Main points:
IDF Activity in Lebanon:
The IDF persists in its efforts to eliminate threats and combat Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure in southern Lebanon.
During an IDF activity in the Saluki area, (Approximately 10 km from Israeli territory, west of the Metula area, Kiryat Shmona, and the Ramim ridge) a warehouse containing a cache of weapons, including launchers, missiles, and IEDs, was discovered. The buildings in the area contained numerous weapons, such as rocket launchers, explosive devices, dozens of Kalashnikov rifles, grenades, electrically guided missiles, mines, observation devices, explosive devices, and tactical combat equipment. The forces destroyed the weapons depot and confiscated all the weapons they found.
The IDF carried out two airstrikes to remove a threat in Lebanon:
On January 1 Hezbollah terrorists were identified transporting weapons from a weapons depot in southern Lebanon. The terrorists, the vehicle, and the weapons depot were attacked from the air.
On January 2, an airstrike destroyed Hezbollah rocket launchers in two different locations. As part of the enforcement of the understanding between Israel and Lebanon, before the attack, a request was sent to the Lebanese army to neutralize the launchers, which posed a threat to the Israeli home front and IDF forces. The launchers were attacked only after the Lebanese army did not deal with the request.
Is the Lebanese army (LAF) ready for its role as one of the elements that will enforce the ceasefire in south Lebanon?
The Lebanese army lacks the capability (due to a shortage of manpower), is not motivated to enforce (with an emphasis on the Shiites in the army), and is afraid of an armed confrontation with Hezbollah.
An analysis of its activity marking the one-month anniversary of the cease-fire between Hezbollah and Israel raises doubts about the ability and desire of the Lebanese army to act against Hezbollah and prevent its buildup. While the IDF continues to expose Hezbollah’s terror infrastructure and weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon, the LAF focuses on clearing debris and unexploded ordnance, criticizing Israel for its violations without confronting Hezbollah’s violations. Is it capable of preventing Hezbollah’s renewed buildup? Based on experience, the LAF has already failed to fulfill this role within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1701. The coming month will be the real test period for the ceasefire agreement. Read our full article, “Analysis of the Lebanese Army’s Activity: Marking a Month Since the Ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel”.
On Jan. 4, the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Akhbar newspaper reported that the Lebanese army had received “serious indications” from Jasper Jeffers, who serves as chairman of the U.S. Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, that as long as the Lebanese army did not fulfill its role in the agreement, the IDF would not withdraw from Lebanon even after the 60 days decided upon in the agreement.
On Jan. 5, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that the first condition for the agreement was a complete withdrawal of the Hezbollah terrorist organization north of the Litani River, the dismantling of all weapons, and the thwarting of the terrorist infrastructure in the area by the Lebanese army, which has not yet happened. If this condition is not met, there will be no agreement. Israel will have to act on its own to ensure the safe return of the residents of northern Israel to their homes. Israel will not allow the creation of a renewed threat to the communities of the north and the citizens of the State of Israel.
In the same way, UNIFIL also shows neither the will nor the capability to act against Hezbollah. This week (January 4), UNIFIL issued an official statement condemning Israel’s activity in southern Lebanon. According to the organization, an IDF bulldozer destroyed a blue barrel marking the blue line between Israeli and Lebanese territory in the area of Levona (the western sector). In addition, according to UNIFIL, the bulldozer destroyed a Lebanese army observation tower located near a UNIFIL post at the site. They assert that the violation was intentional and direct, causing damage to both UNIFIL and Lebanese army property, thereby constituting a clear breach of Resolution 1701 and international law. It should be noted that Hezbollah has used the observation towers of the Lebanese army over the years.
Apart from condemning Israel’s actions against Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure, UNIFIL is not taking any action that indicates that it is capable of confronting Hezbollah and preventing its re-empowerment.
Parallel with concerns about the continued existence of the ceasefire, on January 5 a plan was issued for the return of the residents of northern Israel to their homes. Commencing on March 1, 2025, the outline will incorporate compensation grants for residents who return to their homes.
It is estimated that only three settlements – Metula, Manara, and Avivim – will be defined as “red settlements,” whose residents will still be able to remain outside the community funded by the state until the restoration of the infrastructure and the return of local services are completed.
On January 6, Amos Hochstein is expected to visit Beirut. The visit aims to track the progress of the Lebanese presidential election, scheduled for January 9, as well as the implementation of the ceasefire by Israel and Hezbollah.
IDF Activity in Syria
In recent weeks, IDF forces have been operating in the Syrian Hermon. As part of their activity, the forces have carried out targeted raids in military buildings and points that control the area, where they have located, confiscated, and destroyed an arsenal of weapons and intelligence.
The details of Operation “Many Roads” (September 8, 2024), in which an IDF force raided and destroyed an underground site belonging to Institute 4000’s precision missile manufacture at the CERS Center in Masyaf, northwest Syria, emerged this week. The activity at the site was carried out under Iranian auspices and guidance. The complex included advanced production lines designed to produce precision missiles and long-range rockets, thus significantly increasing the scope of missile supplies to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the region. The site, carved into the center of a mountain, was established in 2017, while in previous years, attempts were made to attack it from the air.
we took part in an article that was broadcast about the operation in kann news with the reporter Itay Blumental.
The Lebanese arena:
Hezbollah – General:
(January 3) The Iranian airline Mahan Air’s civilian plane landed at Beirut airport carrying Iranian diplomats who were carrying bags allegedly containing cash to fund Hezbollah. Several diplomats were detained for inspection at the airport. Following the incident, Hezbollah supporters went to the airport and demonstrated to protest the inspection of Iranian baggage and support for Hezbollah. According to the Iranians, the cash found in their luggage was intended to finance the activities and expenses of the Iranian embassy in Lebanon.
(January 4) Naim Qassem’s Speech Marking the 5th Anniversary of the Elimination of Qassem Soleimani
After praising Qassem Soleimani, Naim Qassem referred to Hezbollah’s war against Israel. Qassem continued to reiterate Hezbollah’s narrative of victory and glorify its achievements. According to him, in the past (1982), Israel reached Beirut within a few days, but in the current war Hezbollah managed to repel it. “What happened in Syria could have happened in Lebanon,” where Israel entered the villages without any resistance and destroyed the capabilities of Assad’s former army.
Qassem noted that there is no timetable that determines the functioning of the resistance, neither in the agreement nor after the expiration of the 60-day deadline and added: “Our patience is tied to our decision regarding the appropriate timing in which we will face the ‘Israeli’ aggression and the violations, which may end before 60 days and may continue, dictated by the leadership of the resistance,” continuing that “the leadership of the resistance is the one who decides when to be patient when to initiate and when to respond.” He stressed that when the leadership of the resistance decides what we will do, you will see it directly.”
Regarding the number of Hezbollah fatalities, Qassem said that they (Hezbollah’s enemies) did not know that martyrdom was a demand and that whoever became a martyr had in fact achieved his desire. Qassem tries to boost the morale of Hezbollah’s supporters, saying that the material damage is the test, the important thing is that Hezbollah has not fallen.
Naim Qassem also referred to the Houthis in Yemen, who are stepping up their attacks against Israel, saying, “Saluting Yemen, which is potentially poor, rich in its people, its leadership, its faith and its steadfastness, and confronts the Israelis and the Americans.”
Regarding the presidency election in Lebanon, Qassem said, “We in Hezbollah are interested in choosing the president on the basis that the blocs will elect him with cooperation and understanding in open meetings,” adding that “we are acting based on dedicating unity and internal cooperation to advance our country.”
Civilian Activity – Reconstruction of Lebanon
Sheikh Ali Damoush, a senior Hezbollah official who was chosen to be the head of the Executive Council in place of the eliminated Hashem Safi al-Din, announced the launch of Hezbollah’s “Promise and Commitment” project to rebuild the extensive destruction in southern Lebanon and throughout the country. The reconstruction project is part of the “resistance,” which he said began during the war. Damoush also said that reconstruction is Lebanon’s responsibility and that this project does not absolve the Lebanese government of its responsibility.
Damoush also said that the budget required for the reconstruction project was granted “by the grace of the dear Iranian people, who agreed to support the Lebanese people in their entirety and did not stop supporting the Lebanese people for a moment. Damoush continued his thanks to Imam Khamenei “for his love and interest in Lebanon and for his diligence in supporting our country. We would like to express our gratitude to Iran and its dear people and its commander. Thank you very much to Iraq, to the government, to the people, and to the Hashab al-Shaabi, led by the religious authorities in the holy city of Najaf, and to all the friendly countries that have reached out to Lebanon and want to participate in the reconstruction.”
This week, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Diyar reported that Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati informed the US ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, that the only party offering assistance in rebuilding Lebanon was Iran. Mikati advised Johnson not to obstruct Lebanon’s reconstruction or hinder Iranian aid, as Hezbollah will distribute the money if it does not flow through the Lebanese government.
Lebanon – General:
(January 3) The Lebanese army detained several armed men affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in the area of the al-Mitzna crossing, who reportedly entered Lebanese territory unintentionally. The Lebanese army tightened the conditions for Lebanese passage into Syria at the al-Mitzna crossing following the incident. Following the events, the Lebanese army announced that Syrian gunmen, attempting to open an illegal crossing between Syria and Lebanon with a tractor in the village of Maarboun in the Baalbek area, wounded five soldiers with gunfire. Following the clashes, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati spoke with Syrian leader Ahmed al-Shara trying to calm the situation.
The Syrian Arena:
Syria – a current map of control:
Green – the new administration.
Yellow – Kurds (Syrian Democratic Forces).
Blue – The 1974 buffer zone – Israeli physical military presence.
Flags of the United States/Turkey/Russia – unconcealed physical military presence.
Turkey’s involvement in Syria, managed by President Erdogan, reflects an ambitious set of goals: Eliminating Kurdish influence on Turkey’s border, geopolitical expansion and turning Turkey’s status into that of a regional Muslim leader, establishing alliances and economic influence (with Qatar’s support), a strategic foothold for the future, and removing remnants of Iranian or Russian influence identified with the Assad regime. What are the implications of Turkish involvement and entrenchment in Syria in general and the implications for Israel in particular? Read more in our article. Turkey’s Involvement and Entrenchment in Syria – Goals and Implications
During the week, Western and Arab countries continued their diplomatic visits and met with Al-Julani. The foreign ministers of France and Germany came to visit and meet with Al-Julani.
Another interesting visit was by the Ukrainian foreign minister, who declared that Ukraine would begin supplying wheat to Syria instead of Russia.
This week, the new Syrian foreign minister visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two Arab countries that have declared that they will provide aid for Syria’s reconstruction and are trying to gain a foothold in the rebuilding country.
(December 31) The surrendering of weapons belonging to former Assad regime loyalists in the Aleppo province continues. Al-Julani has set January 5, 2025, as the deadline for handing over weapons to the authorities and consolidating all militias under a state-led security body.
Following the Assad regime’s takeover of Syria, the new administration initiated the establishment of status regularization centers, replicating the customs of the previous regime. During the Assad regime, these centers were primarily intended for those who were obligated to serve in the military and did not want to be considered deserters, but now they are intended for everyone who was part of the Assad regime, including various military units, the police, the civil administration, and members of the judicial system.
Reports from the Syrian media reveal long lines forming in front of the newly established regularization centers, where former Assad regime members come to deposit their weapons, including rifles and pistols.
Although al-Jolani’s efforts are focused on consolidating the stability of his rule and the sovereignty of the new regime, it seems that sectarian and political tensions continue to surface and pose a significant challenge to the regime. This week, it was reported that in the city of Homs, gunfire exchanges are taking place between remnants of Assad regime loyalists and armed groups identified with the new Syrian government. In addition, A convoy of dozens of vehicles with armed men affiliated with the new government and members of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization made its way to the government buildings in As-Suweyda in southern Syria. Members of the local factions denied the convoy entry into the city, citing a lack of coordination. The convoy returned to Damascus; the incident reflects the volatile relations between the Druze and the new government in Syria.
(January 1) As part of the foiling of an attempt to smuggle drugs on the Jordanian Syrian border, the Jordanian authorities killed five drug smugglers on the border. This is the first incident of its kind since the fall of the Assad regime.
(January 1) Ahmad al-Shara (Al-Julani) with a delegation of Christian clerics in Damascus.
(January 3) Reports of airstrikes around al-Safira, east of Aleppo. The targets of the attacks are apparently facilities to produce Scud missiles in the Syrian defense factories. In addition, there were reports of an attack on weapons depots at the Khalkhalah airfield in the A-Suwayda district.
The Shiite Axis – General
Wathiq al-Battat, the leader of the pro-Iranian Jaish al-Mukhtar militia in Iraq, said this week that if Israel attacks Iraq, then “the Iraqi resistance has the ability to drown Israel with spit and urine. If every Iraqi from the resistance spits and urinates on Israel, Israel will drown and disappear.” According to him, the reason they are not “drowning” Israel now is because the Iranians are not interested in it.
It was also reported this week that Yasser Watut, a member of the Iraqi parliament’s security committee, said that the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias had stopped their attacks against Israel because of pressure exerted on them by the Iraqi government and Shiite political elements to distance Iraq from the circle of conflict. Watut clarified that Israel and the United States threatened Iraq because of the actions of Iraqi militias close to Iran and that these threats were the main reason for the cessation of operations. Watut also noted that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was a major factor that led to the decision to stop operations against Israel because the Iraqi factions could no longer carry out operations against Israel from Syrian territory.
Yemen – Houthi-Land:
During the past week (December 30 to January 5), the Houthis carried out five attacks against Israel, using UAVs and ballistic missiles. In addition, the Houthis shot down an American MQ9 UAV. Houthi attacks against Israel usually take place in the early morning and are aimed at central Israel (the Tel Aviv area). As a result, they disrupt the daily lives of more than 4 million Israelis living in the central region of Israel.
During the week, several American attacks were also carried out against Houthi targets in the provinces of Sana’a and Saada, including production and storage sites for missiles and UAVs, a command-and-control facility, radars, and more.
Since October 2023, there have been 321 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States, and other targets.
The Houthi attacks on Israel increased greatly in December 2024, becoming the month with the most attacks against Israel since the beginning of the war. Iranian support for the Houthis, which is strengthening and improving Houthi capabilities, involves several units of the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah. Some of these operatives are active in Yemen regularly. Read more in our article – The Quds Force and Hezbollah Involvement Alongside the Houthis in Yemen
