of about 150,000 people, included many stages: the establishment of Palestinian terrorist organizations in southern Lebanon, the entry of the Syrian army into Lebanon, the First Lebanon War in 1982, the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, Iranian entrenchment, the establishment and strengthening of Hezbollah, bloody clashes both between and within religious communities, and the Taif Agreement that brought the civil war to an end.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called during the anniversary events for national unity and the strengthening of state institutions, while warning against reliance on foreign actors: “In Lebanon, no one can cancel out the other. Only the state, the army, and the legitimate security forces can protect us.”
Hezbollah General
Hezbollah and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party Agree on Cooperation in Local Elections
In a meeting held in Baalbek between representatives of Hezbollah and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the two sides agreed to strengthen their political alliance in preparation for the upcoming municipal and regional elections scheduled for May in Lebanon. The parties emphasized the importance of cooperation between all political and religious forces supporting the resistance line, especially Hezbollah, Amal, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
During the meeting, Hezbollah emphasized its continued commitment to resisting Israel, referring to violations on the border and its military conduct. The Hezbollah representative stressed that despite internal and external challenges, resistance activity would not diminish and would continue to be a cornerstone of the organization’s regional activities.
It was also reported that the political cooperation between the two sides would include the coordination of agreed-upon lists in the elections, while involving local communities for the overall interest.
Is Hezbollah Evacuating Hundreds of its Commanders’ Families to South America?
Al-Hadath newspaper reported on April 13th that Hezbollah had transferred about 400 families of mid-level commanders from Lebanon to countries in South America, mainly Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador, with some choosing to settle in Africa as well, in places where there is a large and well-known Shiite community with a significant Hezbollah presence. According to a report by journalist Ali Hamadeh, based on a diplomatic source from South America, this is in preparation for a possible dismantling of Hezbollah’s military apparatus, as the commanders may become targets for persecution by Israel or international intelligence agencies.
We cannot vouch for the reliability of the above report. It is very possible that during the last war, wealthy Shiite families left Lebanon (temporarily or permanently) and arrived in Shiite concentrations in South America and Africa. It is very likely that some of these families are related to activists in various senior ranks of Hezbollah.
Palestinians in Lebanon
Support Rallies for Palestinians and Gaza Held in Sidon and Miniyeh (a Village Near Tripoli) in Lebanon
On Monday, April 7th, two rallies were held in the city of Sidon and the city of Miniyeh in support of the residents of the Gaza Strip. Participants included religious figures, activists, and representatives from the Islamic Jihad movement, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Speakers called for increased support for the Palestinians, protested against international pressure on Lebanon, and opposed demands for the disarmament of resistance organizations. Israeli flags were burned at the rallies.
The Syrian Arena
Syria General:
On Saturday, March 29th, Ahmad al-Shar’ presented the new Syrian government. This government, which is supposed to serve until elections are held in the country (with no date set for the foreseeable future), replaces the transitional government appointed after the fall of the Assad regime. The new Syrian government includes members from most groups in the country, including one female minister. However, despite the relative diversity and the fact that some members of the government had not previously served in the “Salvation Government,” al-Shar’ kept key positions in the hands of his close associates who have been with him since the Idlib days, alongside a number of other ministers who served in the “Salvation Government.” See our article on this topic.
US Expected to Reduce its Military Presence in Syria
According to an official statement from the Pentagon, the US military is expected to reduce its presence in Syria by about half in the coming months. The number of soldiers may drop to just 1,000. According to the Pentagon statement, the decision was made due to the “success in defeating ISIS forces and operational capabilities in the region.” The Americans clarified in their statement that “they are leaving forces in the Syria region prepared to continue operating against terrorist threats.”
According to local reports, in recent days, the US has begun evacuating its base at the Conoco and Al-Omar oil fields in the Deir ez-Zor region in eastern Syria. Convoys with dozens of vehicles left the base en-route to the city of Erbil in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
The Iranians and Hezbollah have not abandoned their intentions to try to re-establish a foothold on Syrian soil. The motivation for this exists. We estimate that this could materialize in the near future, including through the creation of new partnerships with local forces, based on various interests and money (possibly even with the Kurds against the backdrop of their frustration with American policy), and the reactivation of the overland routes of the original corridor, which crossed Syria from east (Iraqi border) to west (Lebanese border) (see the dashed lines on the attached map of the original land corridor). Against the backdrop of reports that the US will reduce its troop numbers in Syria by half and has already begun withdrawing some of its forces, it can be estimated that the motivation of Iran and Hezbollah to re-establish a foothold in the Syrian part of the corridor will further increase. This is even before the possibility that the Americans will also decide to withdraw from the Al-Tanf area in southeastern Syria. In such a case, the potential for a significant shortening of the corridor routes towards Lebanon and the southern Syria region, with an emphasis on the Deraa governorate, which is close to Israel, is re-exposed to potential Iranian influence and entrenchment.
More Than 100 Sites Suspected of Containing Chemical Weapons in Syria
The United Nations Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) revealed on April 6th that there are more than 100 sites in Syria suspected of containing chemical weapons, far more than the locations Assad declared during his rule. These sites, sometimes located in underground facilities or in difficult-to-access places, were likely used for the production or storage of chemical weapons during Assad’s rule. This involves the use of substances such as sarin and chlorine against civilians and rebels since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011.
The organization reported that the new information is based on research conducted by experts, non-governmental organizations, and member states of the organization. In 2013, the Assad government admitted to only 27 sites, but clear evidence of the continued use of chemical weapons existed until 2018.
Dismantling of “Brigade 8” in Southern Syria – Deraa Governorate
On April 13, 2025, Ahmad al-Awda’s “Brigade 8” officially announced its dissolution and the subordination of its personnel to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. This organization, which had been operating in the Deraa region since 2018, took part in the rebel offensive that led to the fall of the Assad regime but refused to subject itself to the new regime that arose in its wake. The dismantling of “Brigade 8” is an important development for the al-Shar’ regime, as it neutralized another center of power that sought to maintain autonomy and is likely to influence other groups to align with the regime. See our article on this topic.
Syrian President’s Visit to the Emirates
Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’ paid an official visit to the United Arab Emirates on April 13th, his first visit since taking office in January 2025. He met in Abu Dhabi with the President of the Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed, and the two discussed strengthening relations between the countries and economic and regional cooperation. The Syrian President expressed his appreciation for the Emirates’ commitment to supporting Syria during the transition period and assisting in its reconstruction.
During the visit, al-Shar’ and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shibani, also met with Syrian businessmen operating in the Emirates. According to Shibani, “great achievements” were made in the areas of investments, the resumption of flights, and the strengthening of bilateral relations. The United Arab Emirates emphasized its commitment to supporting Syria’s sovereignty and stability, as part of the regional effort to strengthen unity and security.
Visit of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to Damascus and His Meeting with al-Shar’ (April 19th)
Turkish Involvement in Syria:
Syria Continues Mine Clearance Efforts with Turkish Support
Syrian Defense Minister Mar’af Abu Qasra confirmed on April 13th the continuation of mine and unexploded ordnance clearance operations throughout Syria, with logistical support from Turkey. According to him, the engineering units of the Ministry of Defense are operating in vast areas, despite challenges on the ground, as part of an organized plan that also includes searches in villages and main traffic routes.
Abu Qasra noted that the support of the Turkish Ministry of Defense has accelerated the pace of operations and improved their efficiency. Last week, Syria launched a new campaign in the northern Hama governorate, using MEMATT model mine detectors — made in Turkey — which operate remotely and allow for safe work in dangerous areas.
Establishment of a New Regional Mechanism Led by Turkey
Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz announced on April 12th the establishment of a new regional mechanism that includes Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The aim of the mechanism is to address “Israel’s destabilizing role in the strategic stability of the region.” According to Yilmaz, this is a practical step for cooperation and support, especially in strengthening Syria’s capabilities.
The mechanism will begin operating soon, and its center will be established on Syrian territory, with all operations managed in coordination with the Syrian authorities.
The announcement was made against the backdrop of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, where the new Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’ and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met. Erdogan expressed satisfaction with the return of stability in Syria and emphasized the importance of lifting international sanctions, alongside promoting economic cooperation between the two countries.
The forum, held under the title “Embracing Diplomacy in a Polarized World,” became a central arena for discussing the Syrian crisis and presented a clear trend of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus, in an attempt to create a new regional order and limit Israel’s influence.
Reopening of the Yemeni Embassy in Syria
Yemeni Foreign Minister Shayea al-Zindani announced on April 15th that his government is working to reopen the Yemeni embassy in Damascus after years of closure, following the renewal of relations with Syria after the fall of the previous regime. The move includes efforts to restore the embassy building, which had been under the control of the Houthis since 2014. Al-Zindani spoke with his Syrian counterpart about sending a Yemeni delegation to Damascus this month, as part of the coordination for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Syria Begins Extensive Reorganization of its Diplomatic Foreign Service
On April 8th, the Syrian Foreign Ministry launched an extensive reorganization of its embassies and diplomatic missions, under the directives of President Ahmad al-Shar’. Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani announced the expected appointments of new ambassadors, and as part of this, the ambassadors to Russia (Bashar al-Jaafari) and Saudi Arabia (Ayman Sosan) were recalled to Damascus.
Syria has 54 active embassies and missions around the world, with 152 staff members, including 25 ambassadors, 15 chargés d’affaires, 25 counselors, 20 political secretaries, and 72 attachés.
The largest missions are located in New York, Cairo, Muscat, Vienna, Dubai, and Baghdad.
The Syrian Foreign Ministry is reviewing all existing appointments, with the aim of appointing diplomats and academics who were not affiliated with the Assad regime. The affairs of the embassies in Moscow and Riyadh will be managed for the time being by chargés d’affaires until the President announces permanent replacements.
Yemen: Houthi-Land
On April 13th and April 18th, alerts were activated in several areas in central Israel following the launch of a ballistic missile from Yemen. Both missiles were successfully intercepted.
Jordan
Jordanian Intelligence Foiled Hamas-Directed Terror Infrastructure Planning Attacks Against Israel from Jordanian Territory (at this stage, we do not know if there was Iranian and Hezbollah involvement, but it is possible that the exposed terror infrastructure operated under the auspices of the Quds Force – Palestine Branch and Hezbollah’s Unit 3900)
On April 15th, it was reported that Jordanian intelligence had succeeded in foiling a significant terror infrastructure whose activity began in 2021. Sixteen individuals were arrested, some of whom had even received training abroad (Lebanon) and support from external elements (Hamas-Lebanon).
According to the announcement, the infrastructure included the production of short-range rockets, the possession of explosives and firearms, the establishment of facilities for the production of UAVs, and the concealment of a ready-to-launch missile. Reports indicate that some of those involved belonged to an illegal organization, implied to be a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan. The movement denied this and described the involvement as personal actions.
According to the information revealed, four cells were arrested, which were organized and engaged in the following activities:
- A cell that operated to smuggle and store TNT, C4, and SEMTEX-H explosives as well as automatic weapons, including a ready-to-launch Katyusha rocket that was hidden in the Marj al-Hamam area.
- Another cell had already begun the process of producing short-range rockets (range 3-5 km), using local and imported equipment, in a factory in the city of Zarqa and a warehouse in the capital Amman — where secret concrete storage rooms were found. Up to 300 rockets could have been produced with the seized equipment.
- Another cell was involved in the development of UAVs, including a prototype built with external information.
- A fourth cell was used to recruit operatives, who were sent for security training outside of Jordan.
The investigations revealed that members of the cells maintained contact with elements in Lebanon and even traveled there for training, coordination, and the transfer of funds.
The Jordanians informed the Lebanese that members of the cell arrested in Jordan who were involved in rocket production received training from Hamas operatives in Lebanon (who may have been operating under the auspices of the Iranians and Hezbollah’s Unit 3900). Lebanese sources also reported arrests made by security forces in the Palestinian refugee camps of Ain al-Hilweh, Tyre, and Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon, among Hamas operatives.
Following the publication of the affair, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, spoke with his Jordanian counterpart, Bisher al-Khasawneh, and expressed solidarity with Jordan and pledged cooperation. The Palestinian Authority also condemned the plots and emphasized its support for Jordan.
It is worth recalling that on April 1st, a 9-story building in the Dahieh neighborhood in Beirut was attacked from the air. The target was Hassan Badir, known as “Hajj Rabi’,” a very senior figure in Unit 3900, who directed Hamas operatives and assisted them in an attempt to advance a serious attack in the immediate future against Israeli civilians.
Unit 3900 is a joint unit belonging to Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards – Quds Force – Palestine Branch, commanded by Mohammed Said Izadi, known as “Hajj Ramadan.” The main mission of Unit 3900 is cooperation with Palestinian terrorist organizations to carry out terrorist activities against Israeli targets and interests in Israel and around the world, and to provide financial support, knowledge, and means. Two of the main areas of operation for Unit 3900 are Jordan and Judea and Samaria (West Bank).
Iran and Hezbollah’s long-standing effort to establish terrorist infrastructures in Jordan has two main goals. The first is to undermine the governing stability in Jordan and to increase the potential for a foothold of the Shiite axis in the kingdom. The second is to carry out terrorist activities against Israel from Jordanian territory and to destabilize relations between the two countries. See our article on the topic.
Marking Iranian “Army Day”
On April 17th, Iran marked Iranian Army Day with ceremonies, parades, and interesting meetings. One of them is a joint meeting of senior Iranian army officials with senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officials:
In the picture: The joint meeting on the occasion of Iranian Army Day between the senior commanders of the army and the IRGC.
