By: Dr. Zoe Levornik and Sarit Zehavi.
At the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, under Resolution 1701, the international force UNIFIL (together with the Lebanese Army) was given the mandate and responsibility to operate in southern Lebanon, to monitor and prevent Hezbollah’s activity in the area south of the Litani River. Since then, and for 18 years, UNIFIL has clearly failed in the mission assigned to it, and therefore its mandate should be terminated immediately. On June 8, 2025, it was reported that Israel and the United States had decided to end UNIFIL’s operations in southern Lebanon. This report has not yet been confirmed, but if accurate, it is the right decision.
Until the 2023 war, UNIFIL allowed Hezbollah to establish itself in southern Lebanon without any intervention. The amount of weapons and equipment the IDF discovered during the war indicates the utter failure of UNIFIL. The IDF found uniforms, bags, and motorcycles belonging to Hezbollah operatives, ready for use in a planned invasion of Israel. The level of Hezbollah’s military preparedness in southern Lebanon was truly alarming, with weapons depots and launch systems scattered throughout the area—echoing patterns seen in Gaza. The threat to residents of northern Israel was immediate and significant. This was all located in open areas, where UNIFIL has full freedom to patrol—and it is part of its responsibility.
Hezbollah’s tunnel network was also constructed over the years without any interruption, and in some cases, right next to UNIFIL positions—raising serious doubts as to whether its personnel were unaware of their existence and the purpose for which they were built: a planned invasion of northern Israeli communities by Hezbollah forces.
During the war, UNIFIL not only failed to prevent Hezbollah’s operations and rocket fire into Israel, but also interfered with and disrupted the IDF’s ability to operate in the area. UNIFIL refused to vacate its positions and allowed Hezbollah to use its personnel as human shields (See the article from October 2024)
Since the ceasefire was declared on November 27, 2024, there has been no significant change in UNIFIL’s ability to operate in the 1701 area against Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts (See the article from February 2025), in contrast to the promotional content published by the organization in the media and on social networks attempting to highlight its supposed contribution to the rehabilitation and security in southern Lebanon.
In recent months, numerous incidents have been documented in which UNIFIL forces operating in southern Lebanon—especially when not accompanied by the Lebanese Army—were expelled from villages and even attacked by residents, Hezbollah supporters, and possibly also Hezbollah operatives (See article from early May 2025).
As part of the ceasefire agreement, a monitoring mechanism was established in southern Lebanon that includes the United States, France, the Lebanese Army, and UNIFIL. Israel engages with this mechanism when it identifies violations of the ceasefire. The Lebanese Army has indeed increased its enforcement activity in southern Lebanon, and although enforcement remains only partial, there is a noticeable improvement in its willingness to act.
UNIFIL defines itself as a critical conduit between the Lebanese Army and the IDF. However, reality does not support this claim, as most communication occurs through the United States. The existence of the new mechanism—combined with UNIFIL’s inability or unwillingness to act—has rendered it more redundant than ever.
UNIFIL consists of over 10,000 soldiers (10% of all UN forces) and operates with an annual budget of more than half a billion dollars. After nearly two decades, it can be stated with confidence that continued investment in the organization is unjustified. UNIFIL has failed to protect residents along the border— on both the Israeli side and the Lebanese side. It did not prevent Hezbollah’s military buildup since 2006, which has taken place openly across the entire area mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution1701, and it allowed Hezbollah to become a significant threat to residents of northern Israel.
In response to criticism over its ineffectiveness, UNIFIL personnel have previously claimed that the organization’s mandate is focused on monitoring, support, and humanitarian assistance, and that it is not authorized to intervene militarily or operate in “private” areas against Hezbollah’s activities. This interpretation once again raises the question: what, then, is UNIFIL’s actual contribution to maintaining security along the Israel–Lebanon border? If the goal is humanitarian aid, it would be better handled by UN agencies or organizations that specialize in such efforts—not by a force whose core mission is “peacekeeping.”
Reality has shown that the problem lies not in the mandate itself, but in the force’s willingness to carry out its primary mission. Even within the current limited mandate, much more could have been done to counter Hezbollah’s military deployment in southern Lebanon, which was revealed during the war.
Over the years, UNIFIL has had numerous opportunities to improve and fulfill its role, particularly in light of Israel’s repeated warnings. Yet no real attempt has been made to alter the organization’s conduct. There is no reason to believe that renewing the mandate—even with improvements—will bring about the necessary change that would make UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon relevant and effective in maintaining the security of both Israel and Lebanon.
