In the main image – the Turkish flag raised by the rebels on the Aleppo Citadel with their conquest of the city
By: Yaakov Lapin and Tal Beeri.
Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Turkey has been increasing its involvement in Syria. Neo-Ottoman rhetoric by Turkey’s Islamist President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, about “praying in the courtyards of the Umayyad Mosque” in Damascus, finds expression in military and political moves reflecting broad ambitions. These moves establish Turkey as the strongest force in Syria and affect other countries in the Middle East.
What are Turkey’s three main strategic goals in Syria?
• The establishment of a Sunni Islamist client state that will be part of Erdogan’s and his AKP party’s vision of restoring the Ottoman Empire (and as part of this, to build a Sunni-jihadist terror infrastructure against Israel in southern Syria).
• Distancing the Kurdish forces of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) from Turkey’s borders and breaking the connection between the SDF and the Kurds in southern Turkey.
• Returning about 3 million Syrian refugees from Turkey back to Syria.
The effort against the Kurds appears to be the first and immediate goal to achieve from the standpoint of Turkey’s timeline.
Turkey’s overt and covert aspirations in Syria are part of a broader effort to renew a neo-Ottoman influence over the entire Middle East.
At the same time, Turkey seeks to establish itself as a senior mediator in regional conflicts, for example in the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, or through its direct involvement in Libya. In all those cases, there is a recurring pattern in which Ankara involves its military and intelligence arms (in particular the MIT) in order to influence internal processes in neighboring or more distant countries.
It was impossible to ignore the well-publicized and heavily media-covered arrival of the Turkish MIT chief to Damascus immediately after the fall of Assad’s regime, his prayer at the Umayyad Mosque, and his meeting with Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani).
In Syria, Turkey’s moves have deep influence, and to a major extent, these moves raise concern among other countries, including Israel, which sees Turkey as having interests that could harm regional security.
Turkey entered open military involvement in Syria in several stages. In the early years of the Syrian civil war, even before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Ankara supported various Sunni rebel factions operating under the framework of the Free Syrian Army, which operated until recently in Idlib, northwestern Syria.
When the Assad regime led by Iran and Russia managed to cling to power by force, the Turks had to settle for more limited military control along the northern border of Syria, and mainly dealt with crushing the Kurds’ aspirations to establish an autonomous or federal region in Syria.
The connection between the Kurds in Syria under the framework of the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) aroused deep concern in Ankara, which saw it as a tangible threat to its territorial integrity.
Hence began a policy under which Turkey invaded deeper into Syrian territory in order to weaken the Kurds, and even seize strategic areas in the north of the country. These events became a focal point of friction between Turkey and the United States, which supported the Syrian-Kurdish forces in the war on ISIS.
While the Assad regime collapsed dramatically within 10 days, after the rebels’ offensive that began on November 27, 2024 with the conquest of the city of Aleppo, carried out by a coalition of rebels supported financially and militarily by Turkey – an unprecedented opportunity emerged for Ankara to reshape Syria.
While the Iranians and Russians did not come to the aid of their ally, the Assad regime, and Hezbollah fled Syria with the regime’s fall, Turkey reached the opposite situation, in which it is positioned as the most important influential force in Syria today, both directly and via rebel organizations that serve as its proxy.
Meanwhile, the rhetoric of the newly re-elected American president, Donald Trump, was marked by references to Turkey’s “unfriendly takeover” of the post-Assad situation in Syria. This comes at a time when Turkey declares its intention to train a new Syrian army composed of rebel fighters, and at the same time – to continue pursuing the Kurds throughout northern Syria.
Ankara’s declared goal is to prevent any Kurdish autonomy, and to portray the SDF as a terrorist arm directed against Turkey’s security.
It is important to note that the SDF is mostly made up of Kurdish fighters from the YPG units, which have worked in close cooperation with the United States in defeating ISIS in recent years. In Erdogan’s view, these forces are an offshoot of the PKK, defined as a terrorist organization in Turkey, as well as in the US and Europe.
The Turkish claim is that any weapon or aid that reaches the SDF will ultimately assist sabotage activities on the Turkish borders themselves. Therefore, Turkey’s foreign and defense ministers (Hakan Fidan and Yasar Guler) repeatedly emphasize that they intend to eradicate the YPG and the SDF, and that any new government formed in Syria will have to deal with the Kurds in a ‘decisive’ manner.
In practice, this is an attack on a pro-Western force, which according to various media reports, is also claimed to have connections with Israel. This is a force that fought hard to defeat ISIS in Syria, with the Kurds conducting most of the ground fighting and losing about ten thousand fighters in that war, while the international coalition led by the US mainly made do with airstrikes.
The seizure of the border areas between Syria and Iraq by the SDF constitutes a clear advantage for Israel’s security interest, given that it represents a significant disruption of the Shi’ite axis’s activity in that area, linked, among other things, to Iran’s arms smuggling corridor. We estimate that despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the Iranians will rethink and adapt their activities to the new situation. The above area will remain relevant for their future attempts.
For Israel, the significance of Turkey’s vision in Syria is that the establishment of a dominant Sunni Islamist rule in Damascus, one that pro-Turkey, may be a factor threatening the region in other ways, even if it weakens the Iranian axis.
There is no vacuum: the influence of extreme Shi’ite Muslim ideology has been replaced by the influence of extreme Sunni Muslim ideology.
The main organization that replaced Assad as the ruling force in Damascus is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an organization with roots in al-Qaeda. For a long time, HTS was classified as a terrorist organization, and even Turkey itself placed it on the list of terrorist organizations a few years ago. However, it seems that the reality on the ground has changed, and in recent years there has been pragmatic (and less public) cooperation between Turkey and HTS, in which HTS allowed Ankara to establish observation posts in areas it controlled in Idlib, and to stop the flow of ISIS operatives into Turkey.
In addition, HTS assisted Turkey in its struggle against cells of competing organizations in northern Syria. The ideological background of HTS still raises concern in Israel, and some claim that its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), is moderating his positions as only a tactical step.
Others believe that al-Sharaa wants to attract international support for rebuilding Syria under an HTS-led transitional government and is thus willing to present a more moderate outward and inward face.
Al-Sharaa takes care to issue relatively moderate statements regarding minorities (the Druze, Christians, and Alawites) and even makes sure to be photographed at his meetings with their representatives, but the potential for conflagration around harm to religious symbols still exists and the sensitive tension could ignite, once again, a ‘sectarian war.’
It is still too early to know whether in practice al-Jolani and HTS will continue along such a pragmatic path, or whether they will reveal their true faces once they establish themselves in power and grow stronger. What is certain is that Turkey is not wasting time in exercising its influence and its ties with the rebels in order to begin shaping Syria in its own image.
The Syrian National Army (SNA) was established under Turkey’s auspices and is made up of Syrian rebel groups of varying affiliations – some driven by Syrian nationalism and some with an Islamist element. Ultimately, most of them are willing to accept Ankara’s authority.
In recent weeks, the SNA has carried out operations against the Kurds, including the conquest of the city of Manbij and the takeover of areas in northern Syria. This involvement significantly harmed American attempts to stabilize the region after the victory over ISIS, as the Kurds are critical allies in the fight against terror. Meanwhile, the American administration expressed reservations about Turkish activity, but in practice did not prevent it, while Turkey’s status as an ally within NATO was not harmed at all.
According to various media reports, Turkey also approached the new Syrian leadership in Damascus and offered to provide the emerging Syrian army with military training, on the condition that it follows the line Ankara desires.
The senior official who arrived in Damascus on December 22, 2024 to meet with al-Jolani is Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister. Subsequently, President Erdogan himself is supposedly expected to arrive. During the meeting, Fidan was quoted as saying that Turkey will help “unite all forces” under a leadership that requires the abolition of the independent Kurdish entity. At the same time, there have been many reports of Turkish troop concentrations near Kobani, the Kurdish city that has gained great symbolism in the battles against ISIS. The fear is that Turkey intends to conquer Kobani and erase any trace of Kurdish autonomy.
Will Syria turn into a platform for Sunni terror instead of Shi’ite terror?
Now, with the collapse of the Assad regime, the question arises whether no less threatening an entity than the Iranian-Shi’ite axis, which was driven out of Syria, has entered in its place: Extreme Sunni organizations with a jihadist outlook, close to the Muslim Brotherhood and encouraging hatred toward Israel no less than Iran did.
Adding to the complexity is Turkey’s attitude to the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan has identified more than once with the Muslim Brotherhood, supported Egypt’s deposed president Mohammed Morsi in 2013, and sponsored Islamist opposition elements in several Arab countries. Furthermore, senior leaders and activists of Hamas have established themselves on Turkish soil and have managed and directed many terror operations from there.
Turkey’s ambition to regain a leading position in the Sunni world is also evident in Ankara’s foothold in Qatar, where Turkey has established a military and economic base together with the Qatari regime that supports the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The Qataris, for their part, also aspire to regional influence in light of their immense wealth in oil and gas.
On several historical occasions, there has been close cooperation between Turkey and Qatar, including in Gaza through ties with Hamas. While Egypt and Saudi Arabia quarreled with Qatar, Turkey saw an opportunity to penetrate another corner of the Middle East, by using regional levers of pressure.
Also in another sphere, closer but one that receives less coverage – the Horn of Africa – Turkey managed to establish a relationship with Somalia and Ethiopia, a move through which Ankara strengthened its status as a mediator between them. This is a diplomatic achievement that partly drains the influence of Egypt, according to a report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, as Egypt is hostile to Ethiopia due to the dispute over the Renaissance Dam.
The Turkish-Somali-Ethiopian agreement forces Egypt to recalculate its route, since Turkey has stepped into the vacuum and is becoming a key player in this part of the world as well. This fact affects additional power struggles and serves as an example of how Turkey tries to expand its influence far beyond the Middle East.
Turkey is now more prominently present on the African continent as a whole, trying to cash in on economic coupons, while avoiding direct confrontation with superpowers, but at the same time exploiting their regional weaknesses.
Erdogan’s media-hyped return to the Syrian arena is accompanied by rhetoric that repeatedly emphasizes his desire to expand Turkey’s sphere of influence. His speeches throughout December 2024 mention that Turkey is “larger than its current territory” and that it is committed to a “historical regional mission.” This means that Erdogan regards Syria (and also some other countries) as a natural area of interest, into which a tradition of Ottoman presence must be reintroduced.
This perception echoes a pattern in which Erdogan conducts an aggressive policy, allowing himself to send forces, intervene in internal struggles, and direct diplomatic negotiations as a party with a clear interest, not necessarily a neutral arbiter.
During December 2024, Erdogan declared in a speech that “Patience will bring us victory,” in response to the crowd chanting, “Take us to Jerusalem.” Anyone who watched the event could momentarily think that it was not Erdogan speaking, but Iran’s Supreme Leader—Khamenei, and that the crowd was the same frenzied Iranian audience blindly encouraging any inflammatory demagogic statement…
The significance of a scenario in which Islamist militias supported by Turkey might try to entrench themselves in southern Syria on Israel’s border is clear. There is good reason for Israel’s steps to establish military control in the buffer zone, which was designated as far back as 1974 on the border with Syria, and to consolidate a physical military presence there.
What are the possible reasons for Erdogan’s rhetoric becoming extreme?
It is possible that the change in Erdogan’s rhetoric stems from the fact that his party lost in the municipal elections of March 2024 in all the major cities: Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. The defeat was to a Turkish party, the secular CHP party, whose statements are known for their extremism against Israel.
Another possible reason is Israel’s refusal for Turkey to parachute humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip from planes. Nowadays it is clear to all that there is no real humanitarian benefit in this parachute drop apart from marketing and cognitive gains for the state doing. However, the damage to Turkish honor and Turkish cognitive efforts is apparently enough to cause an escalation in Erdogan’s rhetoric.
The economic aspect and the aspect of Syrian refugees in Turkey constitute key components.
Turkey needs oil and gas. Over the years, it has not been indifferent to the gas game in the Mediterranean, in which Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus also participate. The controversial maritime agreement between Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Libya (which preceded the current government in Libya) was intended to grant Ankara rights in the economic waters of the eastern Mediterranean, in a manner conflicting with the claims of other countries in the region.
Additionally, Turkey seeks to exploit opportunities to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure (destroyed over the years of war), by receiving construction contracts, electrical projects, and other infrastructure for the many Turkish companies.
In the wider regional and political realm, it is important to note that millions of Syrian refugees are currently in Turkey, and their number is estimated at three million or more. Erdogan has exploited the refugee card as leverage against the European Union, previously threatening to allow many refugees to continue on their way into Europe if the European Union did not comply with his economic and political demands. Now, in the post-Assad era, Erdogan promises the new government in Damascus that he will allocate economic resources to stabilize the situation, thus creating conditions that would allow the return of some or even all of the refugees to Syria.
Such a move, if carried out, would serve Turkey’s interest in reducing the burden on Turkish cities. Erdogan, who lost in key cities like Istanbul in the last municipal elections, understands that the refugee issue is a heavy electoral burden.
It should be remembered that the Syrian refugees in Turkey have de facto gone through Turkish indoctrination. From Turkey’s perspective, it is a very large sympathetic population that will return to Syria with a Turkish orientation.
What are the implications for Israel?
Regarding the question of implications for Israel, in the immediate term, Israel gains very significant benefit from the severe blow dealt to the Shi’ite axis led by Iran in Syria, and from the fact that some of the military production sites, such as the CERS research centers or bases that served to transfer weapons to Hezbollah, have already been destroyed or fallen.
Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ability to transfer advanced missiles and ammunition to Lebanon has been dramatically reduced. Nevertheless, the rise of radical Sunni groups in power in Damascus constitutes a considerable strategic risk, since these may at some point turn their weapons against Israel. These elements occasionally declare their desire to “liberate Jerusalem,” and may become tools serving Erdogan’s regional Islamist agenda.
Israel is concerned about Turkey’s dominant entry into Syria. From Israel’s point of view, the immediate advantage is the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah on its northern border. But the long-term risk is the rise of radical Sunni groups backed by Ankara, their approach to Israel’s border, and the possibility that the new Syrian system might deteriorate into endless internal power struggles.
Also, Turkey’s very influence in the area, guided by Erdogan, who defines himself as the “Protector of Islam” and as one who wants to “liberate al-Aqsa,” does not bode well for Israel. Turkey’s president has already stated that in his opinion, Jerusalem should be the focus of Muslim attention, and he did not hesitate to defame Israel with harsh and anti-Semitic labels.
On the other hand, Erdogan also acts pragmatically when it suits him, and maintains economic ties with Israel. In addition, Turkey has clearly positioned itself as a counterweight to Iran. One must remember that there has already been significant rivalry between these two regional powers, a rivalry that has now sharpened and intensified even more. The wedge now clearly stuck between them does not hurt Israel, to say the least.
The big unknown is how the United States will behave.
In the twilight of President Biden’s term and the transition process to President Trump, there is no unequivocal policy: on the one hand, there were American statements about a temporary ceasefire between Turkey and the Kurds, which the Turkish leadership flatly denied. On the other hand, it seems that Washington does not intend to invest large forces to prevent Turkey’s takeover of areas in northern Syria. Thus, the Kurds remain worried and uncertain, trying to reach understandings with the new regime in Damascus that might provide them with autonomy guarantees, but the fear is that HTS or SNA will actually seek to dismantle any Kurdish framework, under Turkish direction. In such a scenario, if a broad round of fighting against the Kurds breaks out, it would lead to new waves of refugees, a possible Kurdish uprising, and high international tension.
Conclusion
One can see Turkey as the decisive foreign factor shaping the face of Syria in the post-Assad era, and as a force that can push it toward a Sunni-Islamist government tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan’s modern Ottoman vision. Qatar is an auxiliary player, playing funding and supporting roles. Meanwhile, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE may try to exert some influence, but at this stage they do not seem prepared for a confrontation with Turkey on Syrian soil, and may even prefer to wait and see how the situation in Syria develops.
Israel is in the middle, focusing mainly on eliminating the remnants of Iranian capabilities and protecting its border by controlling the Syrian side of the buffer zone, but in the future may be forced to deal with a new Syria managed by parties oriented toward Turkey, which may have an interest in the future to establish a new platform for Sunni militias operating against Israel.
For Israel, the situation is a double-edged sword: On one hand, Hezbollah and Iran have been weakened, and extremely dangerous weapons caches have been dismantled. On the other hand, an Islamist government hostile to Israel could emerge in Syria, threatening the northern border in a new way. Much depends on the identity, judgment, and ideological development of Ahmad al-Sharaa, and on how he manages the complex alliance with Turkey and the other factions.
Behind the scenes, America signals a general intention to leave, or at least reduce its presence, which may give Erdogan the opportunity to continue his plans without facing constraints. Meanwhile, the Middle East once again faces a changing reality, and it is hard to predict the final direction of developments. But one cannot ignore that Turkey has taken the initiative, and Erdogan explicitly aims to bring about a structural change in Syria and accordingly, also a substantive change in regional power balances, in favor of what he sees as the historical destiny of his country.
3 Responses
It is written only on the basis of the author’s speculation, and regardless of the facts on the ground, Golani has repeatedly stressed that he has no desire for war with Israel.
The Kurds act as mercenaries of foreign powers against local forces, and it is natural that they are considered a threat by the governments of the region
The West still maintains its colonial temperament and only its shape has become more beautiful.
As an Azerbaijani, I personally wish for reconciliation and peace between. Turkey and Israel, one is our brother and the other is our best friend,
I wish you both the best
Very long time the Al-Nusra offshoot of Al-Qaeda which created the ISIS in Iraq, has been provided by foreign fighters (ISKP) from A-Zeweri (Egyptian) in Idlib, trained in Khyber Pakstunwala for the Khilafat, is a threat to basic India.