The Northern Arena and the Shiite Axis – Weekly Review of Events and Key Data (23-30 Sept.)

On the evening of September 27, Israel attacked Hezbollah’s headquarters in the Haret Hreik area of southwest Beirut. The headquarters were located in an underground complex beneath civilian residential buildings. The goal was the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah and other senior officials (among them was Ali Karki, commander of the Southern Front) were eliminated.

All along, one thing was clear to the Iranians. Hezbollah, in general, and Nasrallah, in particular, are very valuable and important assets. Such an asset needs to be preserved. They lost Nasrallah. Now the Iranians will have to reevaluate their strategy and decide what to do next.

An article detailing the attack and analyzing the implications following Nasrallah’s elimination was published by us on September 29.

Over the past week, the IDF has significantly increased its attacks throughout Lebanon. After calls to evacuate the population of villages in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut, the IDF began significant airstrikes against weapons depots Hezbollah had stored in civilian areas in Lebanon and continued to attack Hezbollah’s rocket launchers. In addition, airstrikes are carried out to thwart Hezbollah’s weapons smuggling from Syria to Lebanon, and after warning, flights by Iranian planes to Beirut airport were suspended.

Hezbollah continues to fire rockets at the State of Israel, and even launching rockets toward central Israel, more than 100 km from the Israeli Lebanese border. Over the past week 117 has carried out attacks against Israel resulting in several civilian injuries and damage to only buildings and property.

Almost all of Hezbollah attacks were carried out using a high-trajectory fire of at least 860 rockets and missiles. The majority, 87 strikes, targeted non-evacuated areas and deep into Israel territory. It has been noticeable over the past week that the number of rockets in each barrage is decreasing. While last week (September 16-23) there were barrages of about 120 launches towards the Safed area and about 85 launches towards the Krayot area, in the past week, the highest number of rockets fired in a single barrage was about 45.

Hezbollah’s capabilities have deteriorated, and its attacks against Israel have lacked coordination. These are indicated both in the low number of munitions it fired and in the attacks for which it claims responsibility even though there is no indication for these presumed attacks, or, for example, launching toward a certain area where in fact the rockets were fired towards a different area. The IDF’s intensive activity in attacking weapons depots and eliminating Hezbollah commanders and senior officials caused damage to Hezbollah’s firepower, potentially contributing to the disorder and confusion evident in Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel.

The severe estimates (derived from IDF scenarios), estimates that we also deliberated, asserted, that Hezbollah could launch an average of 3,000 munitions a day, in the first period given of an all-out war. It is clear that not all of these munitions would have struck their targets (interceptions/unexploded ordnance/falling in open spaces/falling in Lebanon itself).

In our estimation, Hezbollah intended to implement this scenario when it launched a surprise attack (for example, such as the attack it planned to conquer the Galilee) or when Israel crossed three red lines: damage to the leadership, damage to infrastructure in Beirut, and ground maneuvers.

To date, two lines have already been crossed by Israel as far as Hezbollah is concerned (striking the leadership and Beirut), still, the above estimates have not materialized.

There are two main possibilities for this: first, Hezbollah’s main launching capabilities were severely damaged by the IDF, and second, a serious problem of functional continuity (temporary?) related to damage to the chain of command and leadership. Of course, there may be a combination of these two options.

We do not know if a ground maneuver will be carried out, but if such a maneuver is carried out and Hezbollah still does not implement firing at the civilian home front in Israel, according to the above assessments, then it can be assumed with high probability that both of the above options are correct. If so, this is a very great success on the part of the IDF, which in effect paralyzed Hezbollah’s main firepower (missiles and rockets) and severely damaged Hezbollah’s functional continuity.

It should also be remembered that Hezbollah has been firing at Israel for an entire year. During this year, and especially in recent months, the IDF has been working intensively to deprive Hezbollah of its capabilities, with an emphasis on short- and medium-range rocket arrays (hitting launchers and rocket depots).

In light of this, it can be estimated that as a result of the combination of Hezbollah’s utilization of its arsenal and the ongoing IDF operations to thwart it, even before the significant escalation that began about a week and a half ago, Hezbollah has already effectively lost a considerable percentage of its rocket arsenal and launchers. The near future will reveal the extent of the capabilities and readiness that remain for Hezbollah.

Additional weekly insights:

1. This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for direct attacks on a number of towns and communities in northern Israel. Hezbollah no longer claims to fire only at military targets or in response to IDF attacks; it fires directly at civilians in Israel.
2. Hezbollah changed the wording of its statements claiming responsibility for its attacks against Israel. According to the wording of its announcements, the attacks are in support of the Palestinians but also in the defense of Lebanon and its citizens. Hezbollah is trying to present a narrative according to which it is the defensive side and not the attacker. This narrative serves it both inside Lebanon, in strengthening the legitimacy of the war towards its supporters, and outside Lebanon in order to present Israel as the attacking party that initiated the war.
3. Hezbollah stopped its routine announcing of its operative fatalities, since fatality number 507 (We know of 70 more). Nowadays, Hezbollah occasionally publishes notices and sometimes it doesn’t. It was claimed that this was a decision made by Hezbollah in order to maintain morale. It is also possible that this is a deliberate obfuscation due to a field security decision. We encountered many reports and eulogies on social media regarding those who, judging by their photos, are hard not to define as Hezbollah operatives. The wording of the publication is very similar to that of Hezbollah’s official publications.
4. We must take notice of the confusing naming policies of different weapon systems, such as one weapon system with multiple names or, alternatively, several weapons systems with the same name. In this context, a common phenomenon is the “pasting” of new names to old and familiar weapon systems. That’s how the Iranians behave, and that’s how Hezbollah behaves.
5. In recent weeks, there has been an upward trend in the “successes” of attacks by the Islamic resistance in Iraq. From September 1 to 26, 2024, out of 18 attacks, 13 incidents were reported in which the IDF intercepted aerial targets launched from Iraq (72%). Until August 2024 (inclusive), the vast majority of the airstrikes from Iraq had not reached Israeli territory at all. Only 18% of all claims of responsibility were reported as interceptions carried out by the IDF. Attention should be paid to the sharp increase in September 2024, especially in recent days, as well as the success rates in penetrating into Israeli territory.

The Lebanese arena:

As a result of Hezbollah attacks, 25 civilians and 25 IDF soldiers have been killed in Israel so far, a total of 50 people.

After assessing the situation, as of Sunday (September 22), it was decided to update the protective guidelines for residents from the Haifa line northward, including the Golan Heights, Upper Galilee, Central Galilee, Lower Galilee, Haifa Bay and the Valleys region. The guidelines include canceling educational frameworks and transition to distance learning, limiting gatherings, restricting services, and restricting workplaces only in buildings where it is possible to reach a protected space during an attack. This is an area with about one million citizens of Israel’s population.

In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently.

It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).

The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 31 December 2024.

According to the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, since October 7, 189,000 dunams have been scorched in hundreds of locations across northern Israel (as of August 25, 2024).

During the past week 117 attacks were carried out on the northern border of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 57 attacks against Israel. In addition, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 10 additional attacks for which there were no indications that they had been carried out.

Hamas’ military-terrorist wing in Lebanon claimed responsibility for launching about five rockets toward the Haifa Bay and the Amakim areas.

Since the beginning of the war, 3,211 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.

Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel

(September 23) Hezbollah carried out 19 attacks, including the firing of more than 215 rockets toward the Upper Galilee, Lower Galilee, Safed, Golan Heights, Haifa Bay, the Jezreel Valley and the Western Galilee. In addition, in one attack about 10 launches were fired into Samaria (more than 100 km from the Israeli Lebanese border).

(September 24) Hezbollah carried out 31 attacks, including firing about 200 rockets at the Jezreel Valley, Nahariya and the Western Galilee, Kiryat Shmona, Upper Galilee, Lower Galilee, Haifa Bay, Katzrin and Rosh Pina. In addition, Hezbollah launched three suicide UAVs toward the Atlit area.

(September 25) Hezbollah launched a surface-to-surface missile (or heavy rocket) toward the Gush Dan area (Tel Aviv Metropolitan) and was intercepted by the David’s Sling system. In its claim of responsibility, Hezbollah claimed that it was a Qader-1 missile aimed at Mossad headquarters in the Tel Aviv area. The missile launcher was attacked by the IDF. The diagram shows in general the range of the various interception circles of Israel’s air defense systems up to the Arrow 3. (Illustrative).

This is the location of Hezbollah’s launcher, from which the missile (or heavy rocket) was fired at Gush Dan (September 25). The launcher is located in the village of Nafakhiyeh, east of Tyre, in the compound of a civilian building. This is another example of Hezbollah’s use of human shields. The launcher was destroyed by the IDF in a targeted attack.

(September 28) Hezbollah carried out 21 attacks against Israel, including 90 rockets fired at Safed, Rosh Pina, Jezreel Valley, central Galilee, Upper Galilee, Western Galilee, and Katzrin. Two missiles were also fired at the Binyamin area, which fell in open areas, and one landed causing a fire in the area.

Hezbollah and other organization casualties

Hezbollah stopped its routine announcing of its operative fatalities. However, the social networks publish funerals of operatives killed against the backdrop of posters of Hezbollah fatalities. According to our identification and analysis, at least 73 Hezbollah operatives were killed during the past week.

As of October 8, 2023, approximately 577 Hezbollah operatives have been killed in total. Most of the operatives killed originated south of the Litani River (370 operatives killed, constituting 64% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographical units (Nasr/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).

This week, it was also reported that six Amal operatives were killed, three from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, one from Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, and a Hamas commander in Lebanon.

According to reports from Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 76 operatives from other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal Movement, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya (Al-Fajr), the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Fatah, and the Democratic Front.

Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures

This week, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was eliminated. Ali Karki, commander of the Southern Front, was also eliminated. Along with them, the head of Nasrallah’s security unit, his advisor on terrorism, and likely also the commander of the new Radwan unit, the responsible for building the force and managing fire, were eliminated.

In addition, the head of the missile and rocket array, the commander of the air unit, the commander of the missile unit in southern Lebanon, a senior official in the intelligence staff and the commander of Hezbollah’s preventive security unit, were eliminated.

A total of 14 senior Hezbollah operatives and commanders.

As of October 8, 2023, 76 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, among the senior operatives who were eliminated were Jihad Council members Fouad Shukr (head of the strategic divisions), Ibrahim Aqil (head of the operations division) and Ali Karki (commander of the southern front).

• 5 Senior Hezbollah leaders (6.3% of those eliminated)
• 38% of those eliminated, a total of 30, were from the Radwan unit, including the unit’s acting commanders Wassam al-Tawil (January 2024) and Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi (September 2024).
• 22.8%, a total of 18 of the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units was placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
• Four senior operatives from the air unit, including the unit commander, were eliminated.
• Three others from Hezbollah’s air defense system.
• A senior operative in Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon.
• An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
• 5.1% of those killed, a total of 4, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
• 11.4%, 9 senior operatives from the rocket missile array, including the units commander and the southern Lebanon unit commander.

This week (September 28), Shura Council member Nabil Qaouk was also eliminated (see the article we published this week regarding him).

The elimination effort is important and necessary and must be continued at all times.

These are the heads of the executive councils that are members of Hezbollah’s Central Council. After Nasrallah, the important person is Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Executive Council and apparently Nasrallah’s successor.

Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Executive Council and apparently Nasrallah’s successor, has not been harmed so far. In June 2022, we published an article about him as part of a research project regarding the Executive Council. An interesting detail: His son, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s arms smuggling unit (4400), married Soleimani’s daughter in June 2020. Read the attached article.

The infrastructure of the Executive Council and its operatives enable Hezbollah’s military activity. Collectively, they form the entity known as the state of Hezbollah. To complete the severe blow to Hezbollah, we must also harm them. The article on the Executive Council from June 2022.

Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon

(September 24) An airstrike in Beirut killed Ibrahim Muhammad Qabisi, head of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket system, codenamed Haj Abu Musa. Born in 1962. It originated from Zebedin. Among other things, he was responsible for the array of precision missiles. Qabisi was formerly commander of the Badr unit on the southern front. Based on his position, we estimate that he was subordinate to Fouad Shukr. Since the latter’s elimination, Qabisi may have been directly subordinate to Nasrallah. To the best of our knowledge, Qabisi was not a member of the Jihad Council.

Along with Qabisi, his deputy, Abbas Ibrahim Sharaf al-Din, and another senior missile official, Hussein Hani, were eliminated. Hussein Hani was also close to Fouad Shukr. In addition, Fouad Shafiq Khazal Khanafer, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s surface-to-surface missile array, was killed in another IDF attack. They were centers of knowledge in the Hezbollah terrorist organization and for years led terrorist outlines and force buildup activities to attack the Israeli home front.

(September 25) In one of the IDF strikes, in a populated civilian area, the remains of a missile, apparently a Fateh-110 missile, were exposed and identified. Hezbollah deploys its military infrastructure in civilian areas that serve as human shields throughout Lebanon. Even in non-Shiite areas. The Fateh-110 ballistic missile array is part of Hezbollah’s strategic alignments under the missile unit commanded by Ibrahim Qabisi, which was eliminated on September 24. The precision project focused on Fateh-110 missiles.

During the past week a number of photos and videos were published showing rocket launchers on trucks that were attacked and destroyed. Most of these mobile launchers were located in the heart of a civilian areas.

(September 26) A precision airstrike struck an apartment in a high-rise building in the Dahiya, Beirut. As a result of the airstrike, Muhammad Hussein Srour, aka Abu Saleh, commander of Hezbollah’s aerial unit, was killed. Srour was in charge of Hezbollah’s UAV system, air defense and cruise missiles. The location of the strike is very close to the location of the elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the top command of the Radwan unit on September 20. During his many years in Hezbollah (some forty years), Srour also held positions in the Aziz and Radwan units and was a professional mentor to the Houthis in Yemen concerning the aerial issue.

(September 27) As part of Operation “New Order”, Hezbollah’s main headquarters in Haret Hreik, southwest Beirut, was attacked. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Southern Front commander Ali Karki, and other Hezbollah commanders were killed in the attack. According to official Iranian announcements, the commander of the Syrian-Lebanese Qods Corps, Abbas Nilforushan, was also killed in the attack.

Following Nasrallah’s elimination, Hezbollah’s Unit 910 poses a clear and immediate threat to Israeli and Jewish interests around the world. The unit’s infrastructure is deployed in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia. It can attempt to carry out a significant revenge attack in a short period of time. About 32 years ago, after the elimination of the previous Hezbollah leader, Abbas Musawi, it succeeded. See our article re: Hezbollah’s Unit 910.

(September 27) After the attack on Hezbollah’s main headquarters in Haret Hreik, the IDF announced that three building compounds in south Beirut had to be evacuated:

1. The al-Lilaki neighborhood, the Munir Shadid building and the adjacent buildings.
2. Al-Hadath neighborhood, Sheth Building and adjacent buildings.
3. The Al-Hadath neighborhood, the al-Salam complex and the adjacent buildings.

These are civilian compounds in the heart of a residential area that Hezbollah uses for its military needs to store strategic weapons (including anti-ship missiles) using human shield tactics. Hezbollah has Iranian-made anti-ship missiles (such as Nour), Chinese (such as C802), and possibly even Russian (Yakhont).

(September 27-28) The IDF targeted Hezbollah strategic targets in Beirut, including weapons production sites, buildings where advanced weapons were stored, and Hezbollah headquarters.

(September 27) An airstrike killed Muhammad Ali Ismail, commander of Hezbollah’s missile unit in southern Lebanon. Along with him, his deputy, Hussein Ahmad Ismail, was killed. Other Hezbollah commanders were eliminated with them. Muhammad Ali Ismail was responsible for many terrorist attacks from his sector towards Israeli territory, including launching rockets at Israeli territory and launching a surface-to-surface missile at central Israel on September 25.

(September 28) A UAV airstrike on the Chehir al-Baydar road in northern Al-Bekaa against a vehicle carrying weapons smuggled to Hezbollah. The vehicle was carrying Russian-made ORSIS T-5000M sniper rifles (picture below).

(September 28) In an airstrike on the Dahiya in Beirut, the IDF killed Nabil Qaouk, commander of Hezbollah’s preventive security unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Central Council (Shura). Qaouk was considered close to the top echelons of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, and had been directly involved in promoting terror plots against the State of Israel and its citizens, even in recent days.

(September 28) During the night, a site for manufacturing and assembling rocket and missile launchers in southern Lebanon and another site intended to be part of Hezbollah’s buildup project in the Bekaa Valley were attacked.

Hezbollah – General:

(September 28-29) Following Nasrallah’s death, days of mourning were declared in a number of countries – Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Lebanon – General:

On Monday morning (September 23) the IDF Spokesperson called on residents of villages in Lebanon, the south and the Bekaa Valley to stay away from homes where Hezbollah hides weapons in light of the IDF’s intention to attack them. The report was published on several different media channels. In addition, recorded voice messages were sent to the Lebanese, the Air Force dropped leaflets, the IDF took over radio stations, SMS messages were sent, and voice calls were made. All the means sent warnings and called on residents to evacuate.

Since then, and with the beginning of the extensive attacks in Lebanon, residents of Lebanon, southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley have begun to leave their homes. Lebanese Health Minister Feras al-Abyad revealed that the total number of displaced persons is estimated at half a million, of whom about 31,000 people fled to Syria, mainly to the areas of Homs, the capital Damascus and its suburbs. The number of displaced persons from southern Lebanon is estimated at about 70,000, divided among 533 shelters in various areas of Lebanon: Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Sidon, the Beqaa Valley and the northern governorates.

It is estimated that about 60,000 Syrian refugees who lived in Lebanon have returned to their country.

Hezbollah announcement in the Bekaa Valley intended for families interested in moving to Syria with phone numbers for assistance according to areas in the Beqaa Valley (above)

(September 27) Britain issued a notice to its citizens staying in Lebanon to leave Lebanon immediately.

(September 29) The Lebanese Ministry of Health reported that so far there have been seven hundred eighty-three dead and two thousand three hundred and twelve wounded. These numbers cannot be verified. In addition, it is unclear whether these figures include Hezbollah fatalities and wounded, and it is unclear what period of time they are referring to.

During the past week, several attacks occurred against Shiites who had emigrated from southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut.

The Syrian arena:

(September 29) An airstrike was reported in Syria in the town of Al-Qusayr in the Homs region, against Hezbollah’s weapons smuggling into Lebanon. During the week, the IDF carried out attacks against a number of smuggling routes used by Hezbollah to smuggle weapons from Syria to Lebanon, effectively creating physical roadblocks. There are two main vehicle crossings at Khush al-Sid Ali and an additional 8 optional ones (see map).

(September 29) Reports of an attack on the headquarters of Division 4 and the villa of Maher al-Assad (the president’s brother) west of Damascus.

Syria -General:

(September 24) The governor of Damascus province said that on orders from President Assad, the Syrian government was preparing to provide all concessions for those fleeing Lebanon to Syrian territory, most of them Syrian citizens, including bureaucratic relief and transportation from the border. In the various provinces, including Daraa and Quneitra governorates, there are plans to assist refugees through Red Crescent branches.

)September 27) Sweets were distributed in Idlib, a stronghold of the Syrian rebels, on the occasion of the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah. Also, spontaneous celebrations broke out in Daraa province.

Shiite Axis – General

(September 28) A UAV and rocket attack was reported against the American base in the CONOCO gas field in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria.

After the attack, a UAV attack was reported in Deir ez-Zor against weapons depots and headquarters of the Shiite axis. According to local reports, 15 pro-Iranian militia operatives were killed in the attack and 35 others were wounded.

During the past week (September 23-September 30), the Islamic resistance in Iraq (the Shiite militias) claimed responsibility for 20 attacks against Israel using UAV and cruise missiles. Six incidents were reported, intercepting aerial targets and two attacks hitting a building in southern Israel and the port of Eilat.

In recent weeks there has been an increase in attacks by the Islamic resistance in Iraq, which have managed to penetrate into Israeli territory. Starting in September 2024, there seems to be an upward trend and success rate in the threat potential. Of the 18 attacks, 13 incidents were reported in which the IDF intercepted aerial targets launched from Iraq (72%). Twelve of the attacks occurred in the week of September 17 alone. The increase in the intensity of the attacks from Iraq comes at a time when the intensity of the confrontation with Hezbollah has escalated. Hezbollah suffered heavy blows in Lebanon. It is very possible that the intensification of the attacks from Iraq is intended to help Hezbollah more and employ Israel’s detection and warning systems. We will not be surprised if there is a more significant Iranian guiding hand here. Attention should be paid to the sharp increase in September 2024, especially in recent days, as well as the success rates in penetrating into Israeli territory.

The current graph analyzes all the attacks by the Islamic resistance in Iraq against Israel from November 2023 (the beginning of its activity) to September 25, 2024:

Yemen – Houthi-land:

During the past week, coalition forces managed to strike one UAV, which posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.

(September 27-28) The Houthis carried out two attacks against Israel, including the launch of a ballistic missile. According to Houthi statements, one attack was carried out on the city of Tel Aviv and another on Ben Gurion Airport during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to Israel. Both missiles were intercepted outside Israeli territory.

(September 29) IDF airstrike in Yemen: Dozens of IAF aircraft, including fighter planes, refueling planes and intelligence planes, attacked a number of targets used militarily by the Houthi terrorist regime in the areas of Ras Issa and Hodeida in Yemen. Power plants and a seaport, which are used to import oil, were attacked. The Houthi regime receives Iranian weapons and supplies for military purposes through the infrastructure and ports that were attacked. Power plants and a seaport, which are used to import oil, were attacked. The attack was carried out in response to the Houthi regime’s recent attacks on Israel. Over the past year, the Houthis have been acting under Iranian guidance, funding, and in cooperation with Iraqi militias, in order to harm the State of Israel, undermine the regional order, and disrupt global freedom of navigation.

Since October 2023, there have been 205 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States and other targets.