By: Zoe Levornik.
As Israel continues to fight and thwart threats to its security on multiple fronts, it faces increased international criticism of Israel’s presence and strikes in Lebanese and Syrian territory. This criticism is often biased and misleading. Subsequently, international pressure on Israel is also mounting.
The recurring international criticism claims that Israel’s presence in Lebanon and Syria is not driven by security needs but rather indicates Israel’s intention to occupy territory in violation of the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon and international law regarding Syrian sovereignty. Furthermore, the international criticism asserts that Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Syria are harming uninvolved civilians.
With regard to Lebanon, the criticism against Israel argues that the Lebanese government and army are working to enforce their authority, prevent ceasefire violations, and dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons. Israel’s presence and continued strikes undermine Lebanon’s ability to enforce the ceasefire terms.
In the context of Syria, the argument is that there is no longer any threat to the State of Israel. The old regime supported by Iran has fallen, the civil war has ended, and the new regime has declared that it is not interested in conflict with Israel. Therefore, there is no justification for Israel’s presence in Syrian territory or for conducting strikes there.
In both Lebanon and Syria, Israel maintains a limited presence in areas near the border at several strategic points that allow for monitoring and detection of activities that pose a threat to Israel (see article).
Lebanon:
Since the ceasefire came into effect on November 27, 2024, Israel has been operating on a daily basis against Hezbollah’s military rehabilitation efforts, which are taking place even within the 1701 area south of the Litani River. These efforts include the renewal of infrastructure, reorganization, intelligence gathering, and the transport and smuggling of weapons.
According to an analysis we conducted in April 2025 of IDF airstrikes data in Lebanon since November 27 (link to article), Hezbollah’s activity in southern Lebanon—including south of the Litani—is on the rise, not the opposite. This constitutes a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement.
Although the Lebanese Army’s activity in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah’s violations is occasionally mentioned in headlines and general statements—including claims that several Hezbollah sites were allegedly destroyed—there is practically no actual evidence of this on the ground.
On April 14, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun declared that Lebanon is committed to disarming Hezbollah, but he added that the process would occur through dialogue. Expecting Hezbollah to willingly disarm is, to say the least, unrealistic, and Israel cannot ignore Hezbollah’s ongoing rehabilitation efforts while the Lebanese government and president make declarations, and the actions of the Lebanese Army remain ambiguous.
Since the ceasefire, there have been four shooting incidents from Lebanese territory into Israeli territory, constituting blatant violations of the ceasefire terms and severely harming the sense of security among residents of northern Israel, who are currently in the process of returning to their homes.
While Hezbollah denied responsibility for the shootings and the Lebanese Army stated it is working to locate the suspects, it did not act to prevent the attacks in the first place—highlighting its ineffectiveness and the necessity for Israel to continue operating against threats. This requires a certain level of presence in Lebanese territory and continued strikes against violations of the agreement and against clear and immediate threats.
On April 20, the Lebanese Army announced that it had thwarted a shooting attempt toward Israel and arrested several suspects. Even if this is a credible report and not merely a public relations effort, when considering the number of violations that Israel identifies and thwarts each week, it amounts to a drop in the ocean.
The Lebanese Army’s ability to act comprehensively against Hezbollah in a manner that would prevent its rearmament—as Israel is currently doing—is highly questionable. In this context, see the special report on the Lebanese Army that we published in February (See Special Report – The Lebanese Army)
Syria:
Changes are indeed taking place in Syria—but are they truly for the better?
The new Syrian regime and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmad al-Sharaa), are at a crossroads between the desire to build a state with Western support and the radical Islamic ideology they embrace. As of now, it is still unclear which path al-Julani has chosen. The image he presents to the Western world does not align with the actions of his forces within Syria.
On April 26, it was reported that al-Julani conveyed a message to the United States stating that Syria does not intend to pose a threat to Israel and would even be open to future normalization talks. While the message is optimistic, Syria remains divided and subject to considerable pressure and external interference from actors that, to say the least, are not sympathetic to Israel (Turkey, the Shiite axis, Qatar).
Therefore, even if the new regime does not wish to engage in conflict with Israel, it may not be capable of enforcing its will or preventing internal or external actors involved in Syria from establishing infrastructure that could potentially threaten Israel. Israel’s activity in Syria is intended to prevent hostile entities from gaining a foothold and becoming a threat.
Below are the key recent developments in Syria that may pose a security threat to Israel:
- U.S. troop withdrawal: At the end of April 2025, the United States began withdrawing part of its forces from Syria—a move that many fear will enable the strengthening of terrorist organizations like ISIS within the country and allow renewed footholds for the Shiite axis.
- Advanced conventional and chemical weapons remaining in Syria:
The Syrian army of the Assad regime left behind a large quantity of conventional weapons, some of which are advanced and have yet to be destroyed. In addition, inspectors estimate that there are more than 100 chemical weapons sites still present in Syria from the Assad era.
The risk that these stockpiles—including chemical weapons—could fall into the wrong hands and be used, among other things, against Israel is very real and tangible. For this reason, Israel acted immediately after the fall of the Assad regime and continues to work to destroy remaining weapons and military equipment from the previous regime.
Syria has indeed agreed to allow inspectors to locate and destroy the chemical weapons on its soil, but this process will take time, and until it is completed, the threat remains. - Turkish involvement in Syria: Turkey’s involvement in Syria raises even greater concerns for Israel’s security. Turkey is trying to increase its power and influence in the region and does not hide its hostile intentions toward Israel. Israel is operating in Syria to prevent this scenario from materializing and to establish deterrence against Turkey’s ambitions in the Middle East (See article).
- Violent clashes with minority groups: The violent clashes that occurred over the past week between Druze communities in southern Damascus and in Suwayda and the Syrian regime’s security forces are further evidence of the instability in Syria. Israel has been compelled to act to provide assistance and protection to the attacked Druze population. It carried out several warning strikes and conveyed a message to the Syrian regime that it bears responsibility for protecting all of its citizens.
The demand for the regime to safeguard the rights of all Syrians has also been raised by the international community—particularly European countries and the United States—but Israel remains the only actor actively addressing the potential harm to the Druze minority in Syria.
Israel is determined to prevent an escalation of violent conflict against the Druze in Syria, which could also spill over and threaten Israeli citizens and its national security.
In addition to the developments listed above, it is important to remember that the ongoing instability further amplifies the threat of tactical terrorism from southern Syria against Israel. This threat did not vanish with the collapse of the Assad regime or the weakening of the Shiite axis. This threat could manifest in the form of infiltrations into Israeli territory, rocket fire, IEDs, and more.
The Human Shield:
Despite the numerous pieces of evidence that Israel has published since the beginning of the war (and even in the years prior) regarding Hezbollah’s use of civilians as human shields. This policy is intended, among other things, to make it more difficult for Israel to act against it—knowing that Israel operates in accordance with international law—and to delegitimize Israeli actions.
Unfortunately, many in the international community refuse to acknowledge the fact that this is a deliberate policy by Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s military activity takes place within the civilian population among whom it operates. Israel conducts precise and targeted strikes and makes every possible effort to minimize harm to civilians in accordance with international law, even as Hezbollah continues to use the civilian population as part of its rebuilding efforts.
In addition, Israel reports every violation it detects to the mechanism that is supposed to operate under the ceasefire framework and acts only when those violations are not addressed.
Many European countries differentiate between Hezbollah’s military and civilian wings. (Of the 27 European Union member states, only 9 have recognized Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization—among them are the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The rest attribute terrorist activity solely to Hezbollah’s military wing.) Hezbollah’s civilian activities enable its military operations. The civilian and military functions are intertwined, and Hezbollah itself has stated that it is one single organization with no separate branches—therefore, it will not give up its military activity.
As a result, international media often misleadingly portray Hezbollah operatives (who are dressed in civilian clothing while carrying out military terrorist activity) as uninvolved civilians harmed in Israeli strikes.
It is highly likely that in the near future, criticism and pressure on Israel will intensify—especially if conciliatory messages continue to emerge from Lebanon and Syria. However, conciliatory messages do not actually neutralize threats.
Radical Islamic ideology—both Sunni and Shiite—is here to stay, along with the motivation to harm Israel.
The events of October 7, 2023, proved that our understanding of the other side’s intentions is limited and, at times, nonexistent. Moreover, we will not always have advance warning regarding the realization of such intentions.
In light of the above, Israel’s presence and strikes in Lebanese and Syrian territory are necessary. International coverage must be based on accurate and balanced information that provides a full overview of Israel’s security situation. Unfortunately, this is often not the case.
