By: Zoe Levornik.
Al-Sharaa, has served as Syria’s “interim” president since the rebel attack on November 27, 2024, which led to the fall of Assad’s regime. Since taking power, he has been actively promoting a moderate image and a narrative of unity and internal peace in Syria. While Western countries are quick to be convinced by this transformation—lifting sanctions on Syria—the events that began on March 6 in northwestern Syria reveal cracks in Al-Sharaa’s diplomatic image. Instead of dialogue and respect for all Syrian citizens, there has been violent and brutal suppression of opposition and innocent civilians, particularly targeting the Alawite sect.
The media coverage focuses heavily on Al-Sharaa’s transformation from a former leader of a terrorist organization (linked to ISIS and Al-Qaeda) to a politician and head of state, questioning whether his moderate image is genuine.
There is no doubt that Al-Sharaa knows how to play the game. He is conducting an intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at convincing regional and Western countries that he is leading Syria into a new era of peace and unity. As part of his diplomatic efforts, he has met with representatives from the Middle East to restore Syria’s relations with regional states and gain their support. In recent weeks he has met with King Abdullah II of Jordan, Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
He also attended the Arab Summit in Cairo (March 4) where he met with Arab leaders such as Egypt’s President (Sisi), Lebanon’s President (Aoun), and even the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). Furthermore, he frequently gives interviews to the media, including Western outlets, where he maintains a conciliatory image talking about his vision for a new Syria.
Al-Sharaa knows how to tailor his message to his audience—for instance, expressing support for the Palestinians when meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, yet declaring that Syria is neither hostile to Israel nor affiliated with Hezbollah when addressing the presence of the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Syria. In his public statements, he has repeatedly emphasized the importance of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and rejecting external interference in its internal affairs.
Al-Sharaa is also attempting to project a moderate image domestically, aiming to show that he is different from the previous regime and respects all Syrian citizens. As part of his efforts to unite the factions, a National Dialogue Conference was held in February 2025, intended to provide policy recommendations for the new regime. While the conference certainly supported the conciliatory message Al-Sharaa promotes, its recommendations were non-binding, and Kurdish representatives were excluded. Many others did not attend due to the conference being announced only two days in advance.
Following rising tensions with the Druze community, Al-Sharaa met with the community leaders to reach understandings and ease concerns within the community. Al-Sharaa remains committed to his image as a leader attentive to all factions in Syrian society, resolving crises through peaceful means.
Al-Sharaa is perceived as a pragmatic figure who adapts quickly to the demands of reality. This perception stems from his past actions, such as cutting ties with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and establishing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which he described as a “Syrian national movement fighting against terrorism.” Later, when he took control of the Idlib province, he demonstrated attentiveness to local needs by easing some of the laws imposed on residents and even holding meetings with social activists. He enforced his decisions through persuasion and inclusion, but also through coercion when necessary.
As the President of Syria, Al-Sharaa faces several challenges that require balancing internal needs with Syria’s foreign relations.
The most significant internal challenge for the new regime is uniting the factions within Syria, establishing his rule, and preventing a descent into another civil war. As seen in recent weeks, this challenge arises from the Druze in southern Syria, the Alawites in the northwest, and the Kurds in the northeast. The question is whether he can achieve this without bloodshed, relying solely on persuasion and his personal charisma, as he repeatedly promises. Based on recent events in northwest Syria against the Alawites, this seems unlikely.
To what extent is Al-Sharaa even in control of what is happening on the ground? Is this a deliberate policy or chaos spiraling out of control, pointing to the weakness of the new regime?
On March 10 Al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces signed what is being described as a landmark agreement that recognizes Kurds as “an indigenous community of the Syrian state”, guaranteeing them full political and constitutional rights and incorporating them into the Syrian army. No doubt a commendable counter move to balance against the criticism over the events of the past week and do some damage control to his image as the leader of Syrian unity.
Another challenge is the reconstruction of Syria—not just rebuilding its infrastructure and economy but also shaping the character of the country. Will Syria become an Islamic state or a civil, democratic state (as the West hopes and expects)? Al-Sharaa’s ability to rehabilitate Syria significantly depends on his capacity to get the West to lift the sanctions currently imposed on Syria and establish economic ties with regional countries. It is no coincidence that he invests efforts in projecting a moderate and conciliatory image to the world. The lifting of sanctions and international support for Syria are contingent upon Al-Sharaa’s domestic policies, especially the protection of the rights of all Syrian citizens.
In terms of foreign relations, Syria is currently facing considerable pressures, as many players seek to exploit the new regime and advance their own interests in the region. Iran and Turkey are competing for control in Syria, attempting to interfere in the country’s internal affairs and even destabilize the new regime. Al-Sharaa and his supporters already claim that the recent clashes result from Assad regime loyalists influenced by external actors such as Assad himself and Iran.
Russia seeks to maintain its presence and hold on to its military bases in Syria, it is already engaging in intense negotiations with the regime to secure this.
The West, on the other hand, aims to bring Syria closer to its sphere of influence. Europe, in particular, is eager to embrace Syria’s moderate image, hoping that a stable and secure Syria would facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Europe. As of late February 2025, the European Union began lifting sanctions on Syria.
Despite reports of civilian massacres and innocent casualties emerging from northwest Syria since March 6th, which revealed the regime’s policy toward dissidents and minorities, Europe’s response has been weak—expressing disappointment and issuing faint condemnations. Sanctions, however, have not been reinstated, with the justification that maintaining them would lead to Syria’s collapse as a state.
It seems Al-Sharaa follows a clear strategy of “killing them softly,” and if that fails, simply killing them outright. His opponents are left with the choice of surrendering willingly or by force. Syria’s current state does not allow Al-Sharaa the same freedom to publicly suppress his opposition as the previous regime did; thus, he tries to balance moderation, in order to gain international support, with the necessity to act against threats and consolidate his rule.
While his forces continue to act with severe violence in Syria’s coastal cities, Al-Sharaa announced the formation of an investigative committee to examine the events and ordered the establishment of a special committee to “preserve domestic peace in Syria,” tasked with listening to the residents of the Syrian coast. Also, in preparation for the UN representatives that are coming to inspect the situation Al-Sharaa forces are cleaning up the streets from the dead bodies and other evidence of the violence that took place. On March 10 Al-Sharaa made a public statement saying that the mass killings of members of the Alawite sect is a threat to his mission to unite the country, and promised to punish those responsible, including his own allies if necessary. The goal is, of course, to maintain his image as a progressive and moderate leader among his supporters both inside and outside Syria, while ruthlessly eliminating his opponents.
While the West appears captivated by Al-Sharaa, for Israel, there are three significant factors in assessing the threat posed by the new regime:
- How will the new regime act in southern Syria, and will it prevent the arming of militias that could pose a threat to border residents in the north of Israel?
- What will Al-Sharaa’s stance be towards Israel: status quo, normalization, or aggression?
- With whom will the new regime forge alliances? Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia (or possibly even revive ties with Iran based on varied interests), or will it lean more toward the West?
Regarding Israel, Al-Sharaa expressed opposition to the presence of the IDF in southern Syria, stating that the new regime is not hostile to Israel and does not seek its destruction. He further noted that Syria respects the 1974 agreement and is willing to accept UN forces and protect them. However, as demonstrated this week, Al-Sharaa speaks of moderation and peace while acting violently against those who threaten his rule.
Syria is currently not in a position to directly attack Israel; therefore, it tolerates the presence of the IDF and limits itself to condemnations. However, this does not mean that the threat has disappeared—whether from hostile groups that may establish themselves in southern Syria despite or with the support of the new regime, or from elements of the new regime that may later adopt an aggressive stance against Israel (see our article from January 2025: Has the threat from Syria disappeared? The large quantities of weapons near the border and the potential for an invasion of Israel).
If the international community continues to buy into Al-Sharaa’s façade, the danger is that international pressure on Israel will increase, urging a withdrawal from the buffer zone it has created in southern Syria—a zone critical for maintaining Israel’s security at present. The challenge for Israel is to convince Western countries, especially its allies, that Al-Sharaa’s moderate image and statements cannot be trusted and that it is essential to wait and observe what the new regime’s actual policies will be, both domestically and externally.
Sources
https://www.maarachot.idf.il/30547
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/10/syria-sharaa-kurds-alawites
