Mahan Air – its planes and crews as a central civilian cover platform for smuggling weapons into Syria and Lebanon in service of the Iranian Quds Force
Mahan Air was founded in 1991 by the son of former President Rafsanjani in Kerman and commenced its operations in 1992 (for company details, see Appendix A). The airline’s base is at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini airport and performs commercial and cargo flights. The airline is considered the largest private airline in Iran. The company operates under the auspices of the IRGC under the umbrella of the “Mola al-Movahedin Charitable Organization”(MMC). This so-called “civilian” organization brings together companies and other civilian entities (banks, automakers, engineering companies, etc.).
The organization creates the framework for the IRGC / Quds Force’s economic activity in the Iranian domestic market. It ostensibly constitutes the legal, legitimate civilian framework for the covert financial activities of the Quds Force.
The CEO of Mahan Air is Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, who has served in this position since 1996 (for more on the CEO and the relevant senior company headquarters staff who are in contact with the Revolutionary Guards/Quds Force, see Appendix B). In one of his correspondences with the commander of the Iranian air force, he expresses that his airline operates according to the high values and goals of the Islamic Republic and that the company will continue to operate despite the sanctions imposed on it.
In the past, the airline flew to many European destinations, including Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and more. These flights were stopped in the second decade of the 21st century when US sanctions were imposed on the company.
The purpose of this document is to shed light on “Mahan Air,” whose crews, with an emphasis on its pilots and aircraft, serve as a central arm of the Quds Force as part of the civilian cover for the transfer of weapons components from Iran to Syria and Lebanon in the framework of the Iranian corridor (see the special report we published on the subject). The large number of pilots indicates a large volume of flights, publicly reported flights and flights that are not publicly reported.
The report indicates a very large volume of activity for the Quds Force. The question arises of how an apparently civilian airline can meet such a volume of activity unless it is the main purpose of it.
The “Mahan Air” pilots are not publicly associated with the IRGC. It is highly likely that some of the pilots formally belong to the IRGC and are on “loan” to the company. Their task is to ensure that the sensitive cargo on their plane reaches its destination safely. It is also possible that some of the pilots do not belong to the IRGC, and they engage in their “innocent” and civilian work while “turning a blind eye” to the joint conduct of the company with the IRGC/Quds Force.
It should be noted that after the arrest of the pilot of another Iranian company, “Qeshm Fars Air (which is known to be related to the Quds Force),” in Argentina in June 2022, pictures of him in an IRGC uniform and pictures of weapons were found on his phone. We wonder what can be found and seen on the phones of “Mahan Air” pilots…
(For a list of the 63 names of the pilots involved in the smuggling of weapons to Syria/Lebanon, see Appendix C.)
Until the writing of this report, in 2022, the airline flew at least 110 times to Damascus International Airport (the latest flight was on December 11), at least 39 times to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut (the latest flight was on December 08) and at least 12 times to Nyerev airport in Aleppo (last flight on December 9). Additional flights were assumably carried out by the company’s civilian aircraft, but these flights were not recorded as standard civilian flights and therefore are difficult to locate on tracking apps.
Take a look at this photo from a Flight schedule. This photo was taken from the flight history of one of the “Mahan Air” planes flying to Beirut in August 2022:
On 09 Aug 2022, you can see that the plane flew from Dubai to Tehran (civilian flight). But two days later, on 11 August 2022, the plane suddenly appeared in Beirut and flew a civilian flight to Tehran. How and from where did the plane suddenly reach Beirut? After all, his last documented flight was from Dubai to Tehran. Did he fly from Tehran to Beirut without broadcasting his authentic call signal? What was in the cargo hold of the plane on this flight?
“Mahan Air” is a standard airline landing in civilian airports, currently involved in Quds Force weapons transfers to various destinations in the Middle East, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The company serves the IRGC as a civilian platform for smuggling weapons via their Special Unit 190. This unit is in charge of transferring Iranian weapons throughout the Middle East.
Regarding the recent reports on Iranian gold smuggling, according to the data in our possession, the company that in recent years has flown hundreds of tons of cargo (over 500 tons) to Venezuela and including gold, is Mahan Air.
According to some publications, the gold was transferred from Venezuela to Iran. However, according to our information, the gold went in the opposite direction, from Iran to Venezuela. From there, in our estimation, the gold was transferred to Iranian accomplices, who turned the gold into silver, which returned to Iran to finance military terrorist activities.
In more information regarding Venezuela, Mahan Air and its CEO, as a proxy for the Quds Force, are also linked to sanctions bypass deals involving the supply of Iranian oil to Venezuela totaling five million barrels (800 million liters of oil / 210 million gallons).
The company is likely also involved in transferring weapons and other equipment to Russia due to the war in Ukraine.
In November 2021, a cyberattack was carried out against “Mahan Air.” A hacker group’s statement after the cyber-attack claimed they “obtained sensitive information regarding the close cooperation between “Mahan Air” and Quds Force.” The company confirmed that it had been cyber-attacked.
According to the information obtained in the cyber attack, Mahan Air has a direct relationship with two “travel agencies” called “Hamrah SYR” and “Utab Gasht.” Hamrah has close ties with Mahan Air and has made a considerable number of ticket purchases anonymously (about 60,000 from 2018 to 2021, including on the Tehran-Damascus route), reserving the tickets under the name “Hamrah Hamrah.” Hamrah appears to have direct access to Mahan Air’s computer systems.
In some reservations, there is a notice stating that the passenger has a “special permit.” This special permit is given to nine permanent names who are actually members of the Revolutionary Guards/Quds Force (e.g., Mr. Kakhki or Mr. Esmaeili – About them and about other Quds Force personnel who are in working relationships with “Mahan Air” see Appendix B). in another case, Of 2000 ticket reservations, only 15 telephone numbers were given as contact numbers.
Who is “Hamrah”?
The general director of Hamrah is Sardar (a well-known IRGC rank) Ali Naji Gulfarast, a member of the IRGC who also serves as one of the senior officials of the “Qassam Fares Air” airline (a member of the board of directors). It has long been proven that “Qashm Fares Air” operates under cover and belongs to the IRGC / Qods Force. The connection is based on correspondence regarding the “transportation of equipment and crews.” From this, it can be understood that Hamrah is, in fact, an executive body of the IRGC whose task is to coordinate and organize the transportation of equipment, weapons, and operatives.
A number of Mahan Air staff members (see Appendix B) work directly with “Hamrah”.
Additional findings indicate that “Mahan Air” has bills of lading for tens of tons of equipment designated to Damascus and Lebanon received from Hamrah. In addition, “Utab Gasht” paid for hundreds of kilograms of overweight luggage for passengers, weights that are unreasonable for the average passenger.
According to foreign reports, due to the Quds Force’s use of “Mahan Air” as a platform for weapons transfers, Israel carried out numerous airstrikes on Syria’s main international civilian airports: the Damascus international airport and the Aleppo-Nayrab international airport.
On August 31, 2022, Nayrab Airport was attacked shortly before a “Mahan Air” flight was scheduled to land there that evening. According to an analysis of aircraft tracking apps, the Nayrab airport was attacked after “Mahan Air’s” flight to Damascus was diverted. A few days later, on September 9, the airline resumed landing in Aleppo (flight number W5148, Airbus A300B4-603).
Another incident involving US planes and a “Mahan Air” airplane occurred on July 23, 2020. Flight number W51152 (Airbus A310-304), which took off from Rafiq Hariri Airport in Beirut to Tehran, crossed the no-fly zone imposed by the Americans over the Al-Tanf area (southeastern Syria) and was diverted from its flight path by American planes.
The connection to Hezbollah. On May 20, 2022, Israel revealed that Reza Safi al-Din, the son of Hashem Safi al-Din, was responsible for smuggling advanced weapons components from Iran to Lebanon for Hezbollah’s precision missile project. It is a high-quality smuggling route for small weapons components for Hezbollah’s precision missile project. This smuggling route was based on civilian cover using passengers on civilian flights. The smuggling of the weapons components was carried out by the Quds Force/Unit 190 on direct civilian flights from Iran to the Damascus international airport and the international airport in Beirut. From Damascus, the weapons components were then transferred along the land smuggling route. The components for the precision project were concealed in the passenger’s luggage on ordinary and innocent civilian flights, flights operated by, among others, “Mahan Air.” In our assessment, UAVs and missile components were also smuggled in this manner.
In 2019, France, Germany, and Italy banned the airline from landing in their territory, forcing it to cancel its flights there. In 2020, flights to Spain were also canceled (for more on the sanctions imposed on the company, see Appendix D).
It should be noted that the flights of other Iranian companies, such as “Iran Air,” are still flying as usual to destinations in Western Europe, such as Germany. As of the beginning of 2020, “Mahan Air” is still flying to Varna, Bulgaria. It currently flies to two destinations on the European continent: Belgrade and Moscow.
As of January 2020, the airline’s fleet consisted of 54 aircraft, and currently, the airline possesses 36. The planes are mainly various models of Airbus. The fleet also includes 747-300 Jumbo jets (the last one that still operates this type of aircraft on a passenger line) and 747-400 aircraft whose usefulness is unclear. The use of these planes, some of which were acquired in tortuous ways, caused the company to be on the European blacklist regarding safety issues as early as 2007, even before imposing US sanctions a few years later.
In terms of carrying large cargo, the 747, the Airbus A-300, and A-310 can be used. Smaller cargo (such as weapons components) can also be flown in the other Airbus types (for details of the aircraft fleet, see Appendix E). Today, besides flights to Syria and Lebanon, “Mahan Air” flies to destinations such as Istanbul, Ankara, Moscow, Belgrade, Shanghai, Shenzhen, China, and several domestic destinations inside Iran. Last October, the airline’s flight to Guangzhou, China, continued to its destination, despite a bomb threat. The pilots asked to land in New Delhi. However, when the Indian tower controller directed them to a different airfield, the pilots decided for some reason that the field was not satisfactory for an Airbus 340 aircraft and decided to continue, as usual, landing safely at their original destination (it is intriguing to speculate what was in the cargo of the plane that caused the pilots not to land despite the threat of a bomb…?).
Appendix A – Company Details:
Full company name: Mahan Airlines Private Joint Stock Company (PJSC)
Name in Persian: هواپیمایی ماهان شرکت سهامی خاص
Company Registration number: 411151171777
Company office address: Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way
Web presence:
Company Website: https://www.mahan.aero/en/en
Twitter: https://twitter.com/mahanairlines
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/company/mahan-air
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/Mahanairlines.officialTelegram: https://telegram.me/mahanairchannel
Appendix B – The company’s CEO – Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, The relevant senior company headquarters team that is in contact with the Quds Force and the relevant Quds Force operatives:
The CEO of Mahan Air is Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, who has served in this position since 1996. Khanouki is in his sixties (born April 16, 1961, or May 3, 1956). Before his current position, Khanouki served as commander of the IRGC forces in Croatia and Bosnia. Qasem Soleimani was part of his social circle.
Phone: 989121447090
On March 17, 2015, Khanouki was designated wanted by Interpol (the United States) on the grounds of cooperation with the Quds Force and affiliation with terrorism. Following the proclamation, he was arrested in Qatar and later released.
Khanouki is well-connected with senior Quds Force officials and serves as a senior Quds Force aide in the field of weapons smuggling, aircraft procurement, and other issues. Apparently, Khanouki recently arrived in Syria regarding meetings concerning the airline’s flights to the Nayrab airport in Aleppo and the Rafic Hariri airport in Beirut.
“Mahan Air” headquarters personnel working in cooperation with the Quds Force:
Captain Maghfoori, the deputy to Arabnejad (CEO), is also involved in assisting QF by exploiting its civilian front and leading the cooperation with them. [email protected]
number: +989131404227
Hossein Ebrahimi is head of the Commerce Section at Mahan Air. As a part of his position at the Commerce Department, Ebrahimi receives information regarding the Hamrah Company’s charter flight requests and any reports regarding this company and personally signs off on all of the payment receipts to the Hamrah CEO – Golparast. These receipts are also sent through the mailboxes of two Commerce Department employees, Mehrnaz Noroozi and Pouneh Ahmadi. All these employees are deeply familiar with the Hamrah Company and their questionable business. [email protected]
number: +989124934159.
Majid Kargaran, the substitute head of the Commerce Section, is a key element in the Commerce Department’s operation. Kargaran receives many correspondences regarding Hamrah and QF-related matters, is in direct contact with Mahmud Kakhki and Mohammad Esmaeili, and acts as a mediator between them and planning functions in Mahan Air regarding matters such as dispatching charter flights. All deposits, monthly reports, documents, and tickets relevant to the Hamrah Company are sent to Kargaran. He is personally involved in the Hamrah Company’s business and is aware of their concealment activity. [email protected]
number: +989124957917.
Parisa Ahmadi, an employee of the Administration Bureau, is regularly and thoroughly involved in assisting the Hamrah Company in operating and ordering flights. Furthermore, she confirms ticket orders and passenger lists for Hamrah and is in direct contact with QF members. [email protected].
Mahdi Asghari, a Commerce Section employee, relays a weekly report regarding the delays in Mahan flights. It is evident from the content of these reports that he is well aware of the nature of the Hamrah Company and continues to cooperate with it.
Reyhaneh Mozaffari deals with customers and marketing in the Middle East and is highly involved in managing the Hamrah Company’s financial matters, deposits, and accounts with Mahan Air.
Maryam Bani-Amam is the Middle East Regional Manager at Mahan Air, as a part of her position, Bani-Amam is actively involved in coordinating Hamrah company orders and charter flights and handling its passengers. The entire Tehran-Damascus line is her responsibility, and she is well aware of who uses it and for what purposes.
Quds Force personnel working with Mahan Air:
Mahmud Kakhki is a key QF member who is directly in charge of managing the flight axis via Mahan Air. Kakhki is also closely connected to Mahan Air employees and management, and he appears to have direct access to the company as he authorizes QF members’ flights and excess baggage. Additionally, Kakhki ordered at least 800 tickets between Tehran and Damascus for passengers named ‘Hamrah Hamrah’ in 2021.
Phone number: +989908564530.
Mr. Hosseini, who authorizes the boarding of QF members listed as ‘Hamrah Hamrah’ on flights, is a QF member of the same department as Kakhki, and is also in charge of coordinating flights.
Phone number: +989109821448.
Morteza Esma’ili, or Mr. Esma’ili, authorizes the boarding of passengers listed as ‘Hamrah Hamrah’ on flights. Esma’ili is a QF official and Kakhki’s replacement. Up until recently, Esma’ili was working in Syria and has ordered approximately 800 tickets from there over 2021. His Phone number: +989903399874.
Hasan-Nezhad is a QF official who orders a substantial number of tickets for QF passengers (more than a thousand tickets in 2021). In addition, Nezhad is in close contact with Mahan Air employees. Phone number: +989104598604.
Appendix C – List of 63 names of pilots potentially involved in weapons smuggling to Syria/Lebanon: Note – These pilots have been identified by us as particularly active on the company’s lines to the International Airport in Damascus and to the Nayrab airport in Aleppo in 2022. Our working assumption is very likely that these pilots were also assigned to the dozens of flights to Lebanon carried out in 2022:
- Peiman Bahadori پیمان بهادری
Graduated from a pilot’s training in 1983. Since 2008, he has served as an instructor in various flight schools and captain of Airbus A310/306 aircraft.
2. Mojtaba Paaydar Fard مجتبی پایدار فرد
He holds a master’s degree from the Faculty of Science and Research from the Islamic Azad University academic institution (2007-2010) and received his pilot’s license in 2013. He has been a pilot at Mahan Air since 2015 and owns a travel agency called TAHAGASHT.
3. Hamid Naderi حمید نادری
Serves as a pilot and captain of A310 aircraft at Mahan Air since 2006. He is a graduate of aviation studies at the Arta Kish Training Center in Tehran.
4. Mehran Farshid Rad مهران فرشیدراد
Graduate of the Sharif University of Technology (SUT) in Tehran – holds a Ph.D. in Aeronautical Engineering. Serves as captain of Airbus310/A300-600 aircraft & He has been a pilot at Mahan Air since 2007, before which he worked at Kish Airlines.
5. Ali Reza Khorami علیرضا خرمی
A relatively young pilot, he has been a pilot at Mahan since 2017. He studied his pilot’s training at Arta Kish Pilot Training School in Tehran.
6. Mohammad Javad Arastoui محمدجواد ارسطویی
He is a graduate of aviation studies from the Civil Aviation Technology College – an important and recognized institution in Tehran.
7. Amin Azaimian امین عظیمیان
Originally from the city of Ahvaz in the Khuzestan region and now a resident of Tehran, Graduate of the Darolfonoon academic institution based in Tehran.
8. Alireza Sepehri علیرضا سپهری
A graduate of aviation studies at the Arta Kish Training Center in Tehran, he serves as a co-pilot at Mahan Air. His address is in Tehran, but on his LinkedIn profile, he claims to have his address in Bangkok, Thailand.
9. Mehdi Askari مهدی عسکری
He is originally from the Kerman District, currently lives in Tehran, and is a Civil Aviation Technology College graduate.
10. Majid Ashouri مجید آشوری
Email: [email protected]
Serves as a pilot and captain at Mahan Air since 2007 and holds a pilot’s license from The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
11. Vahid Ezati وحید عزتی
Serves as a pilot and captain of the A300-600 A310 aircraft at Mahan Air – has been with the company since 2007.
12. Siavash Novin سیاوش نوین
Serves as a pilot and captain of A310-306 aircraft at Mahan Air – has been with the company since 2008. Serves as a pilot instructor since 2019. He graduated from the University of Applied Science and Technology in Tehran.
13. Saeed Ebrahimi سعید ابراهیمی
Serves as a pilot of Airbus 300/310 and BAU AVRO-RJ aircraft at Mahan Air – has been there since 2014 | Before that (2011-2013), he served as a flight instructor at the Civil Aviation Technology College, while he served as a safety and licensing expert at the Civil Aviation Organization of Iran (CAO). IRI). From 2010 to 2012, he also served as a pilot at Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries Corporation (the company is subject to international sanctions from the US [2008] and the European Union [2010]).
14. Mohammad Yousef Torkaman محمدیوسف ترکمن
A graduate of aviation studies from the Civil Aviation Technology College, he is also a graduate of Islamic Azad University Karaj Branch | Serves as a pilot and captain of A310-306 aircraft at Mahan Air since 2007 and lives in Tehran, Iran.
Continue the list of pilots that we continue to try to find more details about:
15. Mohammad Vali Karni محمدولی کرنی
16. Amir Tadayon Sepidan Jadid امیر تدین سپیدان جدید
17. Ali Aminizadeh? علی امینیزاده?
18. Hossein Nezam حسین نظام
19. Mohammad Ali Seyed Ahmadnejad Kareh Kamari محمدعلی سیداحمدنژاد کره کمری
20. Houtn Sallehi Shafa هوتن صالحیشفا
21. Arman Matbou Riahi آرمان مطبوع ریاحی
22. Soleiman Mohammadi سلیمان محمدی
23. Seyed Iman Assadi سید ایمان اسدی
24. Mohammad Mehdi Hasanzadeh محمدمهدی حسنزاده
25. Mohsen Arabian محسن عربیان
26. Mehdi Motahari مهدی مطهری
27. Mohammad Amin Jehad محمدامین جهاد
28. Hamed Farhadi حامد فرهادی
29. Hamid Reza Azimi حمیدرضا عظیمی
30. Hossein Parvan حسین پروان
31. Mohammad Nabi Farokhi محمدنبی فرخی
32. Fariborz Alizaedeh Shirazinejad فریبرز علیزاده شیرازینژاد
33. Esmail Rahmati اسماعیل رحمتی
34. Vahid Bazrafshan وحید بذرافشان
35. Mohammad Looni محمد لونی
36. Javad Shooshtari pousti جواد شوشتری پوستی
37. Nourollah Amirabad Farahani نورالله امیرآبادی فراهانی
38. Arash Attaii آرش عطایی
39. Seyed Mostafa Sobhanian سیدمصطفی سبحانیان
40. Jalil Motaharizadeh جلیل مطهریزاده
41. Hamid Mohammad Hasanpour حمید محمد حسنپور
42. Hamed Pahlevani حامد پهلوانی
43. Amir Dornahi Nobari امیر درناهی نوبری
44. Amir Reza Sefidkar امیررضا سفیدکار
45. Reza Behseresht رضا بهسرشت
46. Seyed Alireza Haji MirSadeghi سیدعلیرضا حاجیمیرصادقی
47. Morteza Bayatpour مرتضی بیاتپور
48. Seyed Amir Hossein Toranji سیدامیرحسین ترنجی
49. Alireza Sadripour علیرضا صدریپور
50. Ali Zaghari علی زاغری
51. Ali Sadrin Karami علی صدرین کرمی
52. Sepehr Kalantari سپهر کلانتری
53. Mohammad Reza Yousefzadeh Mahani محمدرضا یوسفزاده ماهانی
54. Gholamali Mohammad Alizadeh Shirazi غلامعلیمحمد علیزاده شیرازی
55. Mohsen Takiani محسن تکیانی
56. Seyed Mohsen Shirkhani سیدمحسن شیرخانی
57. Shahab Shirkhani شهاب شیرخانی
58. Mohammad Reza Rezaei محمدرضا رضایی
59. Mohammad Pouya Amouii محمدپویا عمویی
60. Mohammad Mohsen Rahnama محمدمحسن رهنما
61. Ali Abdollahzadeh Khiabani علی عبداللهزاده خیابانی
62. Shahab Ghassemizadeh شهاب قاسمیزاده
63. Assadollah Teymouri اسدالله تیموری
Appendix D – Sanctions:
Mahan Air is under sanctions under U.S. Presidential Decree (EO) 13224, which includes entities engaged in terrorism. Mahan Air was included in these sanctions for aiding the Quds Force since October 2011. Since May 2013, the order also includes the company’s CEO, Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, due to his recruiting of Mahan Air to the Quds Force and transforming it into a smuggling platform.
Some of the company’s aircraft are also subject to American sanctions, some due to their illegal acquisition and some for their involvement in transporting weapons for the Quds Force.
In early 2016, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two British airlines that helped “Mahan Air” purchase aircraft. Later, in April 2016, it was also banned from flying in Saudi airspace.
In September 2017, the US submitted a diplomatic demand to all countries with active “Mahan Air” flights (including Italy, France, Germany, and Spain) requesting that it cease contact with the company following the sanctions imposed on it in 2011 (which were implemented in Germany, France, and Italy only in 2019). Subsequently, in August 2020, the US imposed sanctions on UAE companies that support the Iranian airline “Mahan Air.” Israel, the US, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, Italy, and Saudi Arabia currently boycott the company.
The full sanctions list:
- OFAC – Specially Designated Global Terrorist List
- DFATD (Canada) Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations
- OFAC – Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
- OFAC – WMD Proliferators & Supporters List
- BIS Denied Persons List
Appendix E – The fleet of aircraft (a total of 36 aircraft):
| Series (Quantity) | Registration number | Models |
| A306(5) | EP-MMO Airbus A300B4-622R EP-MNG Airbus A300B4-603 EP-MNH Airbus A300B4-603 EP-MNJ Airbus A300B4-603 EP-MNL Airbus A300B4-603 |
| A310 (10) | EP-MMA Airbus A340-311 EP-MMB Airbus A340-311 EP-MMC Airbus A340-313 EP-MMD Airbus A340-313 EP-MMT Airbus A340-313 |
| A343(5) | EP-MMA Airbus A340-311 EP-MMB Airbus A340-311 EP-MMC Airbus A340-313 EP-MMD Airbus A340-313 EP-MMT Airbus A340-313 |
| A346 (4) | EP-MME Airbus A340-642 EP-MMH Airbus A340-642 EP-MMQ Airbus A340-642 EP-MMR Airbus A340-642 |
| B462 (1) | EP-MMV BAe 146-200 |
| B463 (4) | EP-MOB BAe 146-300 EP-MOC BAe 146-300 EP-MOE BAe 146-300 EP-MOM BAe 146-300 |
| B743 (1) | EP-MNE Boeing 747-3B3 (M) |
| B744 (2) | EP-MEE Boeing 747-422 EP-MNB Boeing 747-422 |
| C25A (1) | P-MNZ Cessna 525A Citation CJ2 |
| RJ1H(4) | EP-MEB British Aerospace Avro RJ85 EP-MOG Avro RJ100 EP-MOI Avro RJ100 EP-MON Avro RJ100 |
| RJ85 (4) | EP-MEA British Aerospace Avro RJ85 EP-MMS Avro RJ85 EP-MOR Avro RJ85 EP-MOS Avro RJ85 |
